Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

139. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, April 3, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Implementation of an Effective Strategic Concept for South Vietnam

Herewith, the summary I promised you of recent progress in implementing the strategic concept for South Vietnam in recent months. A systematic counterinsurgency operation has been launched very recently in an effort to eliminate Viet Cong guerrilla-subversive forces and rehabilitate the countryside on an area-by-area basis. The most notable progress, however, has been in the civilian rather than in the military sector. The strategic village concept, for example, has taken hold within both the Vietnam Government (GVN) and the US Mission; this concept is now a matter of national, high-priority policy for the GVN. Also, the GVNʼs Civic Action program has been reoriented and is being revitalized and expanded. Indeed, strategic village and Civic Action concepts now are integrated and vital in the GVNʼs general effort against the Viet Cong.

Specific examples of this progress are noted below.

A. A Systematic Counterinsurgency Plan

1. President Diem approved the implementation of the Delta Pacification Plan on March 19, 1962.² This plan calls for a systematic military-civilian counterinsurgency operation to clear the Viet Cong from the Mekong River delta and re-establish government control on an area-by-area basis by giving protection to the villagers and cutting off Viet Cong access to the villages. (See Embassy Telegram 1191, March 20, 1962, Secret.)³

2. The first part of such a plan has been initiated in the form of “Operation Sunrise.” The operation is confined to Binh Duong province but once its objectives have been achieved, a similar plan (as modified on the basis of experience) will be applied in other delta provinces and ultimately throughout most of the country. (See COMUSMACVMACV 127, March 19, 1962, Secret, and Embassy Telegram Toaid 647, March 13, 1962, Secret.)⁴

3. “Operation Sunrise” consists of three phases. The first phase, initiated a month or two ago, involves essentially the necessary planning. The second phase involves military operations, the relocation of hamlets into compact and fortified strategic villages, and Civic Action activities within these villages (since this phase began on March 22, 1962, it is too early to make an assessment of it). The third phase is the period of consolidation emphasizing stepped-up Civic Action activities. The objectives during this phase are to strengthen security, build a socio-political base at the village level, and tie the villages into the national governmental system and the national fabric. The success of “Operation Sunrise” is overridingly keyed to strategic village and Civic Action concepts, thus reflecting the essentially political nature of the problem in South Vietnam. (See CINCPAC 3010, February 24, 1962, Secret.)

4. The US Mission in Vietnam, when asked by the Vietnam Task Force whether all Saigon agencies concurred in the validity of the Thompson approach to counterinsurgency, replied that the Delta Plan “accords in essence” with counterinsurgency planning as worked out and approved by the Mission. (See Embassy Telegram 1159, March 9, 1962, Secret.)⁵

B. Strategic Hamlets or Villages

1. President Ngo Dinh Diem signed a decree on February 3, 1962, creating a special “Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets” which will coordinate the strategic hamlet or village program on a country-wide basis. (See Embassy Despatch 355, February 27, 1962, Unclassified.)⁶

2. Although precise information is not available, it is estimated that 150-200 strategic hamlets or villages have been established throughout more than half of Vietnamʼs 39 provinces. In one province, Vinh Long, the province chief claimed the completion of 60 strategic hamlets by January 1962. (See Embassy Despatch 334, February 12, 1962, Official Use Only.)

3. The village of Tam An and the hamlet of Tan Phu in Bien Hoa province are examples of the effectiveness of the strategic hamlet or village approach for re-establishing government control in the countryside and promoting self-reliance among the peasantry. (See Embassy Despatch 375, March 16, 1962, Confidential.)

a. The Tam An administration, virtually eliminated by the Viet Cong, was re-constituted in October 1961, following an army sweep of the area. A well-built defense post was constructed on a strategic site, equipped by a radio and defended by small locally recruited Self Defense Corps and Civil Guard units. A new village council was created, gifts of medicine, clothing, and rice were given by the province chief, and no reprisals were taken against villagers who once were suspected of cooperating with the Viet Cong. This village has since remained free of the Viet Cong.

b. Tan Phu had been for years prior to July 1961 under almost complete Viet Cong control. Following a security sweep of the area in November 1961, the province chief began to transform Tan Phu into a typical strategic hamlet (surrounding ditch, barbed-wire embankment, defense post, watch tower, etc.) and defended by a small locally recruited Self Defense Corps unit. The administrative system was strengthened and improved by the addition of vigorous and interested officials. Tan Phu continues to remain free of the Viet Cong.

C. Civic Action

1. On January 19, 1962, the Vietnamese Department of Civic Action was reorganized, creating (i) a central Civic Action Service in Saigon by combining related and heretofore separate services within the Department and (ii) an integrated Civic Action office in each province and district. (See Embassy Despatch 380, March 15, 1962, Confidential.)

2. As of January 24, 1962, a chief and deputy chief for Civic Action reportedly had been appointed in every province in South Vietnam. (See CS-3, 502,549, Saigon, February 27, 1962, Confidential, Noforn, Continued Control.)

3. Civilian Civic Action teams have been operating generally in the Mekong River delta and primarily in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Tuy provinces. (See Embassy Telegram Toaid 647, March 13, 1962; Embassy Telegram 1196, March 20, 1962, Confidential; and COMUSMACVMACV 127, March 19, 1962, Secret.)

a. The teams consist of up to 20 specialists in health, agriculture police, education, information, public administration, public works and communications

b. Recently, the mission of these teams has been increasingly focused on the strategic hamlet or village program.

c. Civilian Civic Action activities are coordinated by the Department of Civic Action, assisted in men and material by the other departments and operationally directed at the local level by the district and provincial administrative authorities.

d. In instances where they are employed in a systematic counterinsurgency operation, as in “Operation Sunrise,” Civic Action teams are temporarily under direct military control but will subsequently revert to district and provincial civilian control.

e. USOM has established a committee to provide on a priority basis direct US assistance (and to coordinate such assistance) to Civic Action operations through the relevant Vietnamese Government agencies.

4. The Vietnamese Defense Department is now planning its own Civic Action program. (See Embassy Telegram 1196, March 20, 1962, Confidential.)

D. Security and Police

1. The importance now attached to the counterinsurgency role of the rural security services is reflected in the US Missionʼs recommendation that the strength of the Self Defense Corps be increased to 80,000 by fiscal year 1963 and that of the Civil Guard to 90,000 by fiscal year 1964. (See Embassy Telegram 1135, March 5, 1962, Secret.)

2. Planning in USOM and in AID is proceeding with respect to the development of a rural police force. USOM has drawn up the guidelines for this force, has asked for 20 rural police advisers, and has recommended that 4.8 million dollars in US aid be allocated to the Vietnam police advisory program for fiscal year 1962. (See Department Telegram 1010, February 21, 1962, Secret; and Embassy Telegram Toaid 579, February 24, 1962, Secret.)

E. Village Communication System

1. Of the 133 village radios shipped to Vietnam to date, 44 have been installed in Gia Dinh province, 48 are to be installed in An Xuyen province during April 6-25, and most of the remainder are to be installed concurrently in Binh Duong province where “Operation Sunrise” is now in progress. Priorities have also been established for four other delta provinces. (See Embassy Telegram Toaid 739, March 27, 1962, Confidential.)

2. The public safety role of village radios was demonstrated on March 20, 1962, when a joint USOM-Vietnamese radio installation team was attacked by Viet Cong guerrillas. The security escort engaged the Viet Cong while the team proceeded to install the village radio and then notified district headquarters and other village radio stations. Assistance was despatched and resulted in an ambush of the Viet Cong as they were fleeing toward another village which had been alerted. (See Embassy Telegram Toaid 716, March 22, 1962, Confidential.)

F. US AID Project Priorities

The US Governmentʼs ability to render non-military assistance to Vietnam on an increasingly effective basis was decidedly strengthened by AIDʼs action in March 1962 establishing priorities, first, second, and third, for projects within its Vietnam program. The categorization of these projects was based on their immediate impact on the “counterinsurgency and short-range security objectives in accordance with current US policy.” (See Department Telegram Aidto 556, March 7, 1962. Official Use Only.)

G. Military Tactics

A military operation in late February or early March of this year reflects the effective utilization of security forces and artillery in counter-guerrilla warfare. A combined Vietnamese Army ranger, Civil Guard, and Self Defense Corps force, supported by an Army artillery unit, engaged a Viet Cong guerrilla company in a pre-planned operation in Kien Hoa province. The Viet Cong initially stood and fought but then broke and attempted to withdraw. At that point, artillery fire was requested on the retreating Viet Cong and inflicted severe casualties. In large measure, this operation succeeded, first, because artillery was not employed at the outset (which would have alerted the Viet Cong and permitted them to escape) and, second, because the use of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps forces (which are essentially defensive forces) in an offensive mission was supported by a participating regular army unit. (See CHMAAG Vietnam Magpo 1441, March 4, 1962, Secret.)

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Countries, Vietnam. Secret; Noforn.
2. Diem actually approved the Delta Plan on March 16; see Document 113.
3. Document 117.
4. Unless otherwise indicated in footnotes, the remaining documents cited in this memorandum are not printed.
5. See footnote 2, Document 101.
6. See Document 46.