304. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
749. Task Force VN. Reference: Deptel 704.2 Following is evaluation short-range coup possibilities prepared by Mission Intelligence Committee:
Rumblings of discontent and expression of need for changes which had increasingly pervaded local political scene given additional fillip by Nhu’s anti-American gambit in Vietnamese press. At present, however, no firm indications pointing to any group (categorized below) actively preparing as dynamic element in overthrow GVN.
Civilian opposition groups, within Viet-Nam and also including those active abroad, can be expected step up their activities to remind any group contemplating coup of their availability for participation in future government. They are not believed have capability acting as dynamic element to overthrow government, and there no indications their plotting or forming firm alliances with more vigorous elements at this time.
Reformist group within government (including such figures as V.P. Tho, Thuan, Tuyen, Chau) can be expected maintain its pressure for greater efficiency, but to do so for time being at least within context of Diem’s continuation in power.
The generals and senior military officers are clearly frustrated by combination of stepped-up enemy capabilities and presidential [Page 708] meddling in military affairs. To carry off coup, however, they would have to establish united front and insure that subordinate commanders would follow their lead. Both would require considerable conspiring of which we have no active indications at this time and would face major dilemma between desire for change and still strong personal prestige and authority of Diem.
Major area of our uncertainty is among field grade officers particularly of elite groups who as unit commanders could force senior officers’ hand by mounting coup similar to November 1960. Our coverage political attitudes and possible plotting these groups is still inadequate but it known that their officer corps purged after November 60 and they particularly aware serious nature VC threat today. (We remaining alert to any information bearing on this subject but believe it would be highly dangerous mount special program of collection these attitudes which might provoke either action on their part or serious GVN reaction.)
Despite this current appraisal, it must be expected that discussions and rumors will continue and may well sharpen in minds of above groups and be translated into more precise plans.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-261. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, and London.↩
- In telegram 704, November 28, the Department of State noted recent reports from Viet-Nam regarding coup rumors and asked the Embassy for its evaluation of the possibility of a coup “at any time you note a set of conditions or reports which are particularly significant.” (Ibid., 751K.00/11-2861)↩