Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

302. Memorandum for the Record by the Public Affairs Officer in the Embassy in Viet-Nam (Anspacher)¹

Saigon, December 1, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Anti-U.S. Press Campaign, November 25-30, 1961

Pending a fuller study of this subject, it is worth noting here the more or less accepted version of how the campaign began, what form it took and the “official” reaction to it expressed by the Director General of Information to the PAO.

During a call on the PAO by Dang Duc Khoi presumably for this purpose,² Khoi explained the source of the press campaign as he had determined it: a fit of temper in the Nhu family arising from reports of NBC correspondent Jim Robinson’s reaction to an interview with Madame Nhu. According to Khoi, Nhu issued direct orders to Tran Van Tho (DGI) to let loose a campaign against the U.S. press. This was reportedly executed without President Diem’s knowledge; it was only after it was brought to his attention by Thuan and Tuyen that Nhu’s role was revealed. Meanwhile, Dr. Tho had issued a directive to the Vietnamese press which went far beyond Nhu’s instructions. Certainly there were references throughout the week’s campaign to American reportage on Vietnam-particularly in the New York Times-but this appeared quite patently a “hook” on which to hang a much broader critique of U.S. policies and practices. Little bits of pieces of information gleaned from statements made here and in Washington about US/Vietnamese “negotiations” were interpreted with a heavy dollop of imagination as a means of leveling charges of “interference” and “conditional aid” against the United States.

Although as many as half a dozen newspapers joined in the fracas in the first few days, they all seemed to run out of steam early in the week beginning Monday, November 27 and their comments became either ridiculous and/or considerably less vitriolic. Part of this may have been due to a conversation between Dr. Tho and the PAO on Monday (which Khoi had accurately predicted almost to the minute during his call).

In a two-hour conversation, Dr. Tho said that he had discussed the Thoi Bao articles with the publisher whom he described as a “sincere man who accepts full responsibility” for the articles which were inspired by “tendentious” reportage and commentary in the American press in recent weeks. These articles have reportedly not only more than doubled the newspapers’ sales but had inspired tracts by persons unknown, saying “Ami Go Home” which the GVN has picked up in Gia Dinh. Dr. Tho reminded us of his stand against freedom of the press and stated that here was proof of the correctness of this stand. If other newspapers continue to follow Thoi Bao’s lead, elements of the population would be inflamed to continued anti-American actions, Tho predicted.

There followed further discussion in which we pointed out that the newspapers here had a right to criticize American reporting from Vietnam, but this should really not be a springboard for a massive condemnation of the American Government and people as “Capitalist-Imperialists.” Dr. Tho then proposed that if the American Government could prevail upon the American press to “report correctly” about Viet-Nam that the GVN, through his office, would be able to “persuade” the Vietnamese press to desist in their present anti-American effort.

We made a thorough explanation of how U.S. press relations are conducted, pointing out the difficulties in preventing speculative stories. Tho noted that the State Department should be asked to call “erroneous reporting” to the attention of U.S. editors. We stated that wherever possible, this was done but that our government was not in a position to dictate what the press should print. I said, further, that because of the nature of the situation, we could not offer alternative true copy, in this case as in others.

One of the questions Tho asked was whether the legal principle “the right of response” was accepted in the U.S. so far as press reporting and commentary are concerned. This was a reference to the requirement by law in many countries that a newspaper most [must] provide equal space and equal prominence to counter-charges or at least to a defense against charges against an individual or a government-completely apart from the laws of libel. Of course, my response was in the negative, although I did point out that in this particular instance as in others, any newspaper which had published information thought to be “damaging” against the GVN, for example, would be happy to respond to an offer from the GVN Ambassador in Washington to grant an interview to the newspaper in which the GVN’s position could be re-stated. However, there is no U.S. Government regulation of the press in America except for the law of libel and certain postal regulations. Dr. Tho smiled benignly at this and echoed his predecessor’s sentiments that eventually the U.S. would realize that complete press freedom without some form of government regulation simply gives free run to irresponsibility and in these times may lead to real danger in the national interests. I smiled benignly, too.

I don’t think we got anywhere, really, except to “recognize” each other’s problems. We could make no promises about the American press of course; we are walking on eggs as it is. However, we left the Director General with the assurances we would do what we could; but we were impressed also with his concern over what he had done in response to Brother Nhu’s directive.

Under the circumstances, the only possible thing we could do in reaction to the press campaign itself is to consider it-apart from its source and the way in which it was conducted-a favorable sign of intellectual muscle-flexing on the part of newspaper editors which fundamentally is encouraging.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 335, Press July-December 1961. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum of December 1 to Nolting, in which Anspacher wrote that the recent press campaign was the first one in his experience that had taken on such proportions.
2. This conversation, which took place on November 27, was described in Anspacher’s memorandum of November 28 to Nolting attached to the source text, but not printed.