300. Editorial Note
On November 30, 1961, Chester Bowles drafted a memorandum to the President reporting on his recent 2-week visit to East and Southeast Asia, which included visits to Japan, Indonesia, and Malaya. As a result of the trip Bowles offered several conclusions regarding Vietnam:
- “1. I believe General Taylor’s estimate of the immediate danger in South Viet-Nam is valid. The government in Saigon is not only weak but confused. In its present form I seriously question whether it can create stability within its own borders regardless of our assistance.
- “2. I assume that CIA and other related agencies have surveyed the possibilities of an alternative Vietnamese leadership; if not, I believe they should do so. Under present circumstances I can see little hope for internal stability except through the emergence of a vigorous new leader such as General Park in South Korea who might rally the indigenous anti-Communist forces behind a more effective military policy and intelligence effort solidly based on long overdue economic, political, and social reforms.
- “3.
In the meantime, I believe we are correct in delivering essential military equipment to the present government as long as it shows some willingness to face up to the need for improved performance.
“However, in my opinion, it would be a serious mistake to send in organized units of U.S. troops which like the French before Dien Bien Phu would almost certainly be bogged down in a frustrating and costly struggle of white outsiders against ‘anti-colonial’ guerillas.
- “4. If the over-all situation in Southeast Asia as a whole absolutely requires direct military action, I believe that our pressure should be directed against the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi. Such pressure could be accompanied by an offer through the U.S.S.R. or India to cooperate in establishing a ‘neutral and independent’ Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos with free elections in Viet-Nam within five to ten years provided the present Communist pressure against Viet-Nam is ended.
- “Although such a development runs counter to our present stance, I believe it would be wholly in our long-range interest. It is no more possible over the long haul for the United States to maintain a military power position on a peninsula of Asia against the growing pressure of Communist China than it would have been for the Spanish to hold a military position in Florida in the face of the developing power of the U.S.A. A neutral belt supported by non-Communist Asians is our one best hope of containing China within her present borders.
- “5. In the meantime I feel the CIA, the Pentagon, and State should be asked to prepare a fall back position to which we could withdraw if the situation in Viet-Nam should collapse before these or other moves become possible.”
In the margin of the first page, Bowles wrote, “Decided to delay and expand.” (Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 297, Folder 0496 Kennedy) The expanded version of this paper is apparently a long memorandum Bowles sent to the President on April 4, 1962. (Ibid.)