299. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
737. Task Force VN. Regret report that Thompson Mission is badly off rails from standpoint US-UK coordination and that Thompson recommendations to GVN, whatever may be their intrinsic merit, are bound to complicate our task of bringing about essential reforms in GVN military and administrative structure. Position may be retrievable (and we are working at it). But as of now British initiative has introduced knotty problem in our discussions with GVN.
Difficulties with Thompson Mission have been procedural and substantive. Procedurally, problem has been that Thompson has submitted his recommendations to President Diem without prior consultation with US and without real effort to ascertain thrust of our plans or programs for counterinsurgency. This has occurred despite what I considered most precise prior understanding with Ambassador Hohler that advance consultation was essential if two pitfalls were to be avoided: (1) That we should present alternative recommendations to Diem between which he could vacillate without acting on either; and (2) That British would present recommendations which we for one reason or another could not or would not support and which would therefore be sterile (given fact that UK not contributing substantially to anti-VC effort beyond Thompson recommendations). Second procedural point fully agreed with Hohler [Page 699] was that Thompson would strictly limit himself to intelligence and civil aspects of counterinsurgency effort.
Although Hohler does not deny that there was clear understanding on above points-and I have had occasion to remind him of them several times recently-fact is that Thompson has disregarded them. Only defense offered is that General Taylor specifically requested Thompson’s views without limitation as to subject matter (I have this only from Hohler)2 and that as Thompson Mission is accredited to Diem he must respond to latter’s requests.
Although British performance is procedurally incorrect, substantively it is far more serious. Thompson has submitted to Diem so-called “outline plan” for clearing delta (Embdes 205, Nov. 20).3 This paper deals with whole range of anti-guerrilla measures, including all aspects of military. It is an admirable paper from standpoint of presentation and as a statement of concepts of anti-guerrilla operations. We can easily agree with ninety per cent of it and have in fact been pressing same or similar concepts on GVN for many months.
Problem arises in unexpected way. We have been pressing Diem to set up a proper military command structure headed by field command and to delegate authority to it. Diem accepted this most reluctantly six months ago, but has never fully carried through on it, and recently there have been several instances of direct orders from palace to ARVN units without field commands knowledge. Thompson proposal for delta provides that control of operations in that area bypass field command (since chain of command would be from NISC to Combined Third Corps HQ) and operational control would thus in effect be exercised by Diem. This point has obviously not escaped President. Thuan has already informed McGarr that Diem has “accepted” Thompson plan and inquired whether MAAG has any comments on it. Diem has also asked Thompson to submit plan for clearing area north of Saigon.
I do not wish to suggest by above that I consider Diem’s reaction to Thompson plan is motivated solely by desire avoid delegation of authority which we have been pressing on him, [Page 700] although this is without doubt a major factor. Another is very likely a reaction to our approach in current negotiations. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are being doctrinaire in our reaction, which I think is not the case. Fundamentally, problem is that we are convinced that unless we can bring Diem to delegate authority we shall never get effective counterinsurgency effort in this country, no matter what sort of paper plans we may have. Thompson proposal, particularly coming at this juncture, strikes a hard blow at this effort.
A second major substantive difficulty with Thompson plan is proposal that clearance of delta provinces have first priority. In MAAG view first priority is area to north of Saigon-which Thompson had not surveyed at time he submitted his delta plan to Diem.
At meeting with Hohler and Thompson November 29, at which McGarr and Trueheart present, I spoke along above lines very frankly and even bluntly, emphasizing that I feared Thompson plan would be distinct handicap in discussions which I am now carrying on with GVN. I also warned them that if, as I expected, Diem raised Thompson plan in these discussions, I would have to tell him that we did not agree with command arrangements proposed.
Hohler and Thompson ostensibly accepted all this with good grace and reiterated their desire to cooperate closely with US and by implication to play role of junior partner in this enterprise. I sense nevertheless that Thompson is thoroughly annoyed.
Another meeting is scheduled for next week at which we plan to go through Thompson Plan in detail with object of identifying points on which US and UK approaches diverge.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-3061. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and CINCPAC for PolAd.↩
- In telegram 717 to Saigon, December 1, Taylor told Nolting that he had informally discussed with Thompson the situation in Viet-Nam and had expressed “interest in Thompson’s views.” Taylor said he had been “greatly surprised” to receive from the British Embassy a copy of Thompson’s October 27 paper, “Appreciation of Vietnam, November 1961 to April 1962” (not printed). Taylor said that if it seemed useful to Nolting, he might mention to the British Ambassador that Taylor thought Thompson had misunderstood his request and suggested it be forgotten. (Ibid., 751K.00/12-161) In a covering memorandum of December 1 to U. Alexis Johnson with the text of this message, Taylor stated that he was “somewhat disturbed” that “Thompson was using me as a kind of screen for his out-of-channel operations in Saigon.” (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 237.↩