Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

208. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)¹

Saigon, November 2, 1961.

SGN 766. As views are expressed on military matters in recent cables as result of visit Taylor group, specifically Saigon Emtels to State 516, 540, 541, 545, 558,² wish to give MAAG comments on certain points of military significance. This is considered desirable as except for conference reported Emtel 541, no MAAG personnel attended subject meetings and as MAAG received info copies only after dispatch referenced cables. However, I was given short preview of the 6 points in Emtel 540³ and commented on two of them. Although MAAG has no concern about reporting of statements by various GVN officials concerned, feel strongly MAAG opinions should have been solicited and included in the comment and resume sections of these cables as they, of necessity, precondition at high level decision and policy making levels. Also, although MAAG positions were restated by my staff and me during General Taylor’s personal question period⁴ as well as in answers to lists of questions submitted by various teams of the Taylor group,⁵ they will be subject to overall evaluation and combination in the final report and may well not completely cover the questions highlighted in reference cables.

As the Washington Task Force on Viet-Nam and the Taylor Fact-Finding Group are well briefed on the situation here, I shall only cover few major points. Most have been questioned over past year and MAAG within its capabilities has taken action. As background MAAG has for the past year predicated its actions on conviction that the insurgency, then in its next to last stage, could only be defeated by the following actions:

A. Development of national plan to counter insurgency.

B. Formation of a viable responsive centrally directed intelligence organization.

C. A coordination and control “Framework” for implementing national plan which has authority and ability to integrate at successive levels down to village and hamlet the political, military, psychological and economic arms of governmental power.

D. A politico-military approach to sealing the porous land and sea borders of South Viet-Nam against VC infiltration, thus eliminating foreign VC “safe havens.”

E. Winning the people back from behind Bamboo Curtain to militant not passive-neutralist support of the government against VC blandishment and terror.

F. Additional manpower (recently approved) to allow “rotational training base” so that elements ARVN could be disengaged from operational commitment and trained on phased basis to improve its dangerously low level of training.

G. Additional trained manpower determined by increasing enemy infiltration and capabilities to improve logistic, intelligence and support elements as well as furnish needed fighting replacements and units.

H. Reorganization and retraining of military establishment to make it more responsive to counterinsurgency operations plus institution single chain of command.

I. Development of single military operations plan under single chain of command to be integrated into overall national plan, when developed by GVN, to counter the insurgency. These requirements were written into country team U.S. counterinsurgency plan⁶ handed to Diem by Ambassador Durbrow last February. Many of military elements of plan have been approved or are in process. The “Province Chief” problem as it affects the chain of command is the major military element not yet resolved in the implementation phase, although some better cooperation has been gained.

MAAG will continue to press for continuing military progress but some months ago the time was reached when GVN must be guided into supporting political, social and economic actions as a matter of urgency if the military contribution can be meaningful and permanent. Reported Taylor-Diem-Thuan talks indicate possibility of break-through in this field similar to that in military field. However, recommended that U.S. not make firm commitments unless conditioned at least in part on GVN performance. In Saigon Emtel to State limited distribution 558 Thuan appears definite on questioning if 3,000 Special Forces was to be in addition to Ranger Border Forces mentioned by Taylor with Thuan’s estimate of GVN capability to organize and deploy 4-5,000 Rangers. If more Ranger Units are to be organized this will further dangerously dilute ARVN leadership and manpower capability and should be critically examined. If currently organized Rangers are to be used this will take over half of units now in being for “Border Ranger Force” which are now assigned elsewhere and will need replacing. Mobility for these Rangers raises problem of command. Close coordination and agreement between GVN commanders and MAAG “can be made to work” only if MAAG commands this transportation. Although I have made written representation Diem, Thuan and Ty, under my “advisory role” I have not in over a year gotten really adequate cooperation on joint operational planning. I feel prior command authority for MAAG is imperative. This same applies, any American Units or individuals which may be assigned here. There are also other military factors such as terrain that need considering in any analysis of this plan and of course current significant operations and MAAG plans need consideration. General Lansdale’s special capabilities would be most acceptable for this “Command” as long as the operation is under MAAG command. I am under the impression that General Taylor was thinking in the direction of placing the entire border force under military command. I feel this should be the case.

In respect to Saigon Emtel State 541, the “Politico-Psychological Point,” mentioning the offensive MAAG will of course continue to press for military action and “a genuine and important victory over the VC” (Saigon Emtel to State 545), by the GVN and RVNAF. I have made it known to Thuan and general officers that there must be no let up in hot war and that offensive spirit is of the essence. MAAG messages to CINCPAC info JCS MAGAR-TD-OP3020 and MAG-AR-OP3041⁷ show offensive spirit continues. This offense is of course, realistically determined. The strength and training of RVNAF which except for better organization and within limits determined by operational commitments, improved counter-guerrilla training, has not yet felt any significant impact combat capability wise from the approval of additional 50,000. Induction and training time must be kept in mind.

In respect to Thuan’s request for American instructors for the Thu Duc Reserve Officers School, this again opens the question of so-called “face to face” training-use of advisors as instructors. I invited Mr. Thuan and the Ambassador to SSNG Mao to inspect MAAG worldwide concept of training indigenous personnel to train their own forces. In my considered opinion this is only way VN armed forces will ever be taught to carry their own load-and am concerned at change from Diem’s previous attitude to “give me the material and I will do the job” to what appears to be “you do it for me.” This war can and will be won only by the Vietnamese themselves; we should consider the danger of “over helping” to the point of dulling their own determination and resolve. The specific officers Thuan mentioned as “not very good” are top graduates of last class who, following the U.S. OCS concept, remain to instruct the new students-and then only in School of Soldier. MAAG senior advisor reports other VN instructors adequately qualified. MAAG advisors assigned can and will do job well and in time.

In conclusion we most hopeful that Joint Survey of situation at Province level will result in timely and significant improvement in all areas bearing on problem. Am confident survey group will find MAAG Detachments in good order and training fully oriented on counter-guerrilla operations. Fully recognize that due advanced state of insurgency, Taylor Group of necessity gave heavy emphasis to military matters here and we naturally glad to have benefit their thinking and assistance. Will continue to press all possible on military side but need help in interlocking political-economic-psychological areas which have highest hopes Joint Survey will provide.

1. Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated for information to General Decker. No time of transmission is given on the source text.
2. Telegrams 516, 541, 545, and 558 are printed as Documents 178, 192, 193, and 199, respectively; regarding telegram 540, see footnote 2, Document 190.
3. The six points under reference here are essentially the same as points A-F under Section 2, Document 190.
4. Not further identified.
5. Apparently a reference to Document 173.
6. Document 1. Durbrow presented Diem an abridged version of the plan on February 13; see Document 11.
7. These messages, dated October 31 (311901Z) and November 1 (011459Z), respectively, reported on recent ARVN operations against the Viet Cong. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center Microfilm, Reel 10605)