Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

180. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 13, 1958, 10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Offshore Island Situation and Secretary’s Visit to Taipei

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Martin, Director, CA

The Secretary opened the conversation by asking what Ambassador Yeh thought about the statement issued yesterday by the Chinese Communist Ministry of National Defense extending the cease-fire for two weeks. Ambassador Yeh said he had expected such an extension. He said the Communists were trying to woo public opinion in Taiwan and in the United States. They were also trying to find out what neutral reaction would be for possible moves in the United Nations. The Secretary observed that the Chinese Communists were using all their influence to try to keep the issue out of the United Nations. They had taken this line with friendly Asian countries. The Secretary then remarked on the unusual language of the Chinese Communist statement. Ambassador Yeh said he did not think it was unusual. In fact it seemed to him somewhat nonchalant, saying they could keep on fighting or not.

The Secretary said he thought their line was rather curious. He noted that the statement invited the GRC forces to entrench themselves on Quemoy. Ambassador Yeh said this was intended by the Communists as an expression of their military superiority. It made no difference to them that the GRC forces were entrenched or not.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that the theme which ran through the Chinese Communist statement was to encourage the Chinese Nationalists to do something which the Communists had been unable to prevent them from doing. The only thing which the Communists insisted upon stopping was United States convoying, which they knew we would stop anyway. The Communists have been unable to stop resupply of Quemoy so they pretend they are glad to have it resupplied.

Ambassador Yeh said he had an important message from President Chiang with reference to the conversation the Ambassador had with the Secretary on Friday.¹ President Chiang would be very happy to have the Secretary visit him on Taipei. The Generalissimo had mentioned this to Secretary McElroy in a conversation which he had just had with the latter in Taipei.²

The Secretary said that we are confronted with a delicate situation. The Communists had apparently concluded that a military solution of the offshore island situation would not be profitable for them. The big danger now was political. The Communists were ready to take the political offensive. More and more countries of the free world wanted to deal with the Chinese Communists because they represented power. People like to deal with power. We are having a difficult time holding our friends back who are attracted to this power.

The Secretary alluded to an instruction he had sent to Ambassador Beam in which he had predicted that the Communists, when they realized that they could not accomplish their objective at the general level of military activity they were employing, would be confronted with a choice of increasing its level or letting the fighting stop.³ It was like the Berlin blockade. Then the Communists were willing to carry on at a certain level of activity but when they found they had to expand this level to obtain their objective, they decided to let it go. The same thing applied at Quemoy Of course the Chinese Communists could start up again there. However, it looked as though they would probably intensify their political warfare both in the area and the rest of the world.

The Secretary said that he and President Chiang should deal with the political situation and not the military. We need to give this situation very careful thought. Yesterday he had given considerable thought to the problem of what to do to meet the Communist political offensive. He didn’t want to go out to Taipei and have it look as though he was putting pressure on the GRC. However, we do think there are too many soldiers on Quemoy; the military feels that there are an excessive number from the military standpoint. The Secretary mentioned a JCS military concept which would reduce forces on the offshore islands without implying retreat or abandonment.

The Secretary stressed that it is necessary to clarify the role of the GRC. We must keep alive the idea of a Free China close to the Chinese Communist mainland which would play an important role if the mainland became the scene of unrest. The GRC should be able to make decisive moves if there were uprisings on the mainland against the Communist regime. The forces on Quemoy were no good whatsoever for this purpose. They were hemmed in by strong Communist fortifications. They would be immobilized. The important question is how to preserve the GRC’s international status. How can we do this without running the risk of arousing anti-American feelings in Taiwan especially in the light of current Communist appeals for Chinese unity against the United States.

Ambassador Yeh said that such appeals would have no effect on the people of Taiwan or on their attitude toward the people and Government of the United States. This kind of Communist appeal had been going on for years—there was nothing new in it. It contained the typical language of the Communists—ridicule and sarcasm.

Mr. Robertson felt that the Peng statement was very important because it made clear what the problem is, i.e. that the Communists want to get us out of Taiwan. We will get more support from our people when they see what the problem is. Mr. Robertson expressed his conviction that the grass roots opinion of the United States is overwhelmingly against the Peiping regime, but public opinion has been confused about the nature of the problem of the offshore islands.

The Secretary said the Communists represent power—the power of control over 650,000,000 Chinese. There is a great attraction to power. It makes no difference whether that power is good or evil. Mr. Robertson said he thought this was an accurate statement so far as appraisal of the feeling of other countries was concerned. He had been thinking of our own public opinion.

The Secretary said what he wanted to discuss with President Chiang was how we could combat the trend against our policy. We could not hold countries like Canada, Belgium and France indefinitely. Once one or two of them switched there would be an avalanche. We must face this problem squarely. We must cooperate and help each other to meet it.

Ambassador Yeh referred to the Khrushchev statement and the Soviet support for the Chinese Communists. The Secretary said that the latest Khrushchev statement (in response to a TASS question)⁴ seemed to back down from the position which Khrushchev had taken in his last letter to President Eisenhower.⁵ In that letter he seemed to say that the Soviets would help the Chinese Communists oust us from the west Pacific. In the TASS statement he said only that he would aid the Chinese Communists if the United States attacked them. This seemed to be somewhat of a retreat in the Soviet position.

Ambassador Yeh reverted to the question of the Secretary’s trip to Taipei saying that it would be a good thing to have all these problems talked out between the Secretary and President Chiang. He said that it was the Generalissimo’s idea that after the discussions there would be a simple joint communiqué issued stating that the two had reached agreement on policy. There should be no appearance that the United States was putting pressure on the GRC for reducing troops or eliminating provocations. Ambassador Yeh pointed out that the ratio of GRC and Communist troops was 1 to 4. If the GRC reduced its troops very much it would reach the point where it couldn’t hold Quemoy. The United States would then have to put in that much more assistance if the islands were attacked. If the GRC had more troops on the island, it would be easier for the United States and they could confine its activities to convoying. He hoped that during the coming two weeks there would be no further talk about reducing or withdrawing GRC forces. Such talk would be a blow to morale on Taiwan.

Mr. Robertson said that he thought we could get mileage out of the troop reduction if we played it right. The Communists don’t care whether the Nationalists have 100,000 troops or 70,000 troops on the island. They are not interested in the islands per se. However, it might help us with world opinion to effect a reduction of force there as it is widely believed that the troops were deployed to the islands for offensive action against the mainland rather than for defense of the islands. The Secretary said he agreed it would be helpful in rallying free world opinion. The Secretary departed at this point.

Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese Communist statement was the most helpful statement to come our way. He thought Ambassador Yeh hadn’t read the statement. Ambassador Yeh said he had not read the English text. Mr. Robertson said that the statement showed that reducing the number of troops on the offshore islands would not really help. The Communists would not be satisfied with just the offshore islands. Mr. Robertson read the whole statement to Ambassador Yeh. He pointed out that in the passages referring to the GRC entrenchment on Quemoy the Communists were simply making a virtue of necessity. He thought the statement was directed primarily at morale on Taiwan. From our standpoint it would be hard to write a better statement because it showed up the Communists’ real objectives.

Yeh said that his reaction to this statement was that the one element in it which expressed the Communist attitude was the sentence saying that the United States must stop convoying. The rest of the statement he thought was sheer ballyhoo. He pointed out that the Communists know the United States has a treaty with the GRC which covers the defense of Taiwan and Penghu. They know the United States would not get out of this territory. The passage about wanting the United States to get out was just old stuff. The reference to entrenchment was simply put in to support the theme of Americans getting out and was designed to demonstrate Communist superiority. Mr. Robertson repeated that this passage was simply making a virtue out of necessity since the Communists had not been able to prevent the resupply effort.

Ambassador Yeh said we had won the first round by being firm. We have the job of taking the fullest advantage of this internationally. In Taiwan they have the job of getting ready for renewal of military action or for prolonged political propaganda.

Mr. Robertson said that the Communists were trying to get the GRC into direct negotiations. Ambassador Yeh replied that the GRC would never negotiate with the Communists. Mr. Robertson said the Chinese Communists might have to go back to firing but there would be no mileage in that so far as world opinion was concerned. Ambassador Yeh thought that this might cause many countries to bring pressure on the United States because they were afraid of war.

Mr. Robertson said there was no pressure in the United States to withdraw support from the GRC. People simply did not want to go to war over the offshore islands. They have been “brain washed by their own wishful thinking” into the belief that all the Communists wanted was the offshore islands and the matter could be settled if you gave them to the Communists. What the Communists want is to get rid of Taiwan and the GRC. Mr. Robertson noted that the Communists’ statement says that they will recover the offshore islands and Taiwan and Penghu as a whole.

Mr. Robertson said we did not want to see a reduction of forces on the off shore islands as a concession to the Communists but as a means of strengthening our own strategic position. There might be some quid pro quo such as increase of firepower for the remaining troops.

Ambassador Yeh said the Communists know that the United States has a treaty with the GRC and it won’t pull out of Taiwan and the Penghus. The Communists also know that United States public opinion (even including the Washington Post and the ADA) believes the United States must draw the line against Communist aggression. The trouble is that they don’t want to draw the line on the offshore islands. The Communists’ real intention at this stage is to get the offshore islands. They know that the neutralist countries will say that it is absurd to put pressure on the United States to pull out of Taiwan. The purpose of the Chinese Communists is to get the neutralists to pressure us into getting out of the offshore islands, not out of Taiwan. The statement is a typical Communist tactic of “putting on a great big hat” to hide their real objective. Despite the statement, therefore, the real aim of the Communist is still the offshore islands. Ambassador Yeh said that balanced opinion in the United States felt that the offshore islands should not be used for provocative actions. He recalled that President Chiang pledged he would not use the islands to attack the mainland.⁶ Mr. Robertson recalled that the Generalissimo had stated this publicly. Ambassador Yeh said his position had been taken by President Chiang in order to ease the United States Government’s position at the time of Congressional elections. We could use this pledge on the part of the GRC in discussions with Senator Green and other members of Congress.

Ambassador Yeh said that the Chinese Communist military buildup on the mainland opposite the offshore islands had made necessary the buildup of the GRC forces. It would be a political mistake to talk about GRC reduction of force unless in terms of reciprocal Communist reduction. There had been too much talk about reducing GRC forces on the offshore islands.

Mr. Robertson said it was very important from the United States point of view not just to think about the offshore islands. There was no public support at all for the GRC on the offshore islands. He didn’t agree with Ambassador Yeh as to the significance of the Communist statement. The Chinese Communists wanted the offshore islands as the first step but this was not their objective. Of course, if they could get the offshore islands so much the better for them; it would help break down morale on Taiwan. We must convince people that this is only the first step, that their objective is Taiwan. Mr. Robertson cited an article by William Henry Chamberlain in the October 6 issue of “Human Events” which he thought was the clearest statement of the situation which we face that he had seen from any columnist.

Reverting to the Secretary’s visit, Ambassador Yeh said that he and President Chiang would leave the date of the Secretary’s visit up to him. The Generalissimo thought that the military problem was now pretty well taken care of and the field of discussion between them should be narrowed down to political problems. Mr. Robertson agreed; this was what the Secretary wanted to do. They should discuss how to deal with the political offensive of the Communists. Mr. Robertson affirmed that we did not want the discussions to be interpreted as a weakening of our position. Ambassador Yeh said in light of the recent Peng statement it was important that the United States and the GRC maintain the same line.

Ambassador Yeh said that the Generalissimo had mentioned the invitation to Secretary McElroy because he wanted to emphasize that it had been extended on his own initiative. The actual invitation would be conveyed to the Secretary through Ambassador Yeh. Mr. Robertson said that was the way we wanted it—that the initiative should come from President Chiang.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1358. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. October 10; see Document 172.
2. On October 13; see Document 178.
3. Reference is apparently to Document 152.
4. See footnote 4, Document 173.
5. Document 74.
6. Reference is apparently to a statement made by Chiang at a press conference on September 29. Telegram 508 from Taipei, September 30, reported that Chiang had “affirmed GRC holding Kinmen and Matsu for defensive, not offensive, reasons.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–3058; see Supplement)