Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland⁰

Washington, October 3, 1958, 12:53 p.m.

372. Beam–Wang Talks. Your 503, paragraph 4,¹ repeated information Taipei 23. Following reflects our basic conception:

(1) We believe that developments within next two or three weeks will demonstrate that Chinese Communists will be unable to take Quemoy by starving out garrison through interdiction fire from shore batteries and harassment of small naval craft.

(2) If and as Chicoms realize foregoing, then they will be faced by alternative of either changing character of war, as by using bombers against Quemoy, or allowing hostilities to subside into some form of de facto or formalized cease-fire. Probably latter is more likely.

(3) Fact that Chicoms have not yet used all their capabilities, notably air power, to take islands or attempted an amphibious assault indicates they are hesitant about taking action which would be apt to involve US in a fighting role. This would probably be case if they used bombers because then Chinats from Formosa would surely attack Chicom airfields on mainland and Chicoms would probably feel it necessary retaliate against Formosa airfields. This would be direct attack on Formosa which would involve US.

(4) We are desirous of keeping Warsaw talks going, at least through this period, as their existence may provide some sort of cover or excuse for Chicoms not raising level of their offensive operations.

(5) If they do raise level of operations, then we should want very rapidly and before US response went beyond conventional weapons to seek cease-fire call from UN and perhaps have some intermediary called in. Our Warsaw record would then be made public. We are giving much thought to how this operation could best be conducted if it became necessary.

(6) The Secretary’s last press conference² had result, if not purpose, of giving an impression of flexibility which would enable us to get increased support at UN should this be necessary. It was in essence along lines of statements you have been authorized to make. It may have suggested to Chicoms that if fighting died down they could expect de facto cessation of harassments from offshore islands and probably considerable troop reductions.³

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles, cleared with CA and S/S, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to Taipei. Dulles dictated the message on October 2; a copy of his draft is attached to a memorandum of that date from Greene to Robertson. (Ibid., FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Ambassadorial Discussions with the Chinese Communists; see Supplement)
1. Beam commented on the talks in telegram 503, October 1. In paragraph 4, he requested guidance on the Department’s mid-term or long-term strategy for the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158; see Supplement)
2. Of September 30; see Document 143.
3. In an October 2 letter to Senator Theodore Francis Green, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, President Eisenhower stated: “I am striving to the best of my ability to avoid hostilities; to achieve a cease-fire, and a reasonable adjustment of the situation.” For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1170–1172. Green’s September 29 letter, to which Eisenhower was replying, and Dulles’ draft of the reply are filed with a memorandum by Dulles of an October 2 meeting with Eisenhower in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. For text of Green’s letter, see Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1958, pp. 606–607.