Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland⁰

Washington, September 28, 1958, 10:49 p.m.

351. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for next meeting:

It is important that U.S. posture at Warsaw talks continue to be one of seeking peaceful settlement current hostilities in Taiwan Straits, and our emphasis in talks should continue be on constructive efforts this end. However opportunities should be taken expose Chinese Communist record of aggression and fact its present attack on offshore islands is simply new phase of long-established policy of resort to force. In next meeting therefore you should begin with hard-hitting attack on Chinese Communists’ record. Point out that civilized nations of world cannot tolerate resort to war to enforce claims against disputed territories; e.g. Goa, Kashmir, Antarctica, West New Guinea, or to bring about unification of divided countries; e.g. Germany, Korea, Viet-Nam. If in these cases, parties involved were to resort to force in pursuance their conflicting objectives, each with possible outside backing, there would be an end to peace and security of all nations and all peoples everywhere. U.S. has found it necessary in past and will not hesitate now or in future to defend principle that claims of nations be adjusted by peaceful means.

When Chinese Communist Prime Minister agreed to resumption these talks, there was great relief felt in world because it seemed as though Chinese Communists were accepting principle of settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiation in accordance with practice of peace-loving and civilized nations. World has been profoundly disappointed that Chinese Communists have continued their attacks, and flatly rejected U.S. proposals for a ceasefire. Moreover, Chinese Communists have failed to make any sincere attempt to negotiate but have instead insisted on our side’s 100 per cent compliance their demands while totally rejecting U.S. proposals. This is not negotiation.

In last meeting Wang posed series six questions designed as springboard for spurious attack on U.S. However, questions in which world is really interested are: 1) Will shooting in Taiwan Straits area be stopped immediately? and 2) Will steps be taken avert likelihood of recurrence such hostilities? World demands affirmative answer both questions.

In this light U.S. has drawn up following revised agreed announcement (Deptel 352)¹ to which trust Wang’s side will give its prompt agreement.

Re your 480.² If Wang calls for higher level conference, you should not categorically reject it but ask him what such conference could accomplish that you and he could not. Point out failure so far reach agreement wholly due unwillingness his side either make serious proposal or give serious consideration U.S. proposal which embodies honest effort make first step toward equitable resolution differences between two sides. U.S. believes all that needed is serious purpose negotiate settlement without use or threat of force. Failing this, higher level conference would only be cruel deception of world hoping for peaceful settlement.

FYI. An important purpose our revised agreed announcement is to express fact that current dispute in Taiwan Straits area is an international dispute rather than purely domestic affair as alleged by Communists. For this reason first three paragraphs of statement by each Ambassador recites facts as to dispute which exists in the area among the named countries. Quotations in paragraph 2 re Soviet position taken from rejected Khrushchev letter to President Eisenhower,³ on which in your discretion you may wish elaborate.

Note that Communist undertaking to suspend hostilities is contingent on concurrent reciprocal suspension hostilities by other side. This eliminates need for U.S. giving such undertaking specifically and gets around difficulty of U.S. “seeking that” GRC take such action. End FYI.

For Taipei: Copy our revised agreed announcement given Ambassador Yeh who has also been informed substance above instructions.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared in substance by Dulles, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.
1. Document 139.
2. In telegram 480 from Warsaw, September 27, Beam made recommendations for the next meeting and requested contingency guidance in case Wang called for a higher-level conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2758; see Supplement)
3. See Document 110.