Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, April 15, 1958, 7 p.m.

3729. For Assistant Secretary Robertson from Jones. Embtels 3565¹ and 3680.² It seems to me time may have arrived to make some positive gesture of support toward Indonesian military if we are to preserve pro-American anti-Communist loyalties among top officer group here.

Two apparently conflicting developments are to be observed here:

(1) Recent gestures toward US by government leaders, top army officers and Sukarno which make it apparent Indonesians opening door to new rapprochement with US;

(2) increasing conviction on part GOI military that US is actually aiding rebels.

Both of these developments have been clearly established in opinion all elements Embassy.

It is self-evident that with regard to second point growing conviction of US support to rebels, whether or not actual proof is available, may cause loss of long and carefully nourished relations with Indonesian Army. It is unanimous view Embassy staff that pro-American officers still hold balance of power in army but this could be upset by development such conviction.

I should like therefore to pursue thought included in my recommendations sent you separately April 6³ but based upon analysis situation Embassy reference telegrams. As I see it, army is becoming more and more likely determine future course followed by Indonesia. It is gathering more and more power and authority unto itself in both political and economic spheres. If army remains anti-Communist I believe it can be induced to take positive action to prevent Communist takeover by political means or otherwise. In any event, if new anti-Communist government is formed, it must depend upon army for support and implementation its policy. If such government is not formed, then we may find army is sole remaining major asset in preventing Communist take-over Java.

Army does not regard struggle with rebels as battle between Communists and anti-Communists and neither do most influential Indonesians here so consider it. See for example Hatta’s comments in Embtel 3312.⁴ To army issue is simple one of discipline since Nasution and American-trained officers with whom he has surrounded himself are all regarded as strongly anti-Communist.

With or without a political settlement which includes rebel demands we favor, Indonesian Army foreseeable future will remain major power factor which we must continue to influence in our direction. While gesture may not completely counteract (2) above, absence of support is certain to be taken as substantiation their suspicion and evidence complete lack of sympathy.

If we want to save Java it appears impossible to base policy solely on Padang even if Padang can win real military victory. I have always thought of Padang—and I think you agree—as a tactic, as a means of bringing leverage on situation in Java to force new political direction on central government. I think Padang as a tactic has already succeeded to this extent: precipitation of issues has resulted in increased awareness of them here.

I recognize arguments on other side. Briefly summarized, they are: (1) effect on rebel morale of any US gesture toward GOI military; (2) interpretation of move as support for Sukarno and present government; (3) confirming Sukarno in policy playing off US against Communist bloc and obtaining aid from both; (4) removing in Sukarno’s mind necessity for reaching agreement with Hatta and reorganization of government.

I shall deal with each of these briefly:

(1) I believe this can be overcome by conditions which might be attached to announcement of forthcoming aid.

(2) Unless rebels achieve clearcut victory, Sukarno will emerge with increased prestige anyway, and must be recognized as potent factor for foreseeable future. Our objective must be to hem him in which will be difficult if not impossible with army against us, since army may be only strong counterweight to Communists.

(3) This is fact of life being practiced by Burma, India and other neutrals. But seems clear army wants help from US not Soviets and there seems possibility of backtrack on bloc equipment if we step in fast.

(4) Believe this decision will in any event be based upon other considerations and not upon US aid or lack of it. However, extension of military aid will put us in better position to bring pressure on Sukarno through army and other channels to obtain reorganization of government. Finally, I think arguments in favor of doing nothing here may be outweighed by possibility irretrievable damage our position in current situation.

If Department concurs with this analysis, Secretary may wish consider making early announcement of US willingness extend military aid to GOI under condition delivery will follow settlement current struggle.

In implementing such course of action following possible steps are suggested:

1. Secretary might say something along following lines in press conference: Reiteration of earlier statement that as matter of general policy US does not supply arms to contending forces within any friendly country which may exacerbate internal conflicts, but at same time US recognizes need of every government to maintain order. Therefore US Government has decided to honor longstanding request of Indonesian Government for military equipment. At same time, consistent with our overall policy, these arms will be delivered after resolution of present military dispute in Indonesia.

2. Almost simultaneously Pentagon announce invitation to General Nasution, his wife, aide and two officers to come to US at his convenience as guest of General Taylor.

3. Indicate through Attaché channels:

(A) That we are looking forward to two officers accepting appointments to the Command and Staff School at Leavenworth.

(B) After visit of General Nasution, we would be happy to receive six or seven officers to spend a month or two looking over the military equipment required.

(C) We would be glad to offer training for officers and noncoms in handling equipment.

(D) Inform Army that parachutes on order will be covered by revocation of suspension export license as soon as military hostilities cease.

4. Agree immediately to switch of cotton for rice in accordance with conditions departure from current thinking in Washington. However, I feel altered situation justifies careful scrutiny possible complementary courses of action.⁵

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–1558. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Document 52.
2. See footnote 1, Document 52.
3. Not further identified. This telegram was probably not sent through normal Department of State communications channels.
4. Document 46
5. Telegram 3754 from Djakarta, April 16, from Jones for Robertson, reads as follows: “Australian Ambassador invited me to luncheon today with British Ambassador and we discussed general situation. I took occasion to outline very generally some of thinking contained in Embassy telegram 3729. Both my colleagues agreed time was ripe for some gesture support Indonesian military. British Ambassador said he had thought for some time something of this kind should be done.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–1658)