52. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
3565. For Assistant Secretary Robertson from Ambassador Jones. Following observations may be useful in consideration Indo situation.
Main power factories in current situation are Sukarno, Communists, insurgents, and army. Hatta may ultimately prove to be key to settlement with outer islands but as result role he has chosen to play, he can exert very little leverage at present. Men like Djuanda, who represent middle ground and who conceivably might rally enough support from various non-Communist sources to accomplish something, seem unable to employ their strength for decisive political action.
Where Sukarno stands at present not clear. His position unquestionably bolstered by central government military successes in Sumatra. [Page 93] At same time Sukarno has left door open for compromise settlement and most people who see him regularly claim that he is deeply worried about difficulty rebuilding national unity. Sukarno’s tolerance of communism now generally recognized as one of main causes for insurrection and he is under considerable psychological pressure to break with left wingers. As this would represent almost 180 degree turn for Sukarno it probably unreasonable to expect him make change himself. However most Indonesians agree Sukarno capable of turning against Communists if necessary to preserve his own position. While still major power factor, Sukarno may be more passive than active at present stage because he is center of pressures from Communists and anti-Communists.
As for Communists, while events of past few years seem to have moved steadily in their favor, with non-Communists fighting each other and with great expansion of economic relations with Soviet bloc, nevertheless there are straws in the wind indicating that army is on verge of adopting position hostile to Communist interests. Aidit’s April 1 report to PKI central committee seems clearly aware of this possibility. Much of the PKI growth in recent years might be swept a way if Indonesian political system changed from parliamentary form to military dictatorship which could dispense with elections and deal resolutely with economic development. This is perhaps less likely than increased utilization military within present framework in implementation government decisions. Although PKI probably has succeeded in building small armed force of its own and has infiltrated to small extent regular army, it apparently has nothing like capability for seizing power. Moreover, it is prevented from resorting to violent tactics by fear of offering opportunity which anti-Communist army officers have been vainly seeking for years to suppress PKI by force.
Rebels are losing ground fast militarily. Pakanbaru was serious blow and expectations they would take advantage mountainous terrain resist central forces advances across Sumatra have not been realized. It now appears they may not defend Padang, and from reports of progress made by GOI troops over land toward Bukittinggi, it begins to look as though rebels will not even attempt defend that city (their capital). This leaves guerrilla warfare as their only resort. Hussein might keep up harassment DI style for many years, but prospect of developing alternative government by military and economic pressure on Djakarta seems almost to have faded out. Although main center rebel military strength in Menado area has not yet been tackled, insurgent movement has not proved successful enough to attract open support from other dissident outer island areas and appears to have lost its momentum.
Of four power factors army headquarters seems to have come out ahead. Its successes in Sumatra have raised its prestige and it generally [Page 94] is conceded to be final authority in economic and civil matters. Success of army is something of personal triumph for Nasution who strongest and most consistent advocate of military action against insurgents. Nasution’s current measures aimed against PKI, which Embassy has reported, which have been placed in motion at very moment of central government successes in Sumatra, tend to bear out evaluation of Nasution as basically anti-Communist. As Department aware, Nasution is one of very few prominent Indonesians who in earlier years publicly on record in favor alignment with US.
Consideration of above factors leads me to conclusion that army is emerging as most reliable machinery available for anti-Communist action at present and heightened prestige over Sumatran successes may be expected increase its confidence in ability to handle Communist action of any kind, whether violent or subversive. Latter, of course, is great danger here and army has not yet demonstrated its capability this front.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–658. Secret; Niact. Transmitted in two sections.↩
- In telegram 3680 from Djakarta, April 12, the Embassy reported further on the role of the Indonesian Army and especially that of Army Chief of Staff Nasution. “Embassy reporting past ten days suggests shift in political position army headquarters may be developing,” the telegram reads in part. “Owing extensive intrigue prevalent Djakarta at present it has been unusually difficult pinpoint origin of shift or determine its magnitude. However Nasution appears to be main figure this development. Unless military trend in Sumatra sharply reversed it seems likely Nasution’s importance will continue grow.” (Ibid., 756D.00/4–1258) See Supplement.↩