Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

520. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, May 28, 1959—1 p.m.

2991. Deptel 2331, repeated information Hong Kong 1782.² Numbering corresponds numbered paragraphs referenced telegram.

1. British chargé Adams reports reaction Hong Kong Government, Foreign Office and Embassy Peiping to Pridi approach as follows: Hong Kong [2½ lines of source text not declassified]; Foreign Office [2 line of source text not declassified]; Peiping defers to others’ views. Steps have been taken inform Pridi of substance of foregoing. Re Pridi “refusal” at time Dien Bien Phu, Adams gives Pridi family as source of story which, he says, lacks confirmation any other source. Furthermore, precisely what Pridi “refused” at that time not clear to Adams, except that ChiComs allegedly displeased with Pridi ever since.³

(Re FYI portion paragraph 1. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] Adams has given straight-forward account his attitude toward Pridi and likelihood his return Thailand and since Adams served Thailand at time Pridi flight, knew Pridi well and keenly interested in “Pridi story” which he follows closely, believe his views given considerable weight both in British Embassy here and in Foreign Office. Adams believes Pridi has aged considerably, disillusioned with Communist China and wishes return home. Terming case “classical tragedy” Adams said Pridi man of great personal magnetism and only Thai who ever had constructive program for Thailand. Moreover, he aided “us” greatly during World War II. Should Pridi return, many of former associates would rally around him and he would again have considerable political influence. Forthright anti-Communist stand present Thai Government, however, makes his chances return slimmer than ever. Furthermore, while ChiComs would naturally expect quid pro quo in letting Pridi leave, Pridi probably capable outsmarting himself, foregoing resume and from statement UK Government not prepared grant Pridi asylum “at this time“, can be surmised British harbor somewhat nostalgic memories Pridi and subscribe view he not under Communist influence but believe time not ripe to consider steps leading to his ultimate return Thailand. Does not appear, however, British inclined underestimate Pridi influence here, though they obviously differ from us in evaluating damage his return might do Western interests.)

2. In several conversations with UK Embassy this subject, we have not gained impression British curious about our attitude. Would appear, on balance, British would not be sorry see Pridi return and should he do so, might hope through him exert greater influence over Thai Government than at present. Since British have decided for time being against encouraging Pridi leave Communist China, no need now attempt influence their attitude.

3(B).⁴ Concur. However, as reported [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] many of Sarit’s close followers continue press for Pridi’s return and some possibility exists Sarit might yield to these pressures for one reason or other.

C. Concur.⁵

D. Concur.⁶

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/5–2859. Secret; Noforn; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Hong Kong.
2. Telegram 2331, April 20, commented on a previous Embassy report in telegram 2469 from Bangkok, March 31, to the effect that word had been received of Pridi Phanomyong’s alleged desire to leave the People’s Republic of China. (Both ibid., 792.00/3–3159)
3. Telegram 2469 noted Pridi’s alleged refusal at the time of Dien Bien Phu to lead a movement into Thailand for fear of precipitating fighting among the Thai.
4. This section of telegram 2331 reads: “Doubt [Thai] regime would permit Pridi’s return under present circumstances, but cannot discount possibility his return in event Sarit should leave scene.”
5. In this section, the Department expressed the belief that the Chinese would not permit Pridi’s departure unless they felt it would be in their interests.
6. In this section, the Department offered the view that since Pridi’s departure from China could not be prevented once the Chinese gave permission, his accommodation in a British possession might be the “least undesirable” of the various possibilities.