Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

434. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, February 18, 1959—11 a.m.

2530. During course of conversation yesterday with Serrano on another subject I referred to his mention of “attitude” of U.S. during recent Quemoy-Matsu crisis in speech Feb 6 at University of Manila (Embtel 2389)² and asked if he could explain what he had meant by the word. This opened up half-hour discourse on subject of consultation and use of bases. Serrano said that as Quemoy-Matsu crisis developed it became apparent from U.S. statements and actions that decision had been made to defend Quemoy and Matsu in spite of opinion of many of our allies (which he shared) that military value of these islands did not justify risk of world war. If any serious trouble had started Phils would inevitably have been involved particularly since our bases were being used for supply and deployment. His govt thus felt that they should have been kept informed and consulted during this crisis and in any future ones. Serrano referred to an urgent telephone call from Amb Romulo late in Aug 1958 warning him that certain decisions had been taken in Washington which might cause war with ChiComs to start in 48 hours. While through Amb Bohlen it was learned that this info was not correct³ Serrano felt that both Amb Romulo and himself should have been kept informed of our intentions and plans so that such a rumor could not have gained credence. Serrano referred again and again to tremendous danger faced by Phil nation in case of outbreak of war and consequent responsibilities of Phil administration toward its people.

As another example of lack of consultation he referred to Indo developments where Phil authorities had cooperated closely and enthusiastically with U.S. and then had at certain stage realized that there had been change of U.S. policy of which they had not been forewarned. Repercussions of this were still plaguing their relations with Indonesia.

Comment: Serrano’s lengthy discussion further indication that Phils consider consultation and use of bases issue a key one in bases talks and that their position may have hardened since this was touched on in previous Bohlen-Serrano talks.

Abbott

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/2–1859. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 611.96/2–759)
3. In telegram 2135 to Manila, February 18, Bohlen commented as follows: “Serrano is not being accurate in regard to Quemoy and Matsu crisis. Not only was I able to obtain answer to his question which he referred to but also had extended discussion with President [Garcia] himself prior to Philippines NSC meeting as well as current information on situation we regularly supplied Foreign Office.” (Ibid., 711.56396/2–1859)