Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

433. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 4, 1959, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, February 4, 1959, 11 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 27 persons present, including General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Robert Murphy; Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen; Walter S. Robertson; and Gerard C. Smith.]

1. The Philippines

The meeting was called at the request of the Joint Chiefs to discuss certain problems in the Philippines and to take advantage of the presence of Ambassador Bohlen.²

Ambassador Bohlen started the meeting by describing Foreign Secretary Serrano’s assumptions on the question of consultation with the Philippine Government on use of U.S. military bases. Serrano had indicated to him privately (and had apparently also discussed the matter with a Philippine Congressional committee) that he assumed our bases would not be used without consultation with the GOP in situations where the U.S. was fulfilling its own unilateral obligations (this would not apply in situations where there was a joint US-Philippine obligation as, for example, under the SEATO Treaty or the bilateral agreement). Mr. Bohlen felt that the word “use” did not refer to logistic support of U.S. military actions in other areas, but rather to active military use of the bases—specifically, to strikes mounted from Clark Field or combatant use of Subie Bay. He said that he would have to discuss the matter in the near future with the Philippine Government and wished U.S. governmental agreement on instructions which he could take back. He added that he felt the Philippine Government has a solid argument which cannot be minimized or ignored. He inquired and got agreement from the JCS that our present plans do not presuppose prior consultation with the Philippines.

There followed general discussion of the question of consultation involving use of U.S. bases in other countries. Mr. Murphy cited the UK as the prime example where prior consultation is agreed, as well as with France. He pointed out that the Japanese are demanding and will undoubtedly get a comparable arrangement. In Morocco he felt sure that such agreement will be a sine qua non in any base negotiations.

General White stated that the Air Force in dire emergencies would be required to utilize U.S. bases whether or not there was consultation. There was general concurrence that this as a practical matter was the case for general war, but Mr. Bohlen pointed out that this was not the issue in the Philippines. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Admiral Dennison³ wondered if consultation could be carried out through the Mutual Defense Board. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that the Mutual Defense Treaty has no reference to the subject of consultation and he did not believe the Treaty should be amended to add this feature. Mr. Bohlen did feel, however, that a solution involving consultation within the Board might be worth exploring. There was a necessity, he thought, for a confidential exchange in writing with the Philippine Government, perhaps an exchange of notes to the effect that we would consult the GOP in the event of a proposed active use of the bases in the Philippines in those cases where the U.S. was fulfilling obligations to which the Philippine Government was not a party. There ensued a discussion about arrangements which might be worked out to effect consultation in the course of which Mr. Bohlen commented that the Philippine military could not be counted on as in the past to support solidly a position the U.S. might take. Mr. Smith proposed that the U.S. agreement to commit itself to consultation might be handled verbally by Ambassador Bohlen in his talks with Serrano, but the Ambassador felt that this oral commitment would not be adequate in view of the separation of powers concept of the Philippine Government system, which would require Congressional, in addition to Executive, approval.

The Ambassador then referred to the current sensitivities of the Filipinos on matters involving the U.S. One aspect of this is manifested in their concern that a former enemy (Japan) might get better treatment from the U.S. than the GOP. Mr. Robertson reiterated in this connection that there was not the slightest chance of getting a revised security treaty with Japan without agreement on consultation. He added that he expected the agreement also to be confined in area to the islands of Japan.

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

The next subject was that of criminal jurisdiction. The Ambassador indicated that numerous meetings on this subject had produced no results. He had been operating under rigid instructions and was not aware of the NSC decision⁴ on which his instructions were based until his return to the U.S. for consultation. He felt that the present unique agreement with the GOP (entered into in 1947) probably accomplished as much as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and that the new arrangements proposed by the GOP would also substantially meet the NATO SOF criteria. He referred again to the sensitivity of the Philippine people towards their former colonial status and indicated how this attitude worked against the prolongation of those portions of the early agreements which reflected the former U.S. sovereign position in such matters as extra-territoriality. The Filipino position now is that they must have jurisdiction on U.S. base areas for off-duty offenses, although they would give sympathetic consideration to a U.S. request for a Philippine waiver in order for the U.S. to exercise jurisdiction, perhaps even along the lines of the NATO–Netherlands formula.⁵ He said that the GOP already exercises jurisdiction for off-base offenses subject to the final decision of the Secretary of Justice. He indicated that an off-base offense involving duty status was rare since almost all U.S. official vehicles were now driven by Filipino nationals, and traffic cases represent the only significant category of off-base offenses. He felt that the question of off-base offenses was an extremely minor one and concessions in this regard could produce a better formula for determination of duty status on base.

The Ambassador felt that Defense’s worry about establishing a precedent for other countries was not valid because the long history of US-Philippine relations would be recognized as a special case, and the many other agreements entered into between the two governments have no counterpart in our relations with other powers. Mr. Knight⁶ expressed worry about the precedent, stating that each country wants most favorable treatment on all base right provisions and would use the Philippine agreement as an example. The Ambassador felt that a much worse example would be a deadlock with the GOP on this issue. He did not think we needed to replace the agreement but could handle the new provisions through an attached protocol. He felt we had reached a stage in our Philippine relations where political judgment must be exercised in this matter as being the overriding factor. Mr. Murphy added that he felt the question of criminal jurisdiction was relatively quiescent as compared to a few years ago, despite the current problems in Formosa and Morocco. We must expect change to conform to changing political circumstances. He indicated in response to Mr. Knight’s comment that Congressional interest in the matter seemed to have abated and the Department did not feel that there was any serious reason for concern over adverse Congressional reaction or restrictive legislation during the current session. Mr. Bohlen added that that same reaction was apparent in his talks with Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper.⁷ He repeated that in his view a deadlock on the issue of criminal jurisdiction would freeze all other aspects of our negotiations with the Philippines. This was the issue with the greatest emotional effect, and Serrano had indicated that we could not move ahead in any other negotiations until it was settled.

The discussion concluded with a request from Ambassador Bohlen that Defense reconsider his current instructions on an urgent basis. He felt if he could negotiate quickly he could get a reasonable solution on the question of criminal jurisdiction. If there is further delay, the Philippine position might shift and increase the difficulty of securing a solution which the U.S. Government could accept.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

1. Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.”
2. Ambassador Bohlen was in Washington for consultation from the end of January to February 25.
3. Vice Admiral Robert L. Dennison, member of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. In studying the Nash Report on U.S. overseas bases, the National Security Council commented that the “objective of the United States should be to obtain criminal jurisdiction arrangements with all countries in which US forces are stationed now or in the future, at least as favorable as those contained in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.” The President approved this view March 28, 1958. (Memorandum for the Secretary, March 18, 1958, and memorandum from Howard F. Furnas to Fisher Howe, May 21, 1958; both in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 95)
5. See footnote 3, Document 397.
6. Robert Knight, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.
7. J. William Fulbright, Senator from Arkansas; Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Senator from Iowa. Both were on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.