41. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
3091. I saw Nehru this morning at his request. He was relaxed and cordial and wished discuss package proposal. Prime Minister said he was attracted to it because it came from President Eisenhower and because it offered hope of settlement knotty Indo-Pak problems. But he was troubled by three things which he proceeded to discuss: 1) Presence of third party—Indian thinking had been of new approach to GOP for bilateral talks. My memorandum (which was before him) clarifying points touched on in May 16 talk2 had been helpful and he was rethinking this position in light of our proposal. He did not say what MacDonald reported Pillai told him yesterday that mediation might come to ear of “other governments” who do not have interest in operation being successful and might try obstruct it. 2) Possibility of [Page 115] leak—Nehru’s mention of this was not as forceful as Pillai’s and Desai’s last week; I hope memo, which endeavored reassure him secrecy could be preserved, had desired effect. 3) Past difficulties in dealing with Pakistanis—Nehru more or less repeated description he had given me May 16 of alleged Pakistani unpredictability and un-cooperativeness. He also said he wished Pak elections were over, so situation could be assessed.
Nehru said he thinks will probably make interim reply President Eisenhower’s letter at this time and full reply later. He referred to need to sell his “colleagues in cabinet”—i.e., Pant, Krishna Menon, Morarji Desai, and possibly Law Minister Sen. Since he told me he will not resume his holiday on June 5 as previously scheduled and is uncertain whether or when he will, I hope the full reply will be forthcoming shortly.
In our talk I mentioned President had made proposal because of his great interest in helping to solve difficulties which have plagued Indo-Pak relations last ten years. I said Mirza and Noon had accepted President’s proposal in principle, but that we foresaw danger the pressure of public opinion would force Paks follow up on Graham report in SC with probable acrimonious debate which would only make negotiations more difficult. Ambassador Langley had already approached Mirza and Noon to urge them not to bring matter before SC, but an affirmative answer from him (Nehru) would greatly strengthen our hand in effort dissuade GOP bringing case again to SC or at least persuade them to agree to come in [with] innocuous hold-the-line resolution which would not upset relations further.
After considerable probing I decided it best not press Nehru for early reply since I was convinced he had not yet thought the problem through nor had opportunity to consult his colleagues adequately. I believe my argument had weight without having impression of undue pressure. I am somewhat optimistic after talk although I suspect if he accepts Nehru may be reluctant go much beyond working out mediation procedure, locus, etc., before Pak elections. Memo of conversation follows.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/6–258. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Karachi and London.↩
- See Document 37. The memorandum has not been identified.↩
- On June 3, Bunker forwarded to Bartlett a memorandum of his conversation with Nehru, under cover of a personal letter. (Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 62 D 43, Package)↩