Office of the Historian

39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, May, 22, 1958—8:06 p.m.

2961. For Ambassador. In light indications (Embtel 2904)2 that GOP planning take Kashmir and canal waters issues to SC, suggest you approach Mirza and Noon (perhaps simultaneously as proved effective in package presentation) along following lines:

As indicated May 16, we have given much thought to problem of reduction Indo-Pak tensions. It is our earnest hope that package proposal to which we attach great importance will bear fruit. We pleased by Mirza–Noon initial response and have been encouraged to expect their fullest cooperation. However, problems involved have defied solution for ten years and therefore no one can underestimate the difficulties to be encountered.

We fully cognizant domestic political pressures in Pakistan, noted by Noon at time of package presentation, which tend impel GOP to bring Kashmir and canal waters issues before UN. Since obvious SC debate likely only exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan [Page 111] without any advance toward solution and thus have unfortunate effect on climate needed for successful negotiations, it is USG’s sincere hope, in interest giving package proposal best chance success, that means can be found which would enable GOP not to press for SC action at this time. We would like be able discuss alternative possibilities fully with GOP prior latter’s final decision on taking issue to Council.

Mindful of same Pak domestic pressures, we believe on question Rajasthan canal GOP might wish consider setting forth GOP position in letter to GOI with copies sent to SYG for distribution to members SC. This procedure (which similar though not identical to that employed by GOI in case of Mangla) should provide adequate formal registration GOP position.

In passing, observation can be made that even without important new element our package proposal, wisdom of taking either Kashmir or canal waters issues to SC or GA at this time debatable since, judging from past experience with Soviet veto and other impediments, definitive and fruitful results highly doubtful. This would seem argue all more for giving package proposal fair chance.

FYI—You may wish to discuss above approach with UK High Commissioner, enlisting if useful his support in approach.

It will be noted that suggestion for handling canal question similar that proposed to Pakistanis by Iliff of IBRD, but care should be taken not to intimate that USG informed of Iliff’s action. End FYI.

For London: Inform CRO of above instruction to Ambassador Langley, expressing hope that UKG may be able instruct UK High Commissioner Karachi support Ambassador Langley if such support deemed useful by Ambassador Langley.

Instructions to USUN re approach UN Pakistan representative being repeated separately.3

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690.91/5–2058. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Armin H. Meyer and approved by Rountree. Repeated to New Delhi, London, and USUN.↩
  2. Dated May 20. (Ibid., 690D.91/5–2058)↩

  3. In telegram 820 to USUN, May 22, the Department instructed the Mission in any further conversations with Pakistani Representative Aly Khan to make clear that the United States “does not believe recourse to SC on either Kashmir or canal waters at this time would produce any constructive result from Pakistan’s standpoint.” (Ibid., 690 D. 91/5–2158)

    In telegram 2973 from Karachi, May 25, Langley reported that he called on Mirza the previous day and discussed with him the two proposals contained in telegram 2961 regarding the Kashmir dispute and the Rajasthan canal. Mirza agreed that the U.S. position was valid. Langley then called on Noon, who also agreed with the U.S. position; “but his performance,” the Ambassador indicated, “may leave something to be desired.” The Prime Minister’s first reaction on Kashmir “was to read lecture on how US and UK combining to do nothing to get settlement.” (Ibid., 690D.91/5–2558)

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