163. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
2235. Embtel 22102 regarding current Pakistani-Afghan relations may not have reached Department prior dispatch Deptel 2622 to Ankara3 which provides guidance regarding possible CENTO statement on Pushtunistan issue.
While recognizing considerations which lead Department exercise caution in supporting Pakistan, believe I should make clear my concern that Pakistani resentment could seriously damage our relations.
There several recent indications GOP leaders feel they cannot depend upon US on this issue to extent they believe they entitled, and comparison being widely drawn between all-out Soviet support nations friendly to them, regardless of merits of case, and lack of such support on part Western powers to its friend and ally, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Embassy officers have information to effect Foreign Office particularly resents our “impartial attitude”, including aide-mémoire which I left with President Ayub March 5.4 While not yet mentioned to us here, Jones-Ahmed conversation March 14 also pertinent.5
[Page 343]London’s telegram 4579 to Department6 indicates British, like other diplomatic representatives here, have been impressed with strength of Pakistani feeling their friends are not supporting them. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
My recommendation Embtel 2210 that US refrain for time being from taking further initiative with Pakistanis was based upon feeling, which has been further strengthened within past few days, that GOP would strongly resent any new “impartial” approach at this time.
With reference Deptel 2622 to Ankara, if we should make point suggested to effect we would agree to statement provided it “refrains from taking sides on Pushtunistan dispute”, Pakistanis would see their worst fears realized and their friends abandoning them. Among other considerations they would doubtless believe that a position even weaker than that taken by SEATO in 1956 would result in Afghans becoming more extreme in their demands regarding Pushtunistan. Because of Khrushchev’s statement and Soviet Ambassador’s performance, and in context present situation, neutrality to extent indicated might cut across our own commitment and support for Durand Line.
I am thus concerned that position outlined Deptel 2622 will produce strongly adverse reaction on part GOP. While I cannot at present visualize any formula which on one hand had no adverse effect on Afghans and on other hand meet reasonable Pakistani requests, believe Department should be aware of likely Pakistani attitude and possibility GOP will use this issue test depth US support Pakistan. At minimum it seems to me that we should support CENTO statement along lines Pakistan requests, namely condemnation Soviets for attempting exploit local dispute without regard for merit of case (Tehran’s 617 repeated Department 2155).
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3–2260. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Ankara, Kabul, and London.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 161.↩
- In telegram 2622, March 21, the Department outlined its position in the Pushtunistan dispute for possible use at the upcoming CENTO Council meeting, scheduled to open in Tehran on April 27. The Department explained that the U.S. position regarding Pushtunistan was that it was a bilateral issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and that any statement by CENTO placing it on record as supporting the Pakistani side of the dispute could turn this localized dispute into an “inflamed cold war controversy.” (Department of State, Central Files, 378.752/3–1760)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 158.↩
- See Document 161.↩
- Dated March 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3–2160)↩
- Dated March 17. (Ibid., 378.752/3–1760)↩