Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, March 21, 1960—3 p.m.

896. In reply Karachi’s 2162 to Department² repeated information Kabul 274, this Embassy intended merely suggest that any strong renewed approach to RGA should be accompanied by simultaneous strong representation to Ayub. Far from having any intention of suggesting that GOP jeopardize its position on Pushtunistan, this Embassy’s tentative suggestion above was made with view to seeking resolution on issue, in interest of Pakistan and regional stability, and in pursuance US policy objective which has stood fairly constant since at least 1954.

In response Deptel 692³ repeated Karachi 2262, would like to preface recommendations with review of Afghan position and situation as seen from here.

First this Embassy would like to submit that, whether GOP wants to admit it or not, genuine and practical issue exists over the status and welfare of the Pakistan Pushtuns. This is not in any way to suggest that Afghan position and claims are valid from legal point of view. It does suggest that history, culture, and circumstances this area such that it not unreasonable for Afghans to feel and maintain that they have special interest and concern this matter; indeed, limited Afghan interest in tribes south and east Durand Line admitted by British in supplementary letter to Anglo-Afghan treaty 1921. This Embassy satisfied that Afghan emotional involvement this issue largely genuine, and that while issue may have from time to time been used as political tool, and may have led to occasional pipe dreams of irridentism, basic Afghan motivation deeply held and generally sincere. Pakistan attempts ignore or deny existence of issue are not going to lead to resolution, and claims that this “stunt” are not only unjustified but exacerbate emotions and increase tensions.

This Embassy believes Afghan official statements as to conditions on which they will consider issue settled have been clear although all being great flexibility for Pakistan response, [sic] Daud and Naim have said repeatedly, publicly and in private to me and other ambassadors as well as to Ayub himself, that all they ask is that they be assured by Pakistan Pushtuns themselves that they are satisfied. At least until recently they have not insisted on plebiscite. (We do not know whether this position will be modified by recent Soviet support, but we doubt it will be if some prospect of progress towards solution materializes.) Indeed they have stated they would accept simple statement of Pushtun leaders. They have left form of expression up to GOP, insisting only that it be genuine and in good faith. It would seem that this is a not too demanding position for RGA to take, and that the condition set forth could be fairly simply met by GOP, if its relations with its Pushtuns are what it claims, without risk of legalistic entrapment or injury to pride. (Pakistan Ambassador here admits all this but says they will not try such a simple way out as they don’t trust RGA leaders.) It will be recalled that in earlier phases, this position coupled also with dissolution one unit and restitution provincial status frontier area. It noteworthy that this demand dropped in later positions. The fact that they now offer such a simple solution is one of reasons we feel that despite their emotions, they judge issue has become burden rather than asset and would like to see it settled.

Thirdly, this Embassy believes that repeated Afghan statements expressing desire for settlement should as matter of practical politics and to test their position, be accepted at face value. Naim himself took initiative in February 1959 (Embassy despatch 331, February 16, 1959)⁴ to seek settlement on easy terms described above, and reiterated desire for such settlement again in late spring and fall last year. He restated same position before, during and after Pindi talks. Indeed it is implicit in his most recent reply to Qadir (Embtel 873).⁵ There are several reasons to believe, as reported Embtel 926, May 8, 1959,⁶ and subsequently, that RGA finding Pushtunistan campaign burden and that it would like to get off hook if face-saving formula can be found.

Fourthly, this Embassy continues to be satisfied that despite large-scale Soviet economic and military aid, and long-term increase trade and transit traffic to and through USSR, Afghans are far from pro-Communist and Afghanistan is still far from being Soviet dominated or penetrated. Also relations with US in recent months have been favorable considering all circumstances. Although Embassy still lacks details, it is clear enough from information at hand that Afghanistan leaders stood up to Khrushchev in his recent visit, and it appears that they may have been somewhat soured by his pressure tactics. It natural that RGA should accept and indeed seek such international support on issue as it can elicit; indeed it was entirely predictable and virtually inevitable reaction to recent Pakistan behavior. This is not to say there is no element of danger in Soviet intrusion this issue, especially if Soviets seek to run away with it, or to turn it into instrument of subversion. Latter likelihood not presently visible, however, and this Embassy does not believe that Soviet endorsement basically alters at present Afghanistan international outlook or internal integrity.

Fifthly, this Embassy believes that major present danger lies in the possibility that Pakistan attitude will push RGA into greater and greater reliance on Soviet support and protection to point where Afghanistan may indeed lose its independence. When the tribal fear and anger of the Afghanistani is fully roused he is capable of extremely rash and indeed suicidal behavior. If RGA begins to feel that Pakistan assaults on royal family succeeding, and begins to feel even more isolated from rest of world, it might well turn to Soviet for all-out support regardless of consequences. How Pakistanis can maintain that tough policy will rather bring Afghanistan to heel instead of driving them to Soviet is difficult to understand in face of clear evidence of Afghanistan reactions to tough Pakistan attitudes over recent years.

Sixthly, we question here that Ayub has in fact accepted US truce suggestion which asks him, as it did RGA to take initiative in matter. His Ambassador here is still taking line nothing can be done unless RGA comes up with something more specific. Furthermore his Foreign Minister made reckless and intemperate statement calling for plebiscite in Afghanistan, itself a stunt which could have unfortunate ramifications.

In sum, this Embassy believes that RGA sincerity should be tested as regards a settlement of this issue and that it has repeatedly stated easy conditions on which it would drop matter. Embassy believes these conditions minimum necessary for face-saving and that it not realistic to expect RGA go any further.

Embassy believes if Ayub could be induced elicit genuine statement of loyalty from Pak Pushtun leaders, through Loe Jirgah or whatever device he wants, and even better if he would accompany this with provincial realignment and creation of Pukhtunwha, this issue might be settled once and for all. It will not work, however, if he takes these steps without discussion and alone in grudging sullenness, but only if he adopts posture of trust and constructive and generous effort toward settlement. This Embassy does not see how such an effort would jeopardize GOP legalistically or any other way. If it does not succeed efforts still worth making since GOP would have improved its position and RGA’s position would be more clearly defined.

It is of course for Department, with Rountree’s advice, to judge whether this analysis is correct, and whether or not Ayub can be so influenced. If he cannot, then I believe further US or Turkish initiative would be fruitless and should not be undertaken. It remains however, in our national interest to keep Soviets out of this strategic territory, whether we receive collaboration of Pakistan to that end or not. It is therefore important that RGA not be allowed to feel isolated or abandoned except by Soviet Union. To forestall this, cessation of our initiative in seeking settlement might have to be accompanied with public statement disassociating ourselves from and deploring Pakistan propaganda and subversive attacks on Afghanistan royal family, and reiterating our interest in continued Afghanistan independence.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/3–2160. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, Ankara, London, and Moscow.
2. Dated March 14. (Ibid., 689.90D/3–1460)
3. Supra.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/2–1659)
5. Dated March 16. (Ibid., 689.90D/3–1659)
6. See footnote 3, Document 128.