Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

88. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

December 9, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Conversation Between Prime Minister Mamadou Dia of the Republic of Senegal and Secretary Herter, December 9, 1960, at 2:30 p.m., in the Secretary’s Office

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Penfield
  • Mr. Ferguson
• Senegal
  • Prime Minister Dia
  • Ambassador Diop
  • Two aides

After a preliminary exchange of civilities, Prime Minister Dia said that he had been impressed by the simplicity and sincerity of President Eisenhower¹ and encouraged by his interest in African problems. Prime Minister Dia added that his trip to Washington was not official, but that he had wished to pay a courtesy call here before leaving the United States.

He went on to say, in substance, that Senegal is resolved to have close relations with the United States. The Senegalese know that they do not run the risk of any kind of imperialism—political, economic, cultural or ideological—by having close dealings with the United States, with whose traditions they are familiar.

Independence was a good thing for Africa but could expose the continent to new forms of imperialism. Africa can play a role as an element of equilibrium in world affairs, but only so long as it remains truly independent. If it vacillates, however, this vacillation could have a decisive effect on the whole world.

With respect to cooperation, Prime Minister Dia said that the Senegalese had, of course, more to hope from the United States than the United States from Senegal and felt that a program of technical and economic assistance should be developed. Not here and now of course, but his technical and financial advisors would stay behind to follow up the economic and financial questions with the appropriate American offices and would present concrete proposals.

The Secretary assured Prime Minister Dia of the sympathy with which he and President Eisenhower viewed these problems, and of our desire to discuss concrete measures. He pointed out that we sent an ICA representative to Senegal before its independence and before sending such a representative to other African countries, apart from Guinea and Ghana which became independent earlier. Thus our aim was to discuss concrete steps at the earliest possible moment.

With regard to Mr. Dia’s ideas for the future, the Secretary said there was complete agreement. Very often words that refer to ideologies—“imperialism,” “domination,” and sometimes also “colonialism”—have different meanings for different people and under different circumstances. He assured the Prime Minister that we have no territorial ambition and no desire for territorial domination. In our relations with other countries, the Secretary said, we do what we can to help them. We learn from them, and they from us. It is a free exchange, so that all may live independently and in peace.

The Prime Minister replied that he entirely agreed, that “we are on the same wave length.” He had talked to President Eisenhower about the colonialism resolution now before the UN² and had pointed out that being anti-colonialist did not mean advocacy of immediate withdrawal by the metropolitan powers. One must try to make some progress without leaving chaos behind. To understand otherwise would be a bad interpretation of the meaning of the resolution. Mr. Dia felt that time limits should be set within which the colonial people and the metropolitan power should prepare for independence.

The Secretary responded that the resolution is extremely troublesome. It is so badly worded, and subject to such different interpretations, that its essential aims with respect to independence and self-determination and a sound evolution from colonialism are wrapped in unfortunate phrases, which lend themselves to misinterpretations. It was unfortunate that the group of original sponsors of the resolution did not want to amend it. They were under pressure to amend it both from the USSR and from certain European and moderate countries, and therefore they finally decided to keep the original draft.

Prime Minister Dia said that there have been certain amendments. The amended version of the draft resolution is not perfect because it is vague, but is better than the first version because of its very vagueness. He added that one cannot, simply because of a UN resolution, oblige a country to choose independence even though it may need two or three years to prepare for it.

In response, the Secretary noted that there is a contradiction in the resolution itself because the operative paragraph refers to the UN Charter which provides for a period of transition if the country is not ready for independence.³

The Congo, said Prime Minister Dia, is an example of what he meant. There is reason to believe that Belgium’s sudden grant of independence was responsible for current difficulties there. Nigeria had had an opportunity to prepare, as had Ghana. In the case of Senegal, the French had never set timetables, but it had been understood that autonomy would come first and independence two years later. As for the UN, it is a very fine institution which we should all seek to strengthen, but it will enjoy authority only to the extent that it plays a realistic and constructive role. It is now being used for propaganda purposes, which is extremely dangerous for its future. The Secretary noted that President Eisenhower’s speech before the UN had emphasized the same point.

Continuing, Prime Minister Dia said that, as far as concrete problems are concerned, the Senegalese were in touch with U.S. representatives in Dakar. His technical advisors would stay behind to consult with U.S. agencies, and the Senegalese would soon submit specific proposals with appropriate documentation. Until now, Prime Minister Dia added, we have not hurried because we wanted to be thorough. We had to set up a long-range plan first; that is finished, and in January we shall be able to present the plan and serious proposals.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70E/12–1360. Confidential. Drafted by Floyd and interpreter Charles Sedgwick of the Office of Language Services on December 13.
1. The Prime Minister had met with the President that morning. A memorandum of conversation by Satterthwaite is ibid., 770T.00/12–960.
2. A draft resolution, sponsored by 43 Asian and African states, declaring the necessity of a “speedy and unconditional end [to] colonialism in all its forms and manifestations” and calling for immediate steps to that end. (U.N. doc. A/L.323; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 110–111)
3. According to a memorandum prepared in the Secretary’s office of a telephone conversation between Herter and the President that evening, Herter told the President that he had asked Dia “whether if the U.S. abstained they would be able to abstain also.” Dia had not answered directly, but the Secretary had subsequently learned that Senegal was one of the sponsors of the resolution. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) On December 14, the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 1514 (XV) by a vote of 89 to 0 with 9 abstentions, including the United States.