Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo⁰

August 12, 1960, 6:39 p.m.

438. For Ambassador. To assist our thinking re Lumumba would appreciate your views on following and other pertinent considerations which may occur to you.¹

1) Lumumba is moving to left but is probably not firmly Communist-oriented and believes he can play East and West off against each other. In any event it appears doubtful that Soviets, any more than US, could, under present conditions in Congo, establish reliable continuing influence.

2) Lumumba has demonstrated strength and ability to outmaneuver or intimidate all other Congolese politicians. It is therefore likely that, regardless his titular position, he will continue to play key role in Congolese political life at least over near term.

3) Unless checked in near future he is likely progressively to concentrate under his control all effective elements of authority and thus solidify his position as authoritarian strong man. Thus it may follow that as time goes on it will be increasingly difficult for his opponents to overthrow him.

4) Important element in deciding whether change of government would be in our interest is consideration of alternatives to Lumumba. In addition to absence any apparently effective successor, strengths and abilities Congolese politicians seem to fluctuate, e.g. Kasavubu, regarded few months ago as possible rival, seems to have faded from ranks of contenders. Although there is opposition to Lumumba it appears uncoordinated and disorganized both in Parliament and on the street. Moreover it appears unanimously in favor of political structure of confederation, i.e. loosely associated independent states rather than federation of autonomous provinces or states. Such a confederation has many disadvantages, such as vulnerability to Soviet penetration, potentiality for internecine friction or warfare, etc. In addition it is strongly opposed by other Africans who fear for integrity their own states. Therefore if other elements, such as Lumumba’s erratic and unreliable character, are not overriding, he can probably count on support of other African states. We believe a situation in which we found ourselves out of sympathy with both Lumumba and most other African states acceptable only in most exigent circumstances.

5) Above considerations lead to undesirably negative conclusion that best U.S. course for time being might be to take more or less neutral position toward Lumumba. This does not seem to us however to mean that we must be inactive. We can carry on re-insurance program of cultivating and strengthening potentially effective and friendly rival politicians, attempt to isolate or reform undesirables such as Gizenga and Kashamura and make efforts to mobilize other African opinion and action along constructive lines.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1260. Top Secret. Drafted by Penfield, cleared in draft by Wight, and approved by Satterthwaite.
1. Telegram 458 to Léopoldville, August 15, for Timberlake from Satterthwaite, reads as follows: “Although we assume you understand purpose Deptel 438 we desire to make clear it intended elicit your thinking and does not represent Department policy decisions.” (Ibid., 770G.00/8–1560)