169. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State0
New York, August 9,
1960, 1 a.m.
360. Re: Congo.
- 1.
- FonMin Wigny called me out of SC about 10:30 tonight to say Prime Minister Eyskens had telephoned him “in middle of night” to say he was horrified there was no reference to maintenance of law and order in latest Tunisia—Ceylon res (S/4424).1 Eyskens said it was unthinkable that res with this defect could be passed; it either had to be amended or res had to be defeated.
- 2.
- I told Wigny that those in positions of responsibility in Belgium would have to think carefully and search their consciences on this point because consequences of misstep could bring about another Korea and make present state of affairs in Congo look like tea party. It was dangerous, irresponsible and unthinkable to make res fail.
- 3.
- I said that reference to law and order in pending res was superfluous. I called Wigny’s attention to operative para 1 which confirms authority given SYG by SC res of 22 July. I pointed out that in res of 22 July restoration of law and order is mentioned twice and therefore this principle was clearly established in mandate given SYG and UN force and that operative para 3 by stipulating “full implementation” in effect reenacted res of July 22. I stated that operative para 2 spoke of “modalities determined by SYG” which obviously referred to law and order.
- 4.
- Wigny commented that radio reports had not made this clear in Brussels. I told Wigny that he could make point clear to Belgian public. [51/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- 5.
- I ended conversation by asking Wigny to consider carefully what I had said to him and I repeated my admonition that Belgium carried heavy responsibility for success or failure of this res. I agreed to consider carefully what he said.
- 6.
- A few minutes later Beeley (UK) informed us Wigny (Belgium) had taken same position with Dixon on necessity to cause Ceylonese-Tunisian res to fail as Wigny had taken with Lodge. Beeley said Belgians were attempting to cause res to fail by trying to organize sufficient abstentions or by trying to obtain French veto. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
- 7.
- Beeley said he did not believe they could obtain enough abstentions and they could not obtain French veto. Asked if UK would abstain, Beeley said he did not think they would in the last analysis.
- 8.
- Beeley said in order to get over this problem Dixon had decided to ask question of SYG on how he foresaw working out of “modalities” as referred to in res and SYG would make reply referring to law and order which would be satisfactory. He thought this might solve problem.
- 9.
- Beeley said failure of res and consequent failure of UN effort would result in consequences which would be so serious that everything had to be done to avoid this outcome.
- 10.
- Comment: Belgian complaint appears to be based on Belgian internal politics. It cannot be based on true need for added language to provide for safety of Belgian nationals in Congo since res and SYG’s statements made wholly adequate provision for them. Risk of second Korea is high price to pay for Belgian political crisis.
Lodge