Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations⁰

August 6, 1960, 8:53 p.m.

196. Re: SC Meeting on Congo. Following represents preliminary thinking of Department re SYG’s report¹ and SC meeting which you authorized use as guidance in your consultations with SYG and other SC Members.

1. SYG’s Report. As we analyze report, SYG seeking have SC strengthen his hand with view bringing about implementation SC resolution in entire Congo, including Katanga, without resort to force while at same time leaving Katanga as constitutional question to be worked out internally between Tshombe and Lumumba. Our assessment is that report should be satisfactory to Belgians and Tshombe for three reasons: (a) SYG’s report says Belgian attitude toward question of Katanga not root of problem; (b) report leaves Katanga free work out future status with Congolese Government; and (c) report clearly assures Tshombe of UN impartial role and that UN force will not take sides in conflict.

SC action in effect endorsing SYG’s “suggestions” would arm Hammarskjold with appropriate assurances for Tshombe which we believe would soften Tshombe’s attitude re introduction of UN forces in Katanga. We believe Africans will be unhappy with SYG report, and Lumumba and Soviets even more so.

Principal key to situation in SC, as we see it, is question of Belgian withdrawal from entire Congo, including Katanga and bases. We believe that forthright statement of intentions by Wigny before or early in SC proceedings would pull rug out from Soviets and Lumumba. Two principal ways in which this could be achieved: (a) paragraph in resolution calling for withdrawal of Belgian forces from entire Congo, including Katanga bases, within specific time limit; (b) paragraph in resolution taking note of whatever statement Wigny makes re withdrawal of forces. Latter is clearly best way since it avoids appearance of SC pressuring Belgians. Belgian initiative in this regard would clearly improve their posture, it would be added evidence of their cooperation with UN, and it would indicate willingness to carry out SC resolution as UN takes control of Congo. In our judgment, for maximum effectiveness, Belgian withdrawal statement must clearly apply to both Katanga and bases. With respect to latter, we have already put to Belgians suggestion that they turn over bases to UN. Should Belgium be able to make forthright statement which would be reflected in SC res, we believe it would be much more difficult for USSR to veto resolution or justify veto.²

2. Hearing of Representatives of Katanga

We would hope that representatives of Katanga would not request hearing before SC in view fact that hearing them tends to accord Katanga added legal status and likely cause serious and acrimonious procedural dispute in SC. We hope SYG could work it out so Katanga representatives would not seek hearing. If, nevertheless, Katanga representatives insist, you authorized accept hearing them under Rule 39 which would help avoid legal issue. We would hope you could avoid getting out in front on this procedural issue.

3. SC Resolution

Following is illustrative resolution we have in mind as constituting reasonable SC action. Our hope would be that Tunisia, Ceylon, Argentina, and Ecuador could be urged to sponsor.

“The Security Council

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the Congo contained in Document-----,

Noting with appreciation the efforts of the SYG pursuant to SC resolutions of 14 July and 22 July and the support given him by Member states,

Noting, however, that SC resolutions S/4387 and S/4404 have not yet been fully implemented,

Recognizing the urgent need for complete and rapid fullfilment of the aforementioned resolutions,

[Notes the statement of the Government of Belgium that its troops will be entirely withdrawn from the Congo, that the withdrawal has already begun and that it will be completed by------on the assumption mat the UN will assure order and security in the territory,]³

Requests the full cooperation of all authorities in the Congo so that the UN may exercise its mandate peacefully throughout the country,

Reaffirms its resolution of 22 July which stressed that the Republic of the Congo had been recommended for admission to membership in the UN as a unit,

Recognizes at the same time that the constitutional development of the Congo is an internal political problem to be resolved by the people of the Congo by peaceful means and that the UN cannot take sides in this,

Declares, therefore, that the presence of UN forces in the Congo pursuant to Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 of July and this resolution shall be without prejudice to peaceful and democratic development in the constitutional field,

Reiterates its request to all states to refrain from any action which might tend to hamper the UN in the effective discharge of its mandate, Requests the SYG to continue his efforts to secure full implementation of this resolution and SC resolutions of 14 and 22 of July and to report to the Security Council further as appropriate.”

Re bracketed portion of resolution, you should discuss it with the Belgians in the first instance and refrain from doing so with others.

Dept aware serious objections of Belgian to idea of deadline and strongly prefers to avoid specific date being included in resolution if it is at all possible. It is included in the bracketed [portion] above on the assumption that Sovs and others will be pressing for specific date.

You may wish point out to Belgians that idea of date for completion of phased withdrawal with escape clause stating assumption law and order prevails is probably least objectionable way of handling time element.

Merchant

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–660. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Cargo, Sisco, Tron, and Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs William B. Buffum; cleared by Wallner, Penfield, Ferguson, and Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs William L. Blue; and approved by Merchant. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, Léopoldville, Tunis, Quito, Buenos Aires, and Colombo.
1. Hammarskjöld’s report of August 6, cited in footnote 1, Document 163, stated that he had dropped the plan to introduce U.N. troops into Katanga on August 6 because it was apparent they would be forcibly opposed by the Katangans. It requested instructions from the Council.
2. Telegram 354 to Brussels, August 6, informed the Embassy that the Department had called in Ambassador Scheyven to make this point. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–660) Telegram 347 from USUN, August 7, reported that Lodge had spoken along the same lines to Wigny, calling Belgian withdrawal the key to the situation. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–760)
3. Brackets in the source text.