Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

163. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

August 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Belgian Embassy
• Mr. Woodruff Wallner, IO
• Mr. C. Vaughn Ferguson, AFS
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Scheyven said that he wished to outline in detail the agreement which had been reached between the Belgian Government and Secretary General Hammarskjold in Brussels. He said that the Belgian Government had informed the Secretary General again that they were prepared to implement the Security Council resolution including the withdrawal of forces from Katanga. The Belgians had added that Hammarskjold could use this information in his negotiations with Tshombe. Furthermore Hammarskjold had undertaken to negotiate with the Belgians regarding assurances to the white population of the Katanga. The Belgian Government felt that it had carried out its understanding with Hammarskjold in every detail but that the latter had violated this agreement by issuing a statement regarding Mr. Bunche’s visit to Katanga and the sending of troops into that Province on Saturday, August 6.¹ Ambassador Scheyven said that the Belgians feel they have been abused and Hammarskjold had not acted properly. The schedule which he had set up did not provide any time for meaningful negotiations between Mr. Bunche and the Katanga authorities and indicated he would send troops in regardless of the outcome of these negotiations.

Ambassador Scheyven continued, saying that the effect of Hammarskjold’s action had been extremely bad on the 23,000 whites who lived in the Katanga and who held its economy together. Eighty percent of the white population had been at work until the receipt of Hammarskjold’s statement but it was feared that this would change the situation. He continued, saying that the Secretary General had not respected the deal which he had made in Brussels. He added it was realized that the Secretary General was under strong pressure from extremists in the Congo and from the left-wing elements in the Lumumba Government. The Belgians had concluded that Hammarskjold was following the line of least resistance in order to make his mission a success. He concurred that this mission must succeed but was concerned by the growth of Communist influence in Leopoldville.

Ambassador Scheyven then said that Hammarskjold had apparently taken stock of the situation and had concluded that Belgium would be forced to cooperate by events. However, he had not carried out the spirit of the agreement reached. The Belgians feel that the way the Secretary General has acted and has appeared to succumb to leftist pressure in Leopoldville in fact is consolidating Lumumba’s position. The Belgians feel that Mr. Bunche should go immediately (in fact he had already departed) to the Katanga.

Ambassador Scheyven added that the Belgian position was that the UN should not by its operations give advantage to any one party in the political dispute in the Congo. He said it was realized that Hammarskjold said that the position of the Katanga Government was nonexistent and that they did not have a right to secede. He said under these ground rules Belgium would have never been born at all since Belgium had similarly seceded from the Netherlands in 1830. A juridical approach by the Secretary General might be politically wrong. The UN should not be any party to the internal conflict in the Congo.

Ambassador Scheyven said that the dispatch of UN troops to Katanga might lead to disturbances and might also provide a facade for leftist agitators from Leopoldville to proceed to that Province. He stressed again that the Katanga was actually a going concern and that there was no famine there as elsewhere. With regard to Belgian technicians, Ambassador Scheyven noted, the Secretary-General said their maintenance in Congo was a Belgian responsibility but that Belgium cannot accept this responsibility if the UN troops go into Katanga without satisfactory guarantees having been provided for the 23,000 whites in the Province. He said that Belgium had appealed to these men to remain but the memories of the earlier atrocities were fresh in their minds so that it was difficult to convince them that they should stay. He admitted that the mobilization of Katanga forces might not amount to much and repeated the Belgian troops would certainly not oppose UN forces on their arrival. He also mentioned the tribal problem in the area.

Ambassador Scheyven went on, saying that the Belgian Government wished to underline the dangers existing in the situation and the importance of developing Western counterpressures on Hammarskjold to counterbalance the left-wing element influences exerted through the Congolese Government. There should be influence from Belgium’s friends on Hammarskjold to keep out agitators from Leopoldville in Katanga. He said it would be extremely difficult to solve this problem in 48 hours and that we could only hope that the entry of UN forces would be peaceful. He said that Belgium hoped that white troops would be sent to the area by the UN but noted that the Congolese wanted black troops so the result would probably be that they would be mixed. The Secretary said that he understood the forces would in fact be Irish, Swedish, Tunisian and Moroccan.

Ambassador Scheyven repeated that the UN should not become involved in any way in the internal politics of the Congo since this would be beyond the mandate of the Security Council. He thought that Hammarskjold agreed with the Belgian interpretation of the Security Council resolution in this respect but might give in to Congolese pressure. He said that he hoped the United States would tell Hammarskjold that we felt he should not interfere in internal Congolese politics. With regard to the 23,000 whites in the area the Belgians hoped that we would express concern regarding their security. He thought this was of paramount importance and he noted that Katanga produced at least 60 percent of the riches of the Congo and if this area went to pieces like the rest of the country and the whites should leave the results would be catastrophic. He noted that only some 100 out of 5,000 whites were left in Stanleyville.

The Secretary asked if there were dangers of tribal war in Katanga. The Ambassador said that thus far there had been no outbreaks of this nature but there had been some in the Kasai province. However Tshombe might stir up difficulties and he thought that most of the tribes in Katanga were on his side.

Ambassador Scheyven repeated that it was his view that the Western powers should now adopt a strong position. There might be actual hostilities within 48 hours in the only province where order had reigned. There might be fights also between Katanga and Congolese Government forces. Ambassador Scheyven then passed to the question of the motives of the Ghana and Guinea Governments. He said that Ghana had, on August 1, said in the UN that Belgium should be treated as an aggressor and Guinea had taken a similar line. The Secretary said we had sent our Ambassador to Ghana on his way back to Leopoldville to attempt to get the Ghanaians off of this line and also to ask them to exert their influence in the right way with Lumumba. The Secretary did not think we could have much influence with Guinea but thought that perhaps President Tubman might be able to exert some moderating influence on Sekou Toure and that we were planning to approach President Tubman in this sense.²

Ambassador Scheyven said that the Lodge statement regarding Soviet attitudes in Congo made in the Security Council³ had been very good and he hoped that we could make a similar approach to Ghana and Guinea.

The Secretary repeated that we were indeed planning to do what we could with these two countries. Ambassador Scheyven said would this be in the sense of asking them to exert a restraining influence on Lumumba? The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Ambassador Scheyven continued saying that this was a crucial moment. He said that either the Western powers would have to take a firm position or the UN mission would fail and the result would be catastrophic and chaos favorable to Communist infiltration.

The Secretary said that Hammarskjold’s decision regarding sending troops to Katanga had been taken in the atmosphere of Leopoldville. He thought with Bunche having gone to Elisabethville he might now have a different appreciation of the situation after having been on the spot. He was convinced that the UN authorities would wish to avoid extreme positions. The Secretary agreed that there would be chaos if the whites were to leave Katanga. He repeated that it was difficult to take firm positions when we were so far away from the situation. The Secretary repeated that it was his understanding Hammarskjold was keeping hands off politically in the Congo. He agreed also that Hammarskjold should not take any firm position on the final determination of the Congo state as to whether it should be a centralized state or a looser federation. On the other hand he wondered if we wanted Hammarskjold to stay out of Congo politics entirely. For example, it might be helpful if he were to take what steps he could to strengthen moderate elements in Leopoldville. Ambassador Scheyven said would we approach Hammarskjold in the sense of asking him to remain outside of Congolese politics? The Secretary said we would have to think about that and in any case we did not wish to do anything which would weaken Hammarskjold in carrying out his mission. Ambassador Scheyven asked if we would approach Hammarskjold on his other point of expressing concern regarding the safety of the white population of Katanga. The Secretary said we would be delighted to do this and he did not see any problem in expressing our concern for the safety and security of the white population.

Ambassador Scheyven finally asked if we would make a démarche to the Congolese regarding their declaration that they would seize Belgian businesses, which had been closed, unless they were reopened within eight days. The Secretary said he thought it would be difficult for the Congolese to seize Belgian interests in Katanga especially in view of the presence of Belgian troops and asked what the Congolese would do with these businesses anyway. The Ambassador said they would keep them permanently. The Secretary said he would consider the Ambassador’s request and let him know.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–560. Secret. Drafted by McBride. Approved in S on August 9.
1. At a meeting on August 2 with the Congolese Cabinet Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations, Hammarskjöld stated that he would send Bunche to Katanga on August 5 to begin negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Belgian troops to their bases, that the first U.N. military units would arrive in Katanga on August 6, and that the withdrawal of Belgian troops was to commence immediately. For text, see Hammarskjöld’s report of August 6 to the Security Council; U.N. doc. S/4417, also printed in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, vol. V, pp. 57–66.
2. Telegram 52 from Monrovia, August 6, reported a meeting among Ambassador Elbert G. Mathews, Timberlake, and Tubman, at which Tubman promised to write to Touré. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–660)
3. See Document 144.