Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

301. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Athens, December 14, 1960.

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis
• Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs
• John A. Calhoun, Political Counselor

Mood: The Prime Minister appeared tense and distracted at the beginning of the conversation, as did his wife, but in the course of the succeeding two and half hours he loosened up noticeably and assumed his accustomed air of urbane confidence. He did not display excitement or emotion on issues on which we might have anticipated a strong reaction. He seemed to make a point of keeping the conversation relaxed and friendly in atmosphere.

International Matters: The Prime Minister described briefly his proposal to NATO Secretary General Spaak for a NATO Heads of Government Meeting in the spring which would afford an opportunity for the new American President to meet his NATO opposite numbers and to exchange views with them on the world situation. He said Spaak replied stating that Caramanlis’ proposal would be raised for discussion in the Paris Ministerial Meeting.¹ The Prime Minister said he had no particular feeling about the locale of such a meeting.

The Prime Minister showed (somewhat to our surprise) no excitement or sensitivity regarding the difficult issue of the EEC tobacco tariff which was put to the Greek Government by the Ambassador some days ago.² He commented generally on the high importance of achieving Greek association with the Common Market, agreeing that the alternative would be increased economic relations with the Communist countries leading to greater Greek dependence on them. He noted that the Minister of Coordination would be discussing this matter with Under Secretary Dillon in Paris.³ Ambassador Briggs noted the excellent effect of Foreign Minister Averoff’s presentation some weeks ago to the EEC Foreign Ministers.⁴

The Prime Minister expressed deep concern at the trend of developments regarding Algeria⁵ and feared that this could have a seriously damaging effect on the Free World position.

Domestic Political Matters: The Prime Minister said that he did not expect to make any immediate decisions regarding elections or reshuffle of the Cabinet in the face of growing attacks and scandal charges by the Opposition. He tended to discount the latter as being acts of desperation by opposition leaders who had no hope of achieving power in Greece. He seemed to class all of the opposition leaders, including EDA, in the same category. He maintained that all the nationalist opposition leaders were anxious to participate in the Government but that he did not expect to bring them in as they would be merely a divisive influence and would create even more problems for him. The Prime Minister was particularly vitriolic regarding the press and implied that something may be done to control their irresponsibility.

The Prime Minister said that he expected to make decisions in January (presumably before the end of the forthcoming Parliamentary recess) regarding his future course of action. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] From the viewpoint of elections his feeling was that the best time for elections was still in the autumn of 1961, anticipating that the 1961 crops would be good and that other beneficial effects of economic progress would be felt at that time. He acknowledged that the current political situation might require him to move towards earlier elections, possibly in the spring. He gave the impression that in the event of early elections there would probably be no major reshuffling of the Government but that if there were later elections some reshuffling might be in order. He related these comments to the possibility of establishing a national front in order to defeat the Communists. In answer to an inquiry, he said that he envisaged an electoral law providing for a majority system, although he acknowledged that some form of proportional representation might be required in the larger cities in view of the Communist strength there. He feared that elections which did not isolate and reduce the Communist vote might only perpetuate and even worsen the present political chaos, for example, by creating a block of perhaps 130 ERE seats, some 70 to 80 EDA seats, and about 100 divided among the other opposition groups. The latter could then flirt with the Communists and might form a popular front with them to control Parliament. Avoidance of conditions which might result in a popular front is his primary objective.

[1 paragraph (8–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Economic Matters: The Prime Minister, in discussing some of the economic development problems of Greece, stressed the great difficulties he had had in Parliament with the aluminum contract and said that this experience was yet another indication of the irresponsibility of the Opposition. He acknowledged that the final vote on the aluminum contract had been in the Government’s favor but he was clearly not satisfied with the history of this project in Parliament. In this connection Ambassador Briggs mentioned our concern at the reported proposal to require 51% Greek interest in certain development industries. The Prime Minister did not seem disturbed at the possible effect of such a measure on the climate for private foreign investment. He emphasized that any such measure would only be applied to what he described as a limited category of industries producing for the domestic market.

There was no mention of the foreign debt settlement, APECO or related issues.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/12–1560. Confidential. Drafted by Calhoun on December 15. Sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to a letter from Briggs to G. Lewis Jones, December 15. Briggs noted that the conversation took place at an informal luncheon which he and Mrs. Briggs gave for the Prime Minister and his wife at the U.S. Embassy.
1. December 16–18. The proposal was not approved.
2. This démarche by Briggs has not been further identified.
3. At the December 14 meeting at which the OECD convention would be signed.
4. November 14–15.
5. Following rejection by the Algerian nationalists of a French offer of a cease-fire.