Office of the Historian

55. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0

Moscow, November 21, 1958, 2 p.m.

1128. Pass Bonn 124 Berlin 60 from Moscow.

1.
Would appear that Soviets plan two steps 1) transfer their functions re Berlin to GDR and 2) a notification and perhaps justification to Western powers of their refusal continue recognize special status for Berlin. Not clear which of these actions would come first or whether simultaneous action comtemplated.
2.
While I believe Soviets would refrain from any action which they were convinced would cause us to use force, once they have turned functions over to GDR they would go very far and take great risks rather than back down in face of our counteraction. Almost only way out for them in such circumstances would be demand for immediate top level meeting from which they could hope obtain sufficient concessions from Western side to save face. In these circumstances believe worst policy of all on our part is one in which there is any uncertainty or doubt as to what we will do. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
3.
[3 lines of source text not declassified] British [1 line of source text not declassified] must know that acceptance their position1 including recognition GDR and latter’s control our access would have most serious effect on German and particularly Berlin population and govt and that minimum which would satisfy GDR would be effective control of Berlin escape route for refugees. I see no reason why Soviets, having disengaged from responsibility, should not allow airlift to go on indefinitely unless West German and Western counter blockade imposed sufficiently heavy burden on them to maintain East German economy. Evenso wonder if gradual strangulation West Berlin would not become unbearable first. In dealing with British memorandum suggest we start by trying to get agreed valuation on what Soviet objectives are and then try to get from them commitment as to how and under what circumstances they would agree to use of force to maintain our position in Berlin. Believe such examination will show that we will never have better opportunity of taking stand than we do at present time.
4.
My recommendation is that we attempt to reach agreement with British and French that we will be prepared use force to, maintain road and air communications with Berlin and that we so inform Soviets and West Germans promptly but confidentially. (I assume it is impracticable to maintain rail communications by force.) If this position were adopted I believe it would be wise to show Soviets we mean business by taking at least some steps to move tanks and engineering units into position near East Zone frontier along autobahn routes. At same time believe we should indicate to Soviets our willingness negotiate on this problem.
5.
Should Soviets act before agreement reached on foregoing policy believe we should show travel documents to East German officials but announce publicly that we do so on same basis as we accept normal traffic regulations so long as they are not abused but that we will use force rather than accept interference with our access to Berlin.
6.
If agreement cannot be reached on policy in foregoing para believe we should resort to self-imposed blockade but should at least keep some flexibility in our position by announcing that we reserve our right to use force to maintain our position.
Thompson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–2158. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.↩
  2. See Document 45.↩