Office of the Historian

314. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State0

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 9 a.m.

Secto 76. Paris for USRO. Seventh Session (3:30 to 6:55 pm)—Secretary Herter, Chairman. Couve de Murville pointed out1 while West charged with “sin of package,” Soviet plan is itself package of provisions West required accept. Western plan in part complex because it endeavored meet Soviet objections earlier proposals. While Germany remains divided there are few real problems not associated with reunification. Western frontier questions have been or are in process of being negotiated. None exist with Czecho and Denmark. Presumably Soviet Union not dissatisfied with present situation on eastern frontier.

When unification attained peace treaty will follow naturally and any remaining difficulties can be resolved.

Grewe pointed out2 Soviet draft treaty amounts to abandonment German reunification, establishment three Germanies in discriminatory status. Allegations West German militarism disproved by recent West and East Berlin May Day demonstrations and 1956 East German acknowledgement armed forces of 120,000 while Fed Rep had less than one tenth that number. Fed Rep unwilling enter discussions with East Germans for fundamental reasons, but continuing press campaign vilification should be noted as element. Peace treaty must be negotiated with all German Government responsible to people if it is to be of lasting moral effect. West’s plan provides best means.

Lloyd said3 Soviet plan itself shows interdependence of problems and refutes argument four powers not competent discuss reunification. German entity exists in international law. Peace treaty with two Germanies would preclude German unification. Gromyko misrepresented Khrushchev-Macmillan communiqué4 when he implied they agreed peace treaty conclusion was matter of urgency. Actually reference was [Page 725] to whole complex of German problems. Soviet Peace Treaty would have to be imposed by “diktat”. This unrealistic in present circumstances.

Gromyko denied5 Soviet Plan a “package,” countered assertions West’s plan represents concessions to earlier Soviet objections. Precedents exist for conclusion peace treaty with states successors to one which initiated war, while there is no evidence of existence of so-called German “entity”. West prepared sign agreements with West Germany re atomic armament Bundeswehr6 but pleads incompetence of Federal Republic when it comes to peace treaty. Proof of Soviet desire for reunification of Germany lies in support of East German confederation plan and advocacy urgent signature peace treaty with two existing German states which makes provision for later confederation. Re charge of discrimination in military restriction clauses, treaties with Austria, Italy and Japan which are not considered discriminatory have similar provisions. Soviet draft makes adequate provision for legitimate German defense forces and only prevents weapons of mass destruction, means of aggression. Meanwhile Soviet Draft Treaty is only one on table. Soviets awaiting comment are glad there has been discussion of concrete issues and refuse be so pessimistic as to believe all possibility for discussion on specific articles is exhausted.

Detailed report by airgram.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2059. Official Use Only. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/7 (Corrected), May 19, and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/7, May 20, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1352.↩
  2. For text of Couve de Murville’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/5, May 19, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 113–121 or Cmd. 868, pp. 45–51.↩
  3. For text of Grewe’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/7, June 6, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 535–539 or Cmd. 868, pp. 186–190.↩
  4. For text of Lloyd’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/16, May 19, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 121–124 or Cmd. 868, pp. 51–54.↩
  5. For text of this communiqué, March 3, see RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1959, pp. 11–13.↩
  6. For text of Gromyko’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/17, May 20, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 129–143 or Cmd. 868, pp. 54–62.↩
  7. Presumably Gromyko is referring to the Agreement for Cooperation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense, signed at Bonn on May 5.↩