Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

259. Notes of Discussion⁰

Washington, April 11, 1959, 10 a.m.

[Here follows a list of participants.]

Mr. Gordon Gray explained that he had suggested this meeting primarily to consider the two studies on military and nonmilitary actions which might be taken to maintain allied access to Berlin after such access has been unacceptably interfered with. Mr. Gray suggested that if agreement could be reached on these studies at this meeting, the principals responsible for the studies plus other officials as determined by the President, might go to Augusta on Thursday of next week (the usual NSC meeting time) to present these reports to the President.

General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had found the military paper on the Four Alternative Uses of Force generally O.K., but were very opposed to including the Summary and Conclusions. The Chiefs felt that only the basic study should be submitted to the President. The Chiefs had some comments on the study on non-military measures, but had found it generally O.K.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense found the papers generally O.K., subject to a few changes which could be worked out without taking them up at this meeting.

General Twining added that the Joint Chiefs recommend that the military paper be sent to General Norstad, and that his comments be awaited before submitting it to the President.

Mr. Gray showed some charts which had been prepared by CIA based on the Summary and Conclusions of each of the studies. Mr. Gray also said that the Joint Chiefs had some maps to illustrate the studies. He suggested that these might provide a means of presentation of the reports to the President, subject to the decisions as to the content of the reports.

Mr. Murphy said that he would go along with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He felt it would be premature to present these studies to the President next Thursday. He thought we should have the reaction of General Norstad’s Paris Planning Group first. Mr. Murphy said that this whole problem was in flux and, unless there were to be preliminary presentation to the President, more time would be required. He pointed out that the International Working Group will reconvene in London next Monday (April 13, 1959), and we should know more as a result of those meetings.

Mr. Gray said that was a respectable viewpoint, but his experience indicated that nothing was ever really ready, and meanwhile we go along making decisions by the force of events. He asked what national security policy, decisions the President has to make. Mr. Gray understood that Defense and JCS were deeply concerned at the Four-Power Working Group report. In summary, Mr. Gray wondered whether the President’s reactions and comments on these two studies would not be helpful now.

Mr. Irwin pointed out regarding the military study that the paper does not include Norstad’s planning for a possible probe. Mr. Irwin pointed out that if the paper was sent to General Norstad it would probably go into the Three-Power Planning Group.

Mr. Gray questioned whether this group would want to put the military study into the Three-Power Planning Group without the President’s knowing what has been put in there. Secretary McElroy said he thought the President should have the study and read it before it is put into the Four-Power Group. Mr. Gray suggested then that a decision be made whether to have the Thursday meeting with the President.

General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs wanted the military paper sent to the Three-Power Group in order to smoke out just what our allies are willing to do. He said that the reports to date were not encouraging. Secretary McElroy agreed that we want to find out whether our allies are prepared to go along with us. Mr. Gray said the question was whether responsible people think these studies are ready for the President. Secretary McElroy agreed that there were two or three things that still needed to be straightened out.

Mr. Murphy questioned whether there should be one paper or the entire problem submitted to the President. The State Department has visualized giving the President a comprehensive briefing on the entire problem of Berlin and Germany. Mr. Gray said that he had proposed that only the two studies be submitted to the President at this time. Mr. Murphy also thought that General Norstad should see the military study. Mr. Gray asked whether the military or the non-military studies should now be submitted to the President. Mr. Murphy thought that they should be submitted only after General Norstad’s comments have been received. General Twining said he wanted General Norstad’s comments but he also wanted the views of our allies as soon as possible. He said that until we submit our views the British have indicated that they will not plan for these contingencies.

Mr. Gray pointed out that May 11 is going to be a very important date. If Defense is to be prepared to take the steps contemplated in these studies, they need to know.

Mr. Murphy felt that General Norstad [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should have a reasonable time of three or four days, and then be asked to reflect his views before the studies go to the President. Mr. Irwin suggested that the studies could be sent to London tomorrow (April 12, 1959) for delivery to General Norstad by people who are going over with the working group. Secretary McElroy agreed that we should have General Norstad’s comments before submitting the studies to the President. He also believed that they should be submitted to the President before they are given to a Three-Power group. However, we must as soon as possible get these studies into a Three-Power group.

Mr. Gray questioned whether after General Norstad’s comments were received, how the studies should be presented to the President. Secretary McElroy thought that next Thursday would be a nice date to plan on and then let the President decide what further he wanted to do. Mr. Murphy suggested that the studies be given to the President to read and then he can decide what he wants to do about a meeting. Secretary McElroy thought that the President should be asked to read the studies looking toward Three-Power action. In answer to Mr. Gray’s question as to whether the non-military paper would also be submitted, Mr. Murphy said that State would like the President to read that as well. Mr. Irwin suggested that the non-military paper be treated the same as the military. It was generally agreed that these two studies should be treated the same, and that an overall memorandum of transmittal to the President should be agreed upon.

In answer to Mr. Gray’s question, General Cabell suggested that the intelligence splits in the military paper not be hidden. General Cabell felt that the users of that document should see those split views. General Twining said he thought that was right. Mr. Gray agreed that the intelligence splits should not be hidden but questioned whether the principals would like to express their views on these splits. Secretary Quarles thought the President may not wish the principals to resolve these splits. He thought that they should be presented as balanced judgments. Mr. Gray pointed out that these are very fundamental splits, and that the President may have to decide. However, Mr. Gray understood that the principals do not want to try to resolve them.

Mr. Gray then questioned whether the principals should address themselves to the timing of the various measures in the study. Mr. Murphy thought that making plans for these measures was essential but he personally did not think that any of them would ever happen. General Twining said that the JCS did not think that the specific actions that should be taken at any given time can be accurately predicted in advance. Mr. Irwin thought that we must make our plans for the worst contingencies in any case.

Mr. Gray then summed up his understanding that the remaining disagreements on the two studies would be ironed out—that the nonmilitary paper would go along with the military, plus an agreed memorandum of transmittal—and that we would await General Norstad’s comments before sending the studies to the President.

General Twining asked whether the summary and conclusions were going to be sent to General Norstad. Admiral Triebel expressed his concern because the study itself does not make clear that a “garrison airlift” has already been agreed upon.

Mr. Gray asked whether there should be any conclusions. General Twining suggested that the military paper begin with the body of the study on page 10, and that there be no conclusions. This was agreed. It was also agreed that the summary on the non-military paper was O.K.

Mr. Murphy suggested that both General Norstad and the planning group in Bonn get the non-military paper. Mr. Gray suggested that if either of them had any comments they might also go to the President with the paper.

Mr. Gray then asked what decisions were needed regarding the so-called “phased plan” which was going back to the Four-Power Working Group. He asked whether there were any differences between State and Defense on this plan. Also he wondered if there were any policy decisions on the high altitude flight to Berlin.

On the latter question, General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs were waiting for the U.S. reply to go back to Moscow. Secretary Quarles said that Secretary Herter had cleared that an additional high altitude flight might be made, but not until the U.S. note had been delivered in Moscow. Then, there was to be a limit of one flight. General Norstad had been told to be prepared for this flight but to await further word.

General Twining said that Admiral Dudley now had received some new comments from the Joint Chiefs on the “phased plan”. Mr. Irwin said that there are differences between State and Defense on which they would be getting together with State after this meeting.

At Mr. Murphy’s request, Mr. Merchant said that the May 11 meeting would deal with Germany with all its aspects and Berlin. He did not worry as much as Mr. Gray over the “phased plan” or possible differences. At the May 11 meeting we will present four positions:

1. On Berlin, which will be simple if we mean what we say about not being kicked out.

2. On reunification of Germany.

3. On European security arrangements.

4. On a German peace treaty.

On Berlin, we are working from a clear national policy, only the modalities have to be worked out. On reunification, we are working from existing policy based on free elections. On the peace treaty, there is a clear policy going back to 1955. European security is the only area where there is discussion between State, Defense and JCS as to whether extensions of past policy should be worked in, in order to obtain the support of public opinion for our position. This area also deeply involves the attitude of our allies. The question is how much of our 1957 disarmament proposals we will include in the plan. We must obviously talk this question out with our allies.

Mr. Merchant said there is also the question of stationing certain missiles in Germany. Defense and JCS do not wish to waive that right, whereas the British, French and West Germans would waive it. He pointed out that, after all, we cannot make the West Germans refuse to waive that right.

Mr. Merchant said there was also the question of inserting surprise attack formulas in the package. Defense and JCS are reviewing our past positions on this subject during the next two weeks. This question must also be determined in part by discussions with our allies.

Mr. Merchant summed up that some of these questions may be ones on which State and Defense will have to get a command decision. However, he thought that they were not yet matured sufficiently for presentation to the President. As far as the other aspects of the negotiations are concerned, Mr. Merchant said that he does not feel unprepared as regards to policy, and the rest of the problem involves tactics. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State would certainly want to get the President’s approval to positions before going to the negotiations.

Mr. Irwin agreed generally with Mr. Merchant. He said that what points of difference there were were related to the European security arrangements. He felt that the U.S. position should not be based on the feelings of our allies, but rather we should determine what position we wish to take with our allies. Mr. Gray agreed that the problem was that the U.S. position should not be determined by our allies. Mr. Merchant said that he had intended to suggest that our position be influenced by, but not determined by, our allies.

Mr. Gray said that he was only concerned that, if basic decisions involving national security were required, that they be secured in time.

Mr. Murphy said that the State Department was determined to get a decision on their European security proposals. He hoped that they could be reconciled with Defense, but that otherwise they would certainly go to the President in ample time for his decision. In answer to Mr. Gray, Mr. Murphy said that we must get the President’s decision before the Four-Power Working Group meetings are finished.

Secretary Quarles said they had discussed with Secretary Herter the problems of disarmament and surprise attack. As a result, both State and Defense have instituted a broad attack on both problems. Mr. Quarles felt that these problems were much the most serious. He referred to the 1957 policy on disarmament and said that it was very dangerous to make piecemeal changes in that document. He urged that we block out the disarmament issues in a way which would identify any revisions in the August 1957 policy. He felt sure that there must be time for the President to consider this issue, or otherwise we might make a dangerous slip. Secretary Quarles said that he did not disagree with the State Department on the need for negotiating tactics, but he felt that we should be very clear on our policy before playing it in a conference.

Mr. Gray said that he assumed from this discussion that a decision would be sought from the President in a broad and timely way.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary Subject Files, Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Conference Room at the White House.