Office of the Historian

155. Memorandum of Conversation0

SVE/MC–2
London, February 4, 1959, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference re Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

  • Secretary Dulles
  • Minister Barbour
  • General Norstad
  • Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
  • Ambassador Whitney
  • Mr. Raymond Thurston
  • Mr. Livingston Merchant
  • Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

After reading the “Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference Re Berlin”1 General Norstad said he thought the UK and France could accept the plan of action proposed. He believed that the Western powers had to be firm but deliberate. All possibility of misconception should be avoided by letting the Soviets know precisely what we were thinking. His concern about the old paragraph 4D2 had been that it contemplated taking the ultimate action too fast.

[Page 316]

In response to Mr. Thurston’s question as to whether the first convoy, assuming it got through, should be followed by others, the Secretary said it would seem a good idea to continue sending through convoys until some sort of a pattern were established, perhaps for a period of two weeks or so.3

[1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Secretary mentioned that a new paper had been received yesterday from the JCS,4 filling in some of the paragraphs in the Memorandum of Conclusions.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1201. Top Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting was held at the Embassy Residence. In SVE/MC–3 through 8 Hillenbrand recorded Dulles’ conversation with Norstad on tripartitism; the French naval command question; NATO integrated air defense; French atomic questions; IRBMs for Germany; and IRBMs for Greece and Turkey. (Ibid.)↩
  2. Document 150.↩
  3. See Document 98.↩
  4. In reviewing the day’s events in a message to President Eisenhower, Dulles stated that Norstad believed this approach was “intelligent and practical.” (Dulte 2 from London, February 4; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1197)↩
  5. Reference is to CM–289–59, February 2, which outlined measures that could be taken with regard to Berlin that would be detectable through intelligence channels, but would not create public alarm. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/2–259)↩