Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, January 21, 1959, noon.

1542. Paris pass USRO, USCINCEUR, Thurston and West. I had long private conversation last night with Pres. Heuss. He is excellent man, intellectually independent, morally superior. He said he was not free (because of his constitutional status) to express himself publicly, but held certain views on of German foreign policy which were not fundamentally at variance with those of Chancellor.

After querying me on Mikoyan visit, he observed:

1. There must be no negotiation with Soviets on Berlin question except in larger framework, and we must continue convince them of our firmness in face of their unacceptable proposals. Could not himself now envisage suitable alternative to our present position.

2. We should be ready to talk to Soviets ad infinitum on any and all subjects, excepting Berlin in isolation, regardless of any expectation of constructive results.

3. A summit conference should not be held unless preliminary preparations indicated successful conclusions.

4. He did not think we should depart from current policies because accused of intransigence. In personal life, if one is opposed to murder, arson, stealing, one does not alter ethics when charged with being old-fashioned, or when change might seem momentarily opportune or tempting.

5. However, he thought Western Powers would make mistake in not welcoming, even initiating, conference with Soviets, and taking their chances in regard adverse propaganda. But would be unrealistic of them to enter upon such parleys with expectation of achieving propaganda victory.

6. Exchanges of notes, the language of which bored people, were more unfavorable to us than whatever might come from the confrontation and debate of Foreign Ministers.

In this connection, my new Norwegian colleague lately told me he thought Westerners vastly exaggerated our inferiority to Soviets in propaganda field. He considered public opinion should be assessed in terms of political reactions. In that respect, in his own country, in France, Italy, and elsewhere in Western Europe, the power of indigenous Communist parties had been steadily on wane. This constituted refutation of strident allegations that Western statesmen could not hold their own against Soviet diplomats.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Bonn Embassy Files: Lot 64 F 291. Secret. Drafted by Bruce. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, USAFE, and USAREUR.