Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV

140. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower⁰

December 5, 1960.

Dear Mr. President: This Government’s bargaining strength in the forthcoming tariff conference in Geneva has been seriously impaired by the Tariff Commission’s peril point findings on the products under consideration for possible tariff concessions.¹ These findings were sent to you by the Commission on November 27, 1960, as required by law, and have also been made available to the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements.

Because of the careful selectivity exercised in determining the list of products which was published last May, with your approval, for consideration of possible tariff concessions,² the list represented only 26.3 percent of our total imports in 1959 from the countries with which we contemplate negotiations. The Tariff Commission’s peril point findings are adverse to tariff concessions on products representing one-third of the trade coverage of the list, thus reducing the possible scope of our negotiating ability to only 17.5 percent of our imports from those countries. In the case of some countries, we will be able to offer concessions on less than one percent of our imports from them.

Under the circumstances, it will be exceedingly difficult, if at all possible, for us to conclude meaningful agreements with most of the countries with which we expect to negotiate, and with some of them we may not be able to conclude any agreements at all. The reduced bargaining potential with the European Economic Community (EEC), where the attrition caused by peril points is nearly 38 percent, is particularly serious. Unless the United States is able to induce the EEC to accept a one-sided agreement—and this is not a possibility to be relied upon—the United States will be unable to take full advantage of the offer already made by the EEC to reduce its common external tariff by 20 percent provided adequate reciprocity is offered by other countries in return. There is accordingly a serious risk that we will be unable to accomplish our objective of furthering the interests of the United States by securing the lowest possible level in the new common external tariff of the EEC as well as substantial tariff reductions by other countries.

Although there is no feasible course of remedial action which I can suggest to you at this time, I felt that you would wish to be informed of this situation.

Faithfully yours,

Christian A. Herter

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Confidential. Attached to Document 141. Another copy of Herter’s letter shows it was drafted by Kallis and cleared with Weiss, Davis, Adair, Kirlin, and Martin. (Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/12–560)
1. Not found.
2. Regarding this list, see Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1960, pp. 968–973.