567. Memorandum From Twining to Gates1
SUBJECT
- Soviet Disarmament Proposal of 2 June 1960 (U)
1. Pursuant to the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 8 June 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Soviet disarmament proposal of 2 June 1960. If adopted, this proposal [Typeset Page 2077] would dismantle the U.S. nuclear capability, including the foreign base structure essential to our forward strategy, before any controlled reduction of Sino-Soviet conventional capability had been accomplished. Further, since control functions throughout the disarmament process would, under the Soviet proposal, be carried on essentially only at declared plants and sites with no inspection for clandestine activities, there would be no assurance that even the nuclear capability of the Soviets had been equally nullified.
2. Enough has been said by the West about the necessity for a balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control arrangement that the Soviets undoubtedly know this proposal is completely unacceptable to the West. Indeed, in his letter which transmitted the proposal, Mr. Khrushchev asserted that the West is “not ready to implement it”. Though he cleverly attributed the proposal for immediate nuclear disarmament to French insistence on early restrictions on nuclear delivery systems, the Soviet proposal goes much further than anything which has been suggested by the French.
3. Thus, this proposal appears to constitute but another effort in furtherance of the Sino-Soviet objective to disrupt Free World alliances, disintegrate our collective defenses, and frustrate the United States forward strategy. There has never yet been any reason to regard apparent Soviet willingness to negotiate disarmament measures as other than diversionary tactics, and there is no basis for regarding the present proposal in any different light.
4. For the above reason and also because of its failure to remedy the shortcomings of past Soviet proposals in such areas as control, preliminary [Facsimile Page 2] studies, phasing and post-disarmament peacekeeping, it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposal is completely unacceptable. In any examination of the Soviet proposal at the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference, we should adhere firmly to the principles, conditions and time-phasing set forth in the Western disarmament plan of 16 March 1960. In this connection, it is observed that Mr. Eaton, in his cable to the Secretary of State of 7 June 1960, anticipates heavy pressure from all four of our Allies to make substantial amendments to the Western plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have already rejected in JCSM–203–60, dated 12 May 1960, the French proposal for control of means of delivery for nuclear weapons. Without prejudging any other proposed modification of a specific Western proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard it as imperative that the United States insist strongly upon Allied unity in the future, remembering that it was an instance of disunity which provided the Soviets the opportunity for concealing the true purpose of their present proposal.
5. In addition, it is important that our governmental departments and agencies, and our negotiators, bear constantly in mind the [Typeset Page 2078] fundamental principle which underlies any disarmament measure as well as a dangerous tendency which constantly asserts itself to lead us astray from the principle. We rely upon armaments for national security. With disarmament, there must be a quid pro quo—an adequate substitute if our security is to remain unimpaired. The exchange must be simultaneous with no hiatus. Traditionally, we have regarded the substitute to be an adequate system of inspection and control to assure initial and continuing compliance, since good faith, alone, has been demonstrably proven inadequate. The tendency, which too often achieves headway, is toward the erosion, during the negotiating process, of the control system originally deemed necessary. This result is readily apparent in the nuclear test cessation negotiations, where, through the medium of the moratorium, the United States has, in effect, acceded to the Soviet demand for a cessation of nuclear testing without any assurance that the Soviets are not, themselves, testing. This undesirable precedent must not be permitted to influence the outcome of the Ten Nation negotiations.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Source: Conveys JCS views on a June 2 Soviet disarmament proposal. Secret. 2 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman’s File.↩