Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

566. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 9, 1960

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list. (Page 13)

Secretary Herter suggested that the discussion be based on the memorandum, subject: “Course of Action in Nuclear Test Negotiations”, dated June 7, 1960 (TAB A). Particular attention might be paid to the problem of safeguarding nuclear explosions used in the research program to ensure against their use for weapons development, and to the problem of high altitude detection. He expressed regret at the fact that the Soviets have seen fit to disavow the statements of their scientists at the recent meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Groups by denying plans to take part in any coordinated research program for the purpose of verifying or revising the recommendations of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts. Since any declared moratorium is conditioned on agreement as to a coordinated research program, the moratorium concept is endangered.

Mr. Farley summarized Soviet objections to the United States-suggested co-ordinated research program as follows: Too large a number of nuclear tests, especially small yield tests; study of decoupling which is unnecessary and undesirable; lack of sufficient safeguards, such as internal inspection, for ensuring that devices are not being exploded for the purpose of weapons development.

Mr. Herter remarked that these objections are much like Soviet objections to our “Plowshare” program of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. He called on Mr. McCone to present results of his study as to legal means by which satisfactory safeguards for ensuring against weapons development might be offered.

Mr. McCone responded that the devising of a satisfactory plan presented considerable difficulties. While it is necessary to operate a sophisticated array of instruments in order to secure really useful weapons information, any explosion will give at least a “go-no go” result and might to that extent supply some information of value for weapons development. Therefore, he continued, the possibility of opening the devices for internal inspection has been considered. To do so, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, the AEC must declassify the needed devices. Such declassification might make the device available to countries other than the three nuclear powers, and would thus defeat one of the major purposes of a treaty; i.e., the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons information. The use of U.K. and Soviet devices has also been considered. But the AEC would find it most difficult, under this alternative, to fulfill its statutory responsibility for safety of atomic devices. Mr. Herter suggested that UK devices be examined internally in the UK and, then, in transport to the U.S. and thereafter, be handled as are our devices. Mr. McCone remarked that this would involve quite a cumbersome disassembling and reassembling procedure. Besides, it is doubtful whether the U.K. is in possession of devices which could be so used with a range of yields necessary for the research program.

Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that we declassify some old gun-type devices of our own; such devices as would not be likely to assist another country in achieving nuclear capability. Mr. McCone wondered whether such a device would supply the range of yields necessary for the research program. Dr. English stated that there might be old gun-type devices which could be specially altered for the purpose of giving the required yield, but that such alteration would be a difficult task. They could not be fabricated to yield less than one kiloton. Mr. McCone said that the Kistiakowsky suggestion could be considered. Dr. Kistiakowsky expressed his belief that use of old gun-type devices, though perhaps not as ideal for the research program as use of sophisticated small devices, might be adequate and would be easier to defend from the political standpoint, since there could hardly be suspicion of use for weapons development purposes. Mr. Herter asked whether the number and size of shots planned for the VELA program was a fixed determination from which there should be no departure. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that the Panofsky Panel had been under no instructions to determine a minimum number and had, therefore, selected 12 as a desirable number for an adequate program. He quoted Dr. Panofsky as saying that the panel would not be unanimous as to a minimum number and minimum range of yield. Mr. McCone defined the objective of declassification: To make available old gun-type devices, developed so as to be of use for a sufficient number of shots (perhaps a few less than planned for VELA) and not likely to be of assistance to any powers seeking to develop a nuclear capability. He expressed doubt that any nation without considerable nuclear material resources would be able to make use of the comparatively elaborate and extravagant device using large quantities of U–235 which could be developed. He agreed that the very small nuclear explosions were not essential, although omitting them would require some reorientation of the program. Mr. Herter stressed the importance of obtaining scientific advice within the shortest possible time as to the possibilities of effective use in the research program of declassifiable devices, and on the minimum number of nuclear tests necessary.

Mr. Northrup announced a meeting to take place next week of the Panofsky Panel. It is expected that the Latter brothers and other seismologists will also attend. They are to consider the best distribution of yields for nuclear devices to be used in the research program. This group can consider the question raised by the Principals. Dr. Kistiakowsky defined the question as: The number and yield of devices which need to be detonated in order to make worthwhile the research program on improvement of detection and identification methods. Part of the issue would be the essentiality of detonation of very small devices, and whether these could perhaps be replaced. He also suggested that everyone connected with the planning for Project VELA be included in the group. Mr. Northrup agreed and proposed also the addition of Dr. Harold Brown. He expressed confidence that an answer could be supplied within a week. Mr. Herter asked Mr. McCone whether he would be prepared to accept the guidelines and conclusions of the group of scientists. Mr. McCone indicated that he would accept, pointing out that he had accepted the recommendations as to Project VELA.

Mr. Northrup reported an inclination toward tests with a yield range from one kiloton to 50 kilotons, rather than yield ranges beginning at a fraction of a kiloton, as suggested by the United States at the meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group. However, he expressed belief that the need for experimental shots to determine the effectiveness of decoupling will be reindorsed by the panel of scientists. Mr. McCone and Mr. Irwin reaffirmed the importance of including decoupling in the research program. The study of decoupling is still in the theoretical stage. Mr. McCone said that the negotiations would be at an impasse if the Soviets do not accept the need for this.

Mr. McCone promised to inform the panel of scientists as to the type of devices which can be made available for modification and declassification.

Mr. Farley remarked that the problem of dissemination of information to nth countries could be resolved by getting Congressional relief so that certain devices could be released for the program without being declassified and disseminated. He said that we would be very vulnerable vis-a-vis the Congress if we throw the blame for our inability to use open devices on the limitations imposed by domestic law, without having first consulted with Congress. Mr. McCone stated that the suggestion was worth considering, and that he would discuss the matter with the Joint Committee. As to the use of open devices in peaceful uses projects, it might be possible for Project Gnome and for the Athabasca oil project, but not for the harbor and canal projects, since these require devices based on very advanced technology.

Mr. McCone suggested that we dismiss the idea of using U.K. or Soviet devices and, instead, attempt to satisfy Soviet objections by declassification or legal action. Mr. Herter expressed belief that, when a program of seismic improvement is being carried out earnestly and in good faith, the scientific group in charge might well decide that a number of detonations, additional to the minimum agreed number, might serve a useful purpose. Therefore, the program should be as flexible as possible, and it should be agreed on as soon as possible.

Mr. Farley referred to two other issues on which we hope to obtain agreement soon: the parties article and the quota provisions. The former is designed to ensure, as far as possible, the accession of Red China. The U.K. has promised comment on our proposed language for both articles. Mr. Herter recalled that, based on the report of the 1958 Conference of Experts, we have put forward a proposal calling for 20 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union for events of magnitude 4.75 or above. The Rand Report, summarized at the last meeting of principals on May 10, has however held out the hope of a reduction in unidentified events, based on redistribution and possible addition of control posts.

Mr. Northrup commented that the Rand Report should only be considered as offering an interesting direction for further research. It is merely a theoretical indication of progress which might be made in a research program. He quoted Dr. Richard Latter, who was principally responsible for it, as stating that no proposal to reduce the quota should be based on this report until a research program establishes the correctness of its conclusions. Mr. McCone advocated that the Rand Report not be considered in any way at this time as a basis for policy changes. Mr. Herter expressed disappointment that there had been briefings and much publicity about this report. Mr. Farley said he understood the Rand Report conclusions are no less certain than the conclusions on which we based the proposal for 20 inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union. Mr. Irwin replied that he understood the Rand Report to indicate there might be many more seismic events in the Soviet Union than the 100 estimate contained in it. Mr. Northrup reported an AFTAC study as determining there are about 120 annual seismic events. He pointed out that the efficiency of the system advocated in the Rand Report would be lessened by the use of 30 element arrays instead of 100 element arrays. A study has indicated the impracticability of using 100 element arrays in the Soviet Union. Mr. McCone advocated that we not base policy on theory not yet supported by experience, and that we base our stand on previous determinations while insisting on a seismic improvement program, the results of which may lead to adjustment of the quota.

In reply to Mr. Irwin’s question as to the status of the formula by which we arrive at our quota of 20, Mr. Herter replied that the number we adopt would bear a relationship to probable number of events even though the relationship might not be explicitly agreed. Mr. Farley said that we planned to write a specific number into the treaty, but that this would be subject to revision at the end of two years and periodically thereafter on the basis of recalculation of number of events and other factors.

Dr. Kistiakowsky advocated that the Rand Corporation be requested to supply an explanation as to the reliability of the conclusions in their report. His suggestion was supported by Mr. Herter and Mr. Gates. Dr. Romney suggested that an independent evaluation of the Rand Report be made by a capable group. Mr. Herter replied that he would prefer to have Rand’s own evaluation first. Mr. McCone repeated that the Rand Report should not be considered in any way. He expressed regret that it had received so much publicity before the Joint Committee and in private conversations with the British. Mr. Herter stated what he believed to be the conclusion of the group: That we await an evaluation from Rand Corporation before giving any more consideration to possible use of the figures in the report as a basis for negotiations.

Mr. Herter recalled the cost estimate of one to five billion dollars for installation of 22 control posts in the Soviet Union, mentioned by Mr. Northrup at the May 10th meeting of principals. Mr. Northrup said that this estimate had been presented by United Electrodynamics Corporation at the Joint Committee hearings in April. The corporation has since made a brief restudy and now estimates that installation on the territory of the Soviet Union will cost 750 million dollars, and the entire 1958 Geneva system, exclusive of high altitude, up to 3½ billion dollars. The corporation is now undertaking a careful 90-day study and will present a final estimate in July or August. The AFTAC cost study of last year, which arrived at a figure of 1½ billion dollars for installation, is now believed to have been an underestimation. Mr. Gates stressed the necessity of securing careful cost estimates.

Mr. Herter, Mr. Gates and Mr. McCone agreed that the time has come to make a determination whether the Geneva negotiations are in range of agreement. Such a determination is inherent in the National Security Council directive, Mr. McCone said. It would be wrong to launch a seismic improvement program, costing 75 to 100 million dollars, if its results were to be rejected or to have no practical use. He advocated that the principals meet again by the end of the month in order to decide on alternative courses proposed in Section III of the memorandum (TAB A) in light of the Soviet attitude.

Mr. Irwin reported that the study on possible alternatives to the high altitude system proposed by the Geneva experts has been completed but, pending review by a working group, it is not yet ready for the principals. Dr. Kistiakowsky remarked that, while the Rand Report may have been a bit too optimistic about improvements in the system, the report on high altitude delivered by the Department of Defense specialists, at the meeting of principals on May 5, may be too pessimistic. An ad hoc study group reporting to General Betts has concluded that a simplified x-ray system for use in satellites, having a capability up to 100 million kilometers, might be available much sooner than a system having capability up to 1 billion kilometers. Also, a preliminary study by Lockheed Corporation appears to indicate the feasibility of replacing satellites at 60,000 km as recommended by the Geneva experts with low altitude satellites (perhaps at 300 km) having a capability from 50 km out to distance of capability of the x-ray system. The significance of these developments are a substantial reduction of costs and saving in time, deriving from elimination of a sophisticated system of satellites in far space, and, possibly, elimination of ground-based equipment for detection of events occurring at high altitude. He suggested that the decision of the principals as to high altitude alternatives be delayed a week or so, in order that it may be based on consideration of all studies. Mr. Herter recommended that another meeting of principals be held within two weeks.

Mr. McCone recommended certain revisions to the memorandum concerning courses of action, and these were approved. Agreed revisions are contained in TAB B.

Tab A

Paper Prepared for Principals of Geneva Test Group Meeting

Course of Action in Nuclear Test Negotiations

The meeting of Principals Thursday at 10:15 AM will consider the course of action to be pursued in the nuclear test negotiations, considering specifically (a) the current status of negotiations, (b) US tactics in the period immediately ahead, and (c) the course of action to be followed pursuant to last week’s NSC decision, namely that we should make clear these negotiations and the US moratorium cannot go on indefinitely without a decision, and that the US should determine at what time or at what stage it should seek to place a time limit on its duration.

I. Current status of negotiations.

A chronology of major developments in the negotiations during the past six months is attached. At present, the focal point of Conference discussion is an effort by the US and UK Delegations to seek clarification of the Soviet position on the coordinated research program. Although the Soviet Delegation has reaffirmed the May 3 declaration, accepting the idea of a strictly limited number of nuclear detonations for research purposes, their statement that they will not conduct the chemical explosions discussed by their scientists nor begin coordinated research until signing of the treaty leaves important ambiguities in their position which should be clarified to assist us in determining the prospects for any meaningful coordinated program. For example, we do not know whether the Soviet position is (a) that national research programs should begin now and their coordination begin when the treaty is signed; or (b) that coordinated research should begin now insofar as it involves Soviet observation of US tests and programs but should not involve US observation in the USSR until treaty signature. Moreover, we do not know whether they have cancelled the entire Soviet component of the research program or only the four or five chemical explosions in it.

II. Objectives and Tactics in negotiations during current month.

The following course of action is recommended as a basis for discussions at the meeting. It sets forth certain steps and objectives to be carried out during the month of June to lay the basis for decisive action, and suggests alternative courses that might be pursued at the end of the month.

In general, the objective during the current month should be to lay the basis both for governmental determination and public acceptance of a course of action that will achieve the purpose defined by the NSC decision to, in effect, place a time limit on the duration of the US test moratorium.

The following steps are recommended:

A. The U.S. Delegation should be instructed to stress that the US position as set forth in the White House announcement of March 29 and subsequently in the conference is that a moratorium on testing below an agreed treaty threshold is conditioned upon prior agreement on a coordinated research program. The U.S. Delegation should also stress the corollary of this position, namely that if no agreement can be reached at an early date on treaty and on a coordinated program of research, there can be no such moratorium.

B. The U.S. Delegation should press urgently for clarification of the Soviet position on the coordinated research program.

C. The US should seek to deprive the Soviets of any argument that Project VELA explosions might involve weapons development and to lay the basis in public opinion for the conduct of such explosions. Two alternative possibilities for accomplishing this purpose might be (a) if a fuller technical justification for the present US position on safeguards to demonstrate conclusively that it would not permit weapons development cannot be found, to find methods consistent with the Atomic Energy Act for constructing devices that might be opened to inspection or opening existing devices, and indicating willingness to have observation by qualified scientists on a world-wide basis, or (b) to state US willingness to employ UK devices which would be open to inspection by the three parties before their importation into the US. We understand from the AEC that there are various legal, practical and safety factors which would make the latter course extremely difficult.

D. The U.S. Delegation should seek to ascertain promptly whether the harder Soviet line regarding research has affected the prospects of early agreement on other issues before the conference. In this connection, we should press, in particular, for Soviet responses to the various proposals we have tabled prior to the summit, i.e., quota, staffing, criteria, definition of magnitudes, flight routes, observers and phasing. In order to increase pressure on the Soviets to be specific about the quota, the US might indicate that if the Soviets are unwilling to discuss quota apart from the question of duration of a moratorium, we are prepared to consider these questions simultaneously.

E. In order to assess and demonstrate decisively whether agreement within a reasonable length of time is possible, the US should seek to define and bring to public attention, as quickly as possible, the full range of remaining issues which would have to be resolved if agreement is to be achieved. Specifically, the questions of high altitude and parties should be brought to the fore by the tabling of US proposals. We should also, within the month, in order to complete the process of bringing the negotiations to a decisive focus, fill in all significant gaps in the Western position by tabling the quota article, the definition of nuclear detonations and the revision of Annex I.

III. Alternative courses of action at the end of June.

On the basis of the issues and Soviet attitudes defined by the foregoing tactics, the US should, at the end of the current month, decide upon one or more of the following steps which serve to define with varying degrees of exactness a time limit on the US moratorium.

A. In the absence of substantial agreement in the coordinated research program, the US should (a) announce specific dates for several shots in the VELA series, (b) indicate that we are still hopeful that agreement on safeguards and coordination can be reached before these dates, but the conduct of the explosions will not be dependent upon such agreement, and (c) reaffirm the December 29 position on nuclear weapons tests. This US may also wish to announce one or more Plowshare shots at this time since these, like VELA shots, are unrelated to the moratorium.

B. Depending upon the Soviet attitude and prospects of agreement defined by the tactics outlined above, the US may also wish to announce at the same time or as a subsequent move the indefinite suspension of atmospheric tests on a unilateral basis and either (a) state that in the absence of substantial progress toward agreement, underground weapons tests will also begin at an early date or (b) announce specific weapons tests which would take place after the initial VELA and Plowshare shots.

Recommendations

1. That a decision be reached as to US tactics in the immediate future.

2. That an early meeting of Principals be set to consider the position to be taken on high altitude.

3. That a meeting be scheduled before the end of the month to review the status of negotiations and determine a further course of action.

4. That Defense be requested to expedite its assessment of the Rand report as a basis for determining its relationship to discussion of the quota.

Attachment

CHRONOLOGY OF NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION NEGOTIATIONS

December 18, 1959—Technical Working Group 2 concluded with agreement on possible improvements in the Geneva control system, but with disagreement on the capabilities of the control system, and on criteria for identification of underground seismic events.

December 29, 1959—Augusta statement by the President that United States will be free to resume nuclear weapons tests on expiration of its voluntary moratorium on December 31, but will not do so without advance announcement.

February 11, 1960—US proposal for:

(1) Threshold treaty which would end, upon signature, atmospheric and underwater tests, high altitude tests as far as effective controls are agreed, and underground tests above 4.75 seismic magnitude reading.

(2) Joint research and experimentation to improve detection of small underground tests and permit extension of the ban.

February 16, 1960—Soviet position on criteria for identification of underground events shifts almost to the US–UK position in Technical Working Group 2.

March 19, 1960—Soviets propose conclusion of a threshold treaty as proposed on February 11, but covering all outer space tests and with the joint research program accompanied by an obligation not to conduct underground weapons tests below the threshold.

March 29, 1960—Eisenhower-Macmillan Camp David communique declares negotiation on remaining issues leading to a threshold treaty should be speeded up and completed. As soon as a threshold treaty is signed and arrangements are made for a coordinated research program, a voluntary unilaterally declared moratorium could be instituted for an agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold.

April to mid May, 1960—US and UK introduce proposals on several major elements of a threshold treaty including staffing and extension of the control system; Soviet Union marks time.

May 3, 1960—Soviet Union agrees to proceed with working out a joint research program which would include a strictly limited number of joint underground nuclear explosions. Soviets agree that the moratorium should be unilaterally declared but propose a four to five year duration co-extensive with the program of joint research.

May 7, 1960—White House announces Project VELA expansion to a level of $66 million for FY 61, including such nuclear explosions as are necessary.

May 11, 1960—Experts meet in Geneva to discuss the seismic research program. The Soviets describe a program of fairly extensive seismic research including a number of chemical explosions.

May 17, 1960—Scheduled Summit meeting does not occur.

May 30, 1960—Geneva Experts adjourn with Soviets opposing US plans for studies of decoupling and for a number of nuclear explosions, and expressing view that research program should begin only with signature of treaty.

June 2 and 3, 1960—Tsarapkin rejects US proposals for safeguards to insure that nuclear explosions do not advance weapons development. Disclaims research necessary except as US condition for moratorium; insists on four to five year moratorium duration. States research should be joint, with full Soviet examination of internals of nuclear devices used.

Tab B

Revisions to Memorandum at Tab A

REVISIONS TO MEMORANDUM, “COURSE OF ACTION IN NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS”

1. In paragraph I, insert the following after the third sentence:

Their recent statements are particularly confusing in that they apparently renounce the statement of intentions made by the Soviet scientists in the Seismic Research Advisory Committee meetings.

2. In paragraph II, delete the third sentence.

3. In paragraph II, subparagraph A should read as follows:

A. The U.S. Delegation should be instructed to stress that the U.S. position, as set forth in the White House announcement of March 29, and subsequently in the Conference, is that a moratorium on testing below an agreed treaty threshold is conditioned upon: (a) prior agreement on a coordinated research program; and (b) prior satisfactory agreement on the other issues outstanding, such as on-site inspections, control commission, control post and inspection team staffing, voting matters and peaceful use detonations (also the issues of length of moratorium, schedule for installation of temporary and permanent stations and high altitude monitoring). The U.S. Delegation should also stress the corollary of this position; namely, that, if no agreement can be reached at an early date on all of these treaty issues and on a coordinated program of research, there can be no such moratorium.

4. In paragraph II, the following second sentence should be added to subparagraph B:

However, in so pressing, it should avoid as far as possible any implication that it is the U.S. which will gain by Soviet acceptance (and, hence, the U.S. would be expected to compromise on other essential issues).

5. In paragraph II, subparagraph C should be deleted and the following subparagraph C and D should be substituted:

C. The U.S. should seek to deprive the Soviets of any argument that Project VELA explosions might involve weapons development and to lay the basis in public opinion for the conduct of such explosions. Note: Due to the technical, legal, safety, and other problems involved, the alternate possibilities of using USSR or U.K. devices for Project VELA nuclear shots are deemed an unworkable solution. Other possible alternatives for accomplishing this purpose might be: (a) to develop and fabricate suitable U.S. gun-type designs, and in the necessary yields, which might be declassified; and (b) to secure necessary legislation or Congressional sanction to reveal to the U.K. and the USSR the internal design of the classified device presently planned for the VELA program. (It should be noted that an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act or Congressional sanction to permit the U.S. to reveal the internal design of the classified device to the U.K. and the USSR would present serious difficulties with respect to certain U.S. Allies, particularly France.) The AEC believes that one of the above two alternatives may be possible and has agreed to further examine these two possibilities as a matter of urgency in order to determine if either is practical. Consequently, the AEC will promptly prepare a study which will outline the legal, technical and other considerations which would have to be resolved. The AEC position will be determined after such studies have been carried out and further considered.

D. The U.S. should emphasize publicly and in the Conference the facts that: (a) the proposed safeguards are adequate to give assurance to the Soviets that no significant weapon progress will be made. This is possible if the proposed U.S. safeguards are carried out by both sides or by an international team; and (b) under existing U.S. law, it is impossible to open our devices to the Soviets without declassifying them and, hence, making weapons information available to all countries.

6. In paragraph II, subparagraph D should be deleted and the following subparagraph E should be substituted:

E. The U.S. Delegation should seek to ascertain promptly whether the harder Soviet line regarding research has affected the prospects of early agreement on other issues before the Conference. In this connection, we should press immediately, in particular, for Soviet responses to the various proposals we have tabled prior to the Summit; i.e., quota (and the procedures under which its inspections can be used), staffing criteria, definition of magnitudes, flight routes, observers and phasing. In order to increase pressure on the Soviets to be specific about the quota, the U.S. might indicate that, if the Soviets are unwilling to discuss quota apart from the question of duration of a moratorium, we are prepared to consider these questions simultaneously, but it must be understood that agreement to a moratorium is dependent on a resolution of all other unresolved issues.

7. In paragraph II, old subparagraph E becomes now subparagraph F.

8. In paragraph III, subparagraph A, the words “and other outstanding issues” should be inserted after “coordinated research program” on the second line.

9. Add the following recommendations, numbered 5 and 6, to the section entitled “Recommendations”:

5. U.S. Government spokesmen both here and abroad should make every effort to explain publicly the meaning and importance of the issues which must be resolved, and the necessity for prompt resolution.

6. That more attention be given to realistic cost estimates for installation and operation of the system, and that the U.S. Delegation in Geneva raise these matters in the negotiations when we are prepared to give our considered estimates.

Participants of Meeting of Principals on Nuclear Test Negotiations Held June 9, 1960

• • Department of State:
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Mr. Smith—S/P
  • Mr. Dubs, SOV
  • S/AE—Mr. Farley, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Spiers, Mr. Baker, Mr. Goodby, Mr. Gotzlinger
• • Department of Defense:
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Gen. Loper
  • Gen. Fox
  • Gen. Denney
  • Mr. Northrup
  • Dr. Romney
• • White House:
  • Mr. Gray
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Keeney
• • CIA:
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Brent
• • AEC:
  • Mr. McCone
  • Dr. English
  • Col. Sherrill

1. Source: Safeguarding seismic research explosions, high altitude detection. Secret; Restricted Data. 13 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, RD-Test Ban Question.