Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

563. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, May 5, 1960

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• • State
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Mr. Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AE
  • Mr. Dubs—SOV
  • Mr. Baker—S/AE
  • Mr. Gotzlinger—S/AE
  • Mr. Mau—S/S
• • CIA
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Dr. Scoville
• • AEC
  • Mr. McCone, Chairman
  • Brig. Gen. Starbird
  • Dr. English
• • White House
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Dr. Gray
  • Mr. Keeny
• • DOD
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Knight
  • Mr. Lanier
  • Gen. Betts—ARPA
  • Mr. Beyer—ARPA
  • Col. Brundage—USMC
  • Maj. Poulson—USAF
  • Mr. Northrup—AFTAC
  • Dr. Leonard
  • Dr. Cmdr. Chandler

General Betts introduced members of his staff who would brief the group on present capabilities of detection of high altitude explosions, possibilities of circumventing such detection and possibilities of improvement in the capabilities of detection.

Dr. Leonard explained that detection in outer space can be effected by use of the open-photo multiplier-type x-ray, and neutron and gamma-ray techniques. Neutron and gamma-ray equipment is now ready for use, but the x-ray equipment, which in theory has much greater capabilities, will require extensive research and development work. Furthermore, x-ray techniques can be confounded by a violator’s shielding of the weapon which he explodes. The vehicle requirements of a potential violator of course depends on the effectiveness of the detection system. If there is none, he is free to test a few hundred miles above the earth, using quite simple rockets. It there is a deterrent, he is forced to use multi-stage rockets. As the deterrent improves in effectiveness, the violator is forced farther into space, perhaps to tens of millions of miles.

ARPA’s approach to this problem, Dr. Leonard continued, was based on study of the capabilities and limitations of:

1. the Argus Detection System;

2. A Far Earth Satellite System; and

3. An Advanced Satellite System, containing advanced x-ray equipment.

The Argus System, based on the use of two satellites, could be operational within nine to twelve months at a cost of 100 million dollars. However, the U.S. now has the capability of launching a nuclear device for testing which would not be detected by the Argus. The Argus is effective for detection anywhere up to 15,000 miles, but it has lesser capacity for detecting devices exploded over the polar regions.

The Far Earth System would be composed of six satellites stationed at a distance of 60,000 miles from the earth. It requires no further research and development and can be made operational within 18 months, at a cost of about 200 million dollars. It would be capable of coverage extending to a few million miles, but its effectiveness would vary with the size of the nuclear device being tested. When the U.S. completes the Atlas-Centaur project, the resulting missile could serve as a test vehicle for testing without detection by the Far Earth System.

The Advanced System would be composed of a number of solar and earth satellites containing advanced x-ray, neutron and gamma-ray equipment. Four years of research and development would be necessary plus one additional year before the operational stage is reached. The cost of the System, including the first three or four years of operational capacity, would be 1.1 billion dollars. The capability of the Advanced System cannot be clearly defined; it may be confounded to some degree by shielding of the nuclear device and by unexpected radiation in space. It is a good guess that a determined violator could avoid even this System by going tens of millions of miles into space.

If the foregoing program were carried out, therefore, a violator would not be restricted at all in the first year; in the next six months, he would not be able to test within the earth’s magnetic fields; thereafter, he would have to go out to a distance of a million miles or more until establishment of the advanced system, when he would need vehicles with a range of tens of millions of miles as well as shielding against x-ray detection. The total cost of all systems would be in excess of 1.3 billion dollars.

Major Poulson presented recommendations of the Department of Defense as follows: That the treaty agreement be limited to a controlled ban on tests within the sensible atmosphere (30–50 KM); that control posts be equipped in accordance with the recommendations of the 1958 experts; that a research and development program be instituted to develop increased high altitude detection capabilities and to define a high altitude “threshold”; and that the Treaty ban be progressively expanded, based on research and development program results. Defense recommends immediate initiation of a research and development program to expedite achievement of expanded coverage and definition of a high altitude “threshold”, and consideration as to unilateral establishment of a satellite-based detection system at the earliest time, so as to deter a potential violator and provide at least limited intelligence as to any clandestine tests, in case a moratorium on high altitude testing is agreed to.

In answer to Mr. Dillon’s question Dr. Leonard stated that a violator could be quite certain of testing with impunity if his vehicle reaches a height beyond the effective range of the detection system in use at the particular time. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that the violator takes an automatic chance since he hardly can be absolutely certain that the vehicle will perform as planned. In answer to Mr. Dulles, question, Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that a violator could gain intelligence as to yield alone from a test ten million in space. Mr. McCone expressed belief that diagnostic instruments in the future could pick up more information.

A discussion as to cost of possible clandestine nuclear tests in space ensued. There was agreement that a test, sufficient to escape detection by the Argus System, would cost about 20 million dollars.

Dr. Leonard commented that ground based equipment at 180 stations, as planned by the 1958 Experts, would be capable of picking up a half megaton device detonated at a distance of 600,000 miles. Mr. McCone defined what he believed to be the question before the group: Whether to withdraw from an attempt to negotiate an agreement covering tests above the sensible atmosphere by citing the position expressed in the President’s letter to Khrushchev in April 1959 that we will agree to suspend testing only in those environments where effective controls can be agreed.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the question not be decided before some evaluation of the alternative high altitude plan, which relies on inspection of orbital and sustained space flight missile launchings and radar detection. Mr. McCone commented that this alternative plan, which would appear comparatively simple to the public, should certainly be explored. However, we must keep in mind its effect on our missile testing program and on the ten nation general disarmament negotiations in Geneva. Mr. Dillon pointed out that we had presented this proposal already in the 10-Nation meeting.

It was agreed that a principals meeting be held, Tuesday, May 10, to further discuss our position on high altitude testing in view of the Defense presentation.

Proceeding to a discussion of the proposed agreement on a moratorium on underground testing below the threshold, Mr. Dillon commented that our position had been decided at Camp David as being one to two years. According to Mr. Northrup, AFTAC believes that the Berkner Panel objectives for improvement in the capabilities of the detection system can be attained in three years. But there will be some significant progress within six to twelve months. Mr. Dillon compared the Soviet proposal of a moratorium lasting 4–5 years with the 1–2 year moratorium proposed by the US and UK. He pointed out that British at Camp David had indicated readiness to accept a three year term and said that we must be prepared for British support of three years as a practical compromise. Mr. Gates and Mr. McCone said they saw no reason for anything more than a unilateral declaration as to voluntary suspension of tests until such time as research programs on improved detection methods would show significant results. No definite time should be set. Mr. McCone thought some conclusive results would be obtained from three scheduled firings this year. Mr. Gates expressed belief that the program would take four to five years. He proposed that each of the participating nations make a unilateral declaration as to the length of time of the moratorium it will abide by. Mr. McCone distributed three Atomic Energy Commission papers concerning the proposed research program, “U.S. Position Relative to our Course of Action at the End of the Coordinated Research and Development Program” (TAB A), “Primary U.S. Position on Safeguards Concerning Use of Nuclear Explosions in the Seismic Improvement Program” (TAB B), and “Fallback U.S. Position” (TAB C). He urged that the United States clearly state its objectives in regard to the research program. There had been an unfortunate failure in the past in this regard. At the 1958 Experts meeting, we agreed that complete suspension of tests was feasible based upon 90% identification capability at the 5KT yield equivalent level. Secretary Dulles and Secretary Quarles, however, believed that the Soviets would not accept a sufficient number of on-site inspections, and that a threshold, under which tests under the threshold would be permitted, would result. This belief was not quite borne out, however. Therefore we should very clearly state that the purpose of the coordinated research program will be improvement of detection capabilities and a determination whether or not a threshold will continue to be necessary. Khrushchev and Tsarapkin seem to presuppose that a system having complete capability can be devised. We must make sure that the stated objectives of the research program take into account the possibility of a conclusion that a threshold will continue to be necessary. Mr. Sullivan asked for an estimate as to time necessary to make significant progress in detection of underground events. Mr. Northrup replied, 3 to 5 years. But some very important information can be developed this year and some more next year, at least to the extent of guidelines as to what will be eventually possible.

Mr. Knight raised the question of inspections below the threshold. Mr. McCone distributed an Atomic Energy Commission paper, “U.S. Position on the Quota” (TAB D). He stressed that the number below the threshold must be based on a political determination. The number of 50 has been suggested, because the total annual number of natural events in the Soviet Union below 4.75 magnitude is estimate at 500. However, AEC would not hold to this number. Dr. Scoville raised the possibility of one interchangeable quota covering all events above and below the threshold. Mr. Gates expressed opposition to this approach since it would serve to negate our established principle against formal agreement in environments where there are no adequate safeguards. Until three years of research and development is completed, we will not know whether we can adequately detect events below the threshold. Therefore, there should be no connection between the agreement to ban tests above 4.75 and the unilateral voluntary moratorium on tests below. Mr. Northrup stressed the difficulty of exact determination of magnitude, and stated his belief that a degree of interchangeability would result from this. He expressed hope that the seismic system would not be assigned the task of determining exact magnitude. Mr. McCone advised that the quotas above and below the threshold be kept strictly separate in negotiation; in practice cases might arise where an event slightly below the threshold is inspected out of the quota for events above. Mr. Dillon commented that we should make it plain that the quota below the threshold is not tied to a technical determination. Otherwise, when a technical determination can finally be made, parties might argue against an adjustment. Mr. Gates suggested that we either require no inspections at all below the threshold or settle for a small token number that would be only part of the research program. Mr. McCone cited the Rand study to the effect that an increase of control posts in the Soviet Union from 21 to 30 and a relocation to more favorable sites could materially increase detection capabilities. He suggested that any US–UK compromise in regard to the quota for inspections above the threshold be accompanied by an agreement to effect the changes suggested by the study. He went on to stress the need for consideration of a temporary detection system which will quickly afford some capability after signing of a treaty. Such a system should permit immediate use of our inspection quota. Mr. Dillon asked for comments on the Peaceful Uses paper. (TAB B). Mr. Gates and Mr. McCone stated that they do not agree with any plan involving disclosure of devices. Mr. McCone expressed concern about the legal problem involved and about the problem of disclosure to Nth powers.

Mr. Gates returning to the subject of development of detection capabilities, commented that this program could afford opportunity for weapons development. Two underground tests and one high altitude test could result in an improvement of 6 to 1 in the effectiveness of the Minuteman. There would also be a significant reduction in the need for nuclear materials. Mr. McCone stressed the dramatic improvements in nuclear weaponry which both the Soviets and ourselves are capable of making by engaging in a relatively small number of tests. He promised to bring a chart to the meeting of May 10 to illustrate this point. There are estimates to the effect that the Soviets could ensure a 25 to 1 improvement in efficiency of their 50 megaton nuclear weapons by engaging in just two high altitude tests and one underground test. Smaller weapons are also capable of dramatic improvement in yield and flexibility with just a few underground tests.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

U.S. POSITION RELATIVE TO OUR COURSE OF ACTION AT THE END OF THE COORDINATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

1. The United States should insist that, as a result of a coordinated research and development program, it will determine: whether the Geneva system, improved as appears feasible, can provide a reliable monitoring arrangement for all underground testing; and if not the modifications that are practical to permit greater effectiveness, and, hence, a lowering of the threshold. In reaching its conclusions it will consider both normal firings and decoupled firings. Thereafter the United States would agree to revise the treaty to preclude all testing which can be adequately monitored by the control system incorporating such modifications as have been revealed necessary and are agreed. The United States would feel free to resume the conduct of tests which the monitoring system cannot effectively control.

2. Naturally, should either of the other two nuclear powers resume nuclear weapons testing during the period of the unilateral moratorium, the United States would feel it necessary to take similar action.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

PRIMARY U.S. POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS CONCERNING USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE SEISMIC IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

It is necessary to avoid a situation where the Soviets could use the seismic improvement program as a means of carrying out continuous weapon development, or a situation where our own intentions could be misunderstood. After weighing all courses, we believe the best way to meet this problem is for the U.S. and U.K. to propose at the earliest possible time that the three powers agree that any devices used by them for this program will be deposited as black boxes within an agreed very short period of time, and that these, and only these, devices will be used for this program. Specifically we believe that the U.S.–U.K. proposal should call for agreement by the three powers on the following restrictions:

a. The parties to announce they will use only proven designs for the program;

b. The black boxes will be deposited by each party, within the shortest possible time (say by August 15) in storage within its own territory but under such surveillance by the others (or by an international group) as is required to prevent modification or substitution;

c. Observation of all aspects of the firing and its instrumentation, except the internals of the devices, will be permitted to the other parties;

d. No diagnostic instrumentation will be permitted at the zero point.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

U.S. FALLBACK POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS CONCERNING USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE SEISMIC IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

If the Soviets will not declare their agreement to conduct any nuclear portion of their program under the procedures outlined in the U.S. primary position (black box deposits, observation of firings, etc.), the U.S. and U.K. should announce that we intend to proceed with our programs and under the conditions stated. Simultaneously, the U.S.–U.K. should declare that, if the USSR later, either announces nuclear firings or if detonations are detected, we must assume that these are firings for weapon development, and we shall consider ourselves free to undertake such firings as we believe as we believe are necessary to avoid possible loss in relative nuclear position.

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the Atomic Energy Commission

U.S. POSITION ON THE QUOTA

1. With regard to events of over 4.75 the United States should hold to the annual level of inspections already proposed, namely, 20% of all events located or 30% of all events unidentified by U.S. criteria, either of which is estimated to be about 20 inspections a year in the USSR. The treaty should make clear that both the initial and the periodically revised annual number of inspections are a technical determination and will bear an agreed relationship to scientific facts and the capability of the system.

2. The allowable number of inspections for events under the 4.75 quota must be a number politically taken. We believe that the United States should insist on approximately 50 if the Geneva network is that to be installed. Based on recent estimates this would approximate 10% of the annual number of natural events under 4.75 which occur annually in the USSR.

3. As a matter of principle if there is to be a lesser number of inspections accepted by the United States it should be only upon reaching an agreement that comparable improvement of the system initially called for is agreed by the Soviets. This gain could come through:

a. Increasing somewhat the number of stations above the 21 now contemplated by the US–UK for the USSR, and

b. Permitting the US–UK to make locations in the most favorable areas.

4. So that the system can be most effective even in the short term, we should insist also on the following:

a. The right of the US–UK to install as quickly as possible temporary stations in the USSR with the USSR having comparable rights for territory we control.

b. The US–UK to have the right to inspect any event detected by the temporary system until such time as the permanent system has such capability as to allow the permanent criteria to apply.

1. Source: ARPA briefing on detection of high-altitude explosions; inspection of underground events above the threshold. Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.