Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

562. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 24, 1960, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Ten-Power Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• • France
  • Mr. Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Mr. Pellen
• • United States
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Mr. Farley
  • Mr. McBride

Mr. Couve de Murville said that there was apparently disagreement among the Western delegations in Geneva regarding the nature of the counter proposal to be tabled before the April 29 recess. The United States, generally supported by the U.K., Canada and Italy, wishes to table a paper combining a statement on principles and a call for specific initial disarmament measures. The French prefer to table simply a statement of principle. On tactical grounds, the French delegate believes the specific measures will be effectively attacked by the Soviets as not new, and as very limited, and as emphasizing control more than arms reduction. On grounds of substance, the French find great difficulty in the focus on the cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This measure is for the French, in effect, a renunciation of nuclear weapons, since they are just about to begin production. The proposed specific-measures papers, either in the U.S. version or in the longer version worked out in Geneva, added to French difficulties by presenting the cut-off as a first-stage rather than second-stage measure. The French also have difficulty with troop ceilings or reductions in the near future, though this problem is less serious. In view of the French nuclear situation, they must insist on measures of substantial reconversion of nuclear weapons in order to equalize the position of the present nuclear powers with theirs.

The Secretary recalled the great concern in the United States, especially in military circles, with any early time scale for elimination of the nuclear threat in view of technical inspection limitations and the Western reliance on the nuclear deterrent. Couve said that, of course, the French insisted on balanced nuclear and conventional reductions and maintenance of an adequate military posture.

Mr. Farley said that the U.S. was apprehensive of a separate Western principles statement which would shift the debate to Soviet ground and pose the issue as how one proceeds toward general and complete disarmament as matter of principle, rather than as what practical measures can be taken to make a beginning and to test Soviet professions of willingness to accept effective controls. Couve said that he saw the problem as one of public relations. The West must counter the recent Zorin statement on disarmament principles with something of the same scope and nature but with greater realism. Mr. Farley said that, in addition to the difficulty the U.S. had as a matter of pre-Summit tactics with engaging in a debate on principles, we believe that the principal impression given publicly by the proposed Western principles statement would be one of “realism”. Public relations-wise, the Western document would appear cold and negative and delaying with its references to phasing, balance, and prior effective controls. The U.S. specific measures paper, while fully consistent with the Western five-power plan, was an effort to take out and high-light concrete steps which would emphasize once again the specific actions the West were willing to take. Mr. Dillon observed that the difference appeared to be that Couve considered the Western measures “mouselike”, whereas the U.S. considered them to be concrete and to some extent publicly appealing.

Couve suggested that the U.S. paper might be tabled by the U.S. simply as a U.S. approach. Mr. Farley suggested that the principles statement, of which the text was now agreed among the five Western delegations, might be introduced in the same way, by one of the other Western delegations, as a counter to the Zorin statement.

The Secretary said that the steps might be done in sequence, with first the principles paper introduced and then, subsequently, the U.S. specific measures paper. This might best be done toward the end of the week, in order to leave the Soviets as little time as possible to tear the two papers into bits. Couve agreed generally but observed that the timing would have to be left to the delegations in order to take into account their problems of filling up the week. It was agreed that the principles paper might be introduced as a common five-power Western paper and that the U.S. paper would simply be supported by such other Western delegations as were able to, with any others remaining quiet.

The Secretary said that we had just learned Hammarskjold wished, not only to attend a ten-power meeting next week, but also to exercise his “unquestioned right” to speak to the ten-nation meeting. Couve said that he understood this possibility had been discussed among the Geneva delegations, who did not welcome such an appearance. It was agreed however that, under the circumstances, it would be necessary to hear what the Secretary General had to say.

The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

1. Source: Tactics for ten-power disarmament talks. Confidential. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12–GE/4–2460.