Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

257. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, July 7, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Vice President
• Secretary Gates
• Secretary Dillon
• Mr. McCone
• Mr. Allen Dulles
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• General Persons
• Dr. Kistiakowsky
• Colonel Eisenhower

Mr. Dillon opened by telling the President that we fear the Soviets might terminate the nuclear test talks on the basis that we are not serious in our negotiations and declare a unilateral moratorium. In so doing, they would place us in an uncomfortable position in that they could test at will while we would have to announce if we should resume any activity whatsoever. Actually we are greatly desirous of pushing a research program (Project Vela) to investigate the detectability of underground nuclear shots. This research program would not, in any of our proposals, involve the shooting of devices which have military value any longer.

Our initial proposals for use at Geneva involve the use of outdated U.S. devices which would be available for detailed inspection by the Soviets.¹ The only reservation which we would retain in this matter is that we would not be prepared to provide the Soviets with blueprints of the devices. The test would be conducted in full cooperation with the Soviets. This proposal was presented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy some time ago and, although they indicated support on a Friday,² they had changed their minds by Monday³ and several people said they could not support it. The reason given was strictly political. Various members of both Parties feared that their constituents would interpret this procedure as giving the Russians something for nothing.

Our next approach was a proposal that the devices used for the research program be outdated devices of all three powers, U.S., British and Soviet. All three powers then would be permitted to inspect the devices of the other countries to insure that nothing of military value is being tested. This idea met with the approval of the Joint Committee. At the time that this was approved, we were not aware that Congress was going to adjourn. Therefore, we drafted instructions with the object of pushing this proposal to a conclusion with the British and the Soviets. In so doing, we added a paragraph which put the Soviets on notice that if they rejected this procedure, we would have to resume the research program on our own. This last paragraph has sometimes been referred to as an ultimatum.

The State Department has always feared this ultimatum as written. Accordingly, the Secretary of State watered it down to use such terms as “feel strong compulsion,” to make it sound a little less threatening. At any rate, this reciprocal plan was found to be unsatisfactory to the British. They were afraid that it would place us in a bad position in that the requirement for the Russians to show us their devices would give them an excuse to break off negotiations.

The British therefore suggested two alternative approaches; first, to propose the reciprocal scheme without the “ultimatum” paragraph, and second, if this were not accepted, to make the offer of a unilateral unveiling, coupled with the mild ultimatum paragraph.

A meeting of the principals involved, held at the State Department yesterday at 5:00 PM,⁴ reached the conclusion that there is a small chance that the Russians would ever accept the reciprocal scheme at all. Accordingly, we would be in a bad position if we attempted to go even further and combine the reciprocal scheme with the ultimatum. Therefore, the principals propose to instruct Wadsworth to offer the reciprocal scheme without ultimatum in an effort to find a solution with the Soviets. If this is not acceptable, we should instruct Wadsworth to offer, subject to Congressional action, to go ahead with research on a unilateral basis, opening our devices to the Soviets—this offer to be coupled with the ultimatum. In the event the ultimatum must be carried out, we would conduct the research program unilaterally, inviting all the UN member nations except the Soviets to observe our activities.

The consensus is that making an effort to induce the Soviets to accept the reciprocal scheme reduces to some extent our problems with the Joint Committee. It is considered that even the unilateral research program using open U.S. devices has only a 50/50 chance of acceptance by the Soviets. For some reason the Joint Committee has a phobia against presenting the Soviets with the blueprints. On this basis, we feel there is little problem of difficulty with the Congress since even this conciliatory approach has only a 50/50 chance.

Mr. McCone has proposed checking out this fallback position with members of the Joint Committee. He could proceed on a trip in which half of the Committee members are involved and give them an outline of what we are proposing to do. Theoretically, the presence of the ultimatum with the fallback position should make it palatable to the Joint Committee. State Department, however, feels that it is best not to tell the Joint Committee about the fallback position.

The President said we should reject the idea of the ultimatum if we hope to have any propaganda value in these deliberations. Mr. McCone said it would be satisfactory to him to put out our proposals without a threat provided we were determined to go ahead with our research regardless. The President agreed. Mr. Gates said he had favored the ultimatum since it tended to focus on the cause of the termination of the talks, but he did not feel strongly if he were assured that we have made an internal decision to go ahead if our positions are rejected.

In answering a question by the President, Mr. Dillon said we cannot guarantee the attitude of the British. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. McCone expressed irritation with the position that we have gotten into with the British. Our people figure that the British have enjoyed a five-year advancement on their nuclear program from the information we have given them. Regardless of these benefits, the British still sit by and exact a veto on our further testing. The President pointed out that we expect certain things of the British which can be construed as against their security interests. We utilize the entire island of Britain as one dynamic base despite its vulnerability. Therefore, we cannot be too harsh about this one matter. The President said the difficulty in these decisions is that there are no two-sided problems. He cited Cuba as an example. (Here Mr. Dillon volunteered that Cuba is sending some people to the UN in New York. With Cuba’s predilection to attack the U.S. in the UN rather than the OAS, this may have some significance. Unfortunately, since the UN is in New York, we are required to give them a visa.) The President then directed the group to go ahead with the instructions to Wadsworth, based on what Mr. Dillon had outlined, but without the presence of an ultimatum and with the understanding that we will begin the research program unilaterally if the Russians reject both.⁵

The Vice President then inquired as to the timing of the Geneva proposals. Mr. Dillon said he hoped to introduce the initial proposal in Geneva on Monday,⁶ and if this is rejected, the second proposal would be submitted within a week of the first. The President said that any political difficulties the Joint Committee could always “put on him.” Something must be done to get negotiations with Soviets off dead center. He expressed irritation over the crazy law that put so much power in the hands of the Joint Committee. Mr. McCone said initial talks with the Joint Committee had been encouraging, but the subsequent talks had not. He reemphasized the non-partisan nature of the objection to the unilateral opening of the devices. He said that all the members of the Committee would go along with us if they could be locked up in a room safe from public view. However, since a Joint Resolution is necessary and since this will be placed in the world forum, it would be impossible to keep their views secret.

The Vice President then asked as to the timing of the actual nuclear shot and the prognosis of the Soviets’ accepting our fallback position. Mr. McCone answered the second question first and said that the chances were only 50/50 that the Soviets would accept even the fallback position. He feels that they will use it as a device by which to throw in more obstacles. He evaluates the Soviet objective in the negotiations as merely to keep us pinned while they proceed unilaterally as they desire in secrecy.

The Vice President said that Governor Rockefeller had said we should resume testing. Lyndon Johnson will do the same. Senator Kennedy, being in the hands of certain liberals, will say we should not resume testing. All this makes the timing important in view of the Democratic Presidential possibilities. In answer to the Vice President’s question, Mr. Dillon said we can resume research shots in early August if we desire. The President said, however, that we can drag the announcement out also, if necessary. He admonished the group, however, that no matter what the nature of our test, whether it be with outdated devices or not, the Soviets will tell the world that it is actually military testing. So we must be prepared for the world to take this attitude.

The Vice President then asked whether we would announce the resumption of Plowshare at the same time. Mr. McCone said that Plowshare is an entirely different problem, since some Plowshare activities require advance technology which it will be impossible for us to show to the Soviets. The President said he would like to include in his September 26th speech a promise to dig a canal across Yucatan if negotiations with Mexico can be worked out.⁷

The Vice President said the weakest position which the Republicans could hold in the month of August would be to allow the Soviets to drag us on. This position would allow the Democrats to go either way and criticize us for being either too rigid or too conciliatory. From a political viewpoint, he feels it completely favorable to conduct our research shots in the months of September and October.

At this point Mr. Dulles injected his estimate that there is a 30% chance that the Soviets will break off the conferences very shortly, either when we submit our first proposal or when we announce our intentions to resume research shots. Mr. McCone said that if the Soviets walk out of the conferences, we should feel no restrictions on ourselves whatsoever. The Vice President said that any continuation of the current haggling should not prevent us from moving on Plowshare. He feels this would have great propaganda value if the President, in his last speech to the UN, could tell of accomplishments of Plowshare and Atoms for Peace.

Mr. Dillon then reverted to the matter of advance notification of Congress. He expressed his dislike for this procedure. Mr. Gates agreed, saying the Joint Committee has already refused to support us on the fallback position. The Vice President said we need not worry about the reaction of Congress. If our proposal is accepted by the Soviets, Congress will feel forced to go along even against their will. Mr. McCone said he would like to advise the members of the Joint Committee informally of the whole program since the Committee contained some vindictive people who would take out their frustration in other areas. Mr. Gates said we have a hostage in the hands of the Congress in the form of the Mutual Security Bill which has not been passed yet.

There was then some discussion on the President’s schedule as to whether world developments should keep him from going to Newport. He asked that the Secretary of State return to Washington on Friday⁸ rather than Sunday.

He would like the Secretary of State to come to Newport on Sunday morning. The Vice President pointed out the value of putting out statements on Cuba and the like from Newport. General Persons said we get better press coverage from that location anyway.

John S.D. Eisenhower

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower on July 7. A note on the source text indicates the meeting was held after the NSC meeting. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 364–365.
1. The gun-type bomb design.
2. June 24.
3. June 27.
4. A record of this meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament/Nuclear Test Policy, 1960. See the Supplement.
5. In a July 9 letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan, drafted by Farley and approved by Herter (in draft) and Goodpaster, Eisenhower outlined the proposal in more detail. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/7–960) See the Supplement.
6. July 11.
7. Reference is to Eisenhower’s planned speech before the U.N. General Assembly, which he delivered on September 22. For text of the speech, part of which was devoted to disarmament, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 707–720. The mentioned proposal was not included in the speech.
8. July 8.