Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

256. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 20, 1960, 10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Principals on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State:
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Assistant Secretary Smith
  • Ambassador Eaton
  • S/AE—Messrs. Sullivan, Spiers, Toon, Baker, Goodby
  • SOV—Mr. Dubs
  • S/S—Mr. Mau
• Department of Defense:
  • Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Douglas, Assistant Secretary Irwin, General Dabney, General Fox, Col. Fergusson
  • AEC: Chairman McCone, General Starbird, Dr. English
  • CIA: Deputy Directors Cabell and Amory, Mr. Comer
  • President’s Advisory Committee: Mr. Keeny
  • White House: Mr. Gray

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Eaton to explain the current situation in the disarmament conference in Geneva. Ambassador Eaton began by describing the French emphasis on control of nuclear delivery systems which, he said, ran like a leitmotif through the history of the present negotiations in Geneva.

Secretary Gates asked whether there were not, in fact, two contradictory French positions—the first being their desire for a national nuclear weapons capability, the second their emphasis on control of nuclear delivery systems. One might ask whether the French would give up their concern with nuclear delivery systems control if they were to be given a national nuclear weapons capability. Secretary Herter thought it was possible the French might change their position on disarmament under these circumstances, since the French position on disarmament, he thought, was in part a pressure operation. Mr. Dillon thought the French position on disarmament was a combination of Moch’s desire for bold disarmament measures and De Gaulle’s desire for French possession of modern weapons systems. Moch’s position fitted into De Gaulle’s ambitions.

Ambassador Eaton noted that at Istanbul,¹ Selwyn–Lloyd had also proposed a study of the problem of controlling nuclear delivery systems. Ambassador Eaton went on to say that, from the point of view of our Allies, the minimum move that could be made in our disarmament position was to include an immediate study on the control of nuclear delivery systems. This was because the Allies viewed the Soviet June 2nd plan² as, on its face, being very appealing; the plan would be hard to reject and it would be hard to point out its weaknesses. Furthermore, the Allies felt that the Soviets might break off the negotiations and take their case to the UN. Ambassador Eaton remarked that the Soviets continually speak of their flexibility and refer to their “acceptance” of the French proposals on nuclear delivery systems. Because of this situation, the Allies had become panicky and felt that a move had to be made. There were even rumors that the four Allies might table a plan on their own if the U.S. did not modify its position. As far as the U.S. delegation was concerned, Ambassador Eaton said, the position it had taken with the Allies was that the Allied March 16 plan³ was a good one, that the U.S. was fairly relaxed about the situation, but that the Allied comments would be passed back to Washington.

Ambassador Eaton stated that he saw three possible courses of action which he felt should be considered: (1) the U.S. could stand firm on its present plan; (2) the U.S. could revise the plan, possibly adding new proposals to it; or (3) continue to probe the Soviet plan, anticipating a break in the Conference, and taking our case to the UN with a revised plan. With respect to the first alternative, Ambassador Eaton said that in some manner we would lose the support of our allies if this course were followed. With respect to the second and third alternatives, Ambassador Eaton noted that he had circulated a draft revision of the Allied plan,⁴ adding to the plan the minimum things he felt were needed to gain Allied support.

Chairman McCone remarked the paper that Ambassador Eaton had circulated appeared to be a drastic change in both form and substance. Ambassador Eaton replied that it was intended to change the form but not the substance, except for three additions: (1) a study of control of nuclear delivery systems; (2) world-wide air and missiles bases inspection and (3) a spelling out of the transfer of fissionable material from past production to peaceful uses. There was also added a provision for Security Council review before passing to the second and third stages of the plan.

Secretary Gates inquired as to what would be studied in connection with nuclear delivery systems. Secretary Herter replied that clearly the study would be one of control over delivery systems and that it was certain such a study would show that the inspection required would amount to a complete opening-up of the territory of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Eaton added that the Allies wanted some kind of a bow to nuclear delivery systems but just what they meant was not certain.

Secretary Gates said he thought that a constructive adjustment in our position over the next two months might be preferable to coming right out with a complete revision which might result in not satisfying anyone. Secretary Herter recalled that the President had taken the position that the U.S. would be willing to go as far as anybody with disarmament if adequate controls could be worked out. The Soviets say the U.S. is for control but not disarmament and Secretary Herter wondered whether the Allies had, in any way, retreated from insistence on adequate controls because of the Soviet line. Ambassador Eaton replied that the Allies had not retreated in any way nor had the Soviets changed their position. He mentioned, as an example of the Soviet attitude on control, that while the Soviets say reductions in force levels would be subject to verification, neither the levels before or after reductions could be verified. Furthermore, the Soviets say that only after we have agreed in principle to a complete disarmament program can we talk about the specifics of control. Secretary Herter asked how well prepared the delegations in Geneva were to show up the Soviet plan for what it was? Ambassador Eaton responded that quite a lot along this line had already been done and that the Allies had been very helpful in this respect. Another week of pointing out holes in the Soviet position would be very useful.

With respect to holding a revised plan until the UN convened, Secretary Herter thought we might be asked why such a plan was not tabled in the negotiating forum in Geneva. Further, with respect to holding the Allies together, perhaps an approach should be made directly to the French Foreign Office. Ambassador Eaton said he felt there was no difference between the French Foreign Office and Mr. Moch, except that Mr. Moch appeared willing to take greater risks and make more moves on his own than was Couve de Murville.

Mr. Irwin asked what dangers would the U.S. run if we were to stand fast with the present plan. Secretary Herter stated that the problem was the French emphasis on control of nuclear delivery systems had great appeal to everyone. Reduced to its essentials, there was a fear that the U.S. and the USSR would not get together on controlling the nuclear threat. Secretary Herter further asked Ambassador Eaton whether moves, such as those suggested in the draft revised plan, would help the Soviet Union arid the U.S. reach agreement. Ambassador Eaton said he felt his paper would not lead to agreements since he feared there was no likelihood of genuine negotiations in the near future. The paper would, however, solidify the Alliance, give us a better position with respect to world public opinion, and help keep the disarmament debate from being taken to the UN right away. If it were determined that our objectives were the foregoing, then we should move immediately and take the leadership in revising the Allied plan. Mr. Irwin asked why the U.S. could not take up the Spaak proposal regarding assistance to the French vis-à-vis nuclear delivery systems, since cooperation with the French in this field might enable us to get a better position in disarmament later on. Secretary Herter said he felt the French would not be satisfied with assistance only on nuclear delivery systems but, in any case, agreement on cooperation of this kind with the French would take time. Meanwhile, we were faced with an immediate problem in Geneva.

Secretary Gates said he did not think it would take very long to find out whether giving the French a nuclear weapons capability, while retaining legal custody of the weapons in U.S. hands, would remove the problem we have with the French in disarmament. Mr. Smith said that, with respect to this point, he felt giving the French a nuclear weapons capability would mean that the Germans would seek such assistance next and that the whole sequence of events thereafter might even lead to a break-up of the Atlantic Alliance.

Turning to the details of the draft revised plan he had circulated, Ambassador Eaton again said that while the paper had been drawn to make a more saleable document, only the three changes in policy, which he had noted before, had been added to the paper. He noted that Stage I of the plan was a package, which the ten delegations in Geneva would negotiate. In response to a question by Mr. Irwin, Ambassador Eaton said that there had been no change intended with respect to our policy on the relationship, to each other, of measures in Stage I. This position was that for the purpose of the talks in Geneva, the U.S. agreed that the Stage I measures might be presented as a package; the U.S. felt free, however, to negotiate any one of the individual items separately if the Soviets indicated a desire to do so. Ambassador Eaton recalled that it was the Allies who had wished to keep the Stage I measures as a package and that the U.S. had informed the Allies, particularly Moch, that while the U.S. felt free to separate out any measures of Stage I, we would give them warning before doing so.

Secretary Herter asked which alternative course of action Ambassador Eaton preferred, to which Ambassador Eaton replied that he would recommend revising the Allied plan along the lines he had suggested in the paper he had circulated. Mr. Irwin said he thought there was public appeal in the revised plan but that if the paper were tabled right away, it would give the Soviets time to act before the General Assembly to counteract any support the West might win with the revised plan. Ambassador Eaton said he felt we should move quickly so that the revision would not begin to look like a retreat under pressure. Secretary Herter noted, in this connection, that there had been a move in the UN to postpone the next General Assembly session in view of the forthcoming U.S. elections. The Department of State had made it known that the U.S. opposed postponement and he felt we should counteract any impression that might be abroad that the elections would disrupt our carrying out a foreign policy. This consideration indicated that we should take a position now rather than delay.

With respect to the proposal on the study of nuclear delivery systems, Secretary Gates said he could not quite see what the value of such a study would be since it was obvious that control of nuclear delivery systems required an extremely difficult, extensive, and complicated inspection system over everything from suitcases to missiles. Secretary Herter pointed out that the study, at least, would show the world what we are confronted with in attempting to implement any proposal for control of nuclear delivery systems. Mr. Dillon said that it was not obvious to the people of the world how difficult it was to control nuclear delivery systems, and for this reason the study might be useful.

Chairman McCone stated that he felt that the proposal for cessation of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons was as complicated to implement as the proposal on control of missiles. For this reason, he felt it might be preferable not to delay completion of the First Stage by including in it the nuclear cut-off in the First Stage, together with a proposal to transfer massive quantities of fissionable materials to international stockpiles for peaceful uses. The cut-off itself might then be placed in the Second Stage. Secondly, Chairman McCone commented that, in spelling out the provision for transfer of fissionable material from past production to peaceful uses, he felt the problem could not be handled by defining quantities of fissionable material in terms of Hiroshima bombs. The way to do it was to agree on a figure in kilograms and, if necessary, explain in general terms the meaning of the quantity in terms of explosive yield.

Ambassador Eaton said the U.S. would be subjected to great pressures if we were to move the cut-off to the Second Stage. We had pushed the Soviets so hard on the cut-off proposals that the Soviets had now placed a provision for a study on cessation of production of nuclear weapons in the First Stage. General Cabell stated that one addition to the paper gave him some concern and he would prefer that it be deleted. This was the provision that countries would give prior notification of the crossing of national boundaries of other states by its military aircraft and naval vessels.

Secretary Gates remarked that the consensus seemed to be that we should attempt to draft a new format for the Western plan. If this were the case, we should look at the plan in some detail and have a revised copy to study. Secretary Herter stated that he felt the plan Ambassador Eaton had circulated had a good deal of public appeal.

With respect to a study on nuclear delivery systems, Secretary Herter said that the U.S. should get a good deal more out of the study than the Soviet Union would since we know so little of their program. Furthermore, we would be bearing down on control which had always been our position, and the more clever ways we could find to do this, the better.

Mr. Irwin asked Ambassador Eaton for his estimate of whether the Allies would accept the modified plan, to which Ambassador Eaton replied that they would probably want further revisions. However, the pressure for a quick change, which the Allies had been pressing for, would now help us to get the plan through.

Chairman McCone asked for a clarification as to whether the plan was considered a package, whether we were now saying that we wanted to go all the way to general and complete disarmament or whether we would proceed step by step.

Ambassador Eaton replied that the plan was really two packages: the First Stage measures would be negotiated by the Ten Nations in Geneva. Following that the balance of the program would be negotiated with the proviso that the program could be stopped by the Security Council. Chairman McCone reiterated that the cut-off was not something that could be accomplished quickly and for that reason it might be well to break it into the two stages as he had previously described. He also noted that the plan contained a provision for a zone of inspection in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Did this mean that we had abandoned the idea of the Norstad Zone? Secretary Herter replied that the Norstad Zone appeared to be an impossibility in terms of the political problems that arose. He recalled, in this connection, that Ambassador Eaton had had a suggestion with respect to the Norstad Zone which would have added to it a proposal for world-wide inspection of missiles and air bases. Secretary Herter’s view on this had been that we might reserve this idea for the General Assembly.

Secretary Herter asked that Ambassador Eaton’s paper be redrafted in line with comments made in the present meeting and that the Principals schedule another meeting towards the end of the week to look at the revised paper. Mr. Dillon suggested that the revised paper bring out any area where there might be a difference of views between Departments so that the Principals could concentrate on these issues.

Secretary Herter asked Chairman McCone whether it would not be possible to get a definition of a kilogram of fissionable material in terms of its explosive force, since he felt that explosive force had more meaning to the public than a quantity expressed as kilograms. Chairman McCone replied that it was difficult to do this because of classification problems and because of variations in types of weapons. Secretary Herter then asked whether it would not be possible to set the equivalent explosive force as a range of figures and Chairman McCone said that the AEC would continue to look into the problem. General Starbird and Dr. English emphasized that it was essential that the quantity of fissionable material be first specified before attempting any kind of translation into kilotons. Chairman McCone stated he understood the decision of the Principals had been to dress up the Allied plan with a new format in which each stage consisted of inseparable measures and to which there must be agreement on basic principles before anything else, even Stage One, could be agreed to.

Ambassador Eaton reiterated that, while Stage One would be presented as a package, he understood U.S. policy to be that any measure in this stage could be undertaken separately. Since the Allies had asked us not to break out individual measures, we had agreed not to do so. We had told the Allies, however, that we were willing to break out individual measures if the Soviets indicated a willingness to accept any one of them. Chairman McCone said he felt the U.S. would be in a better position if Stage One were in fact a package.

Mr. Irwin asked whether it was understood that no study of Stage Two and Three measures would be made until studies of Stage One had been completed. Mr. Dillon replied that a decision on this could be made at the next meeting. Chairman McCone added that he was somewhat concerned by the late stage in which an international peace force would be established. He felt that establishment of such a force at an early date might help the U.S. with some of its world-wide responsibilities and permit us to reduce force levels. Secretary Gates responded that he could make a good case for reduction of conventional forces, provided China were included, and provided that nuclear weapons were maintained. Mr. Dillon suggested that the provision for the peace force be placed at the end of Stage Two and it was agreed that this would be done.

The meeting adjourned at 12:30 p.m.⁵

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel–Disarmament/Nuclear Test Policy, 1960. Secret. Drafted by James E. Goodby of S/AE and approved in S on June 24 and U on June 23.
1. At the Ministerial Session of North Atlantic Council May 2–4.
2. For text of the Soviet proposal, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 100–111.
3. For text, see ibid., pp. 68–71.
4. For text of this paper as submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference at Geneva on June 27, see ibid., 126–131.
5. On June 27, the Soviet and Soviet bloc Delegations walked out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee conference at Geneva. In telephone calls to Herter on June 27, Eaton explained the events of the walkout and reported that rather than waiting a few days as planned, he submitted the revised Western proposal (see footnote 4 above) to the remaining members of the conference. (Memoranda of telephone conversations between Eaton and Herter, June 27, 9:15 a.m., and 3 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Memoranda of Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement. The Department of State’s June 27 statement on the Soviet action, Khrushchev’s June 27 letter to President Eisenhower explaining the reasons for the walkout, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s June 27 letter to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld requesting that the General Assembly consider disarmament in light of the breakup of the negotiations, and the July 2 U.S. reply to the June 27 Khrushchev letter to Eisenhower are all printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 131–142.