Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

227. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Principals—Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• State Department
  • Mr. Dillon
  • Mr. Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Morris—S/AE
  • Mr. Borg—S/S
• D.O.D.
  • Mr. Gates
  • Gen. Loper
  • Gen. Fox
• White House
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Keeny
• A.E.C.
  • Mr. McCone
  • Gen. Starbird
• CIA
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Brent

Mr. Dillon stated that he had called the group together to bring them up to date on developments at the nuclear test conference and to present State Department ideas on tactics for the immediate future. He mentioned that we have received word that the Killian technical discussions with the British in London went well and that agreement was reached between our scientists on the technical assessment of the underground problem.¹ Dr. Killian is expected to brief the group in Washington in the very near future. Mr. Farley has gone on to Geneva to inform Amb. Wadsworth and the U.S. Delegation of the result of the discussions.

Mr. Dillon said that we have had the impression from discussions during the last two or three weeks with the British Chargé here that the U.K. was very wary of making any significant move in the Geneva negotiations until after their general elections, which may be held around October 20. More specifically, Secretary Herter last weekend received a letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd² which contained the following proposals:

1) That the U.S. and U.K. take no action at Geneva until the scientists have had an opportunity to report to their Governments on the result of the London discussions and until the Governments have had time to consider the situation in the light of their reports.

2) That the best course would seem to be to wait until the President and the Prime Minister meet in London, when they can thoroughly review the situation together and decide on the best strategy and tactics.

3) That we should bear in mind the probability that the conference will be discussed by Mr. Khrushchev when he visits Washington.

4) Finally, Lloyd proposed that the conference recess for a “summer holiday” from the last week in August for a period of about 3–4 weeks.³ This would allow the conference to reconvene before the United Nations General Assembly really gets down to work.

Mr. Dillon said that we, for different reasons, had likewise concluded that a recess would be advantageous at this time. Among these was the President’s decision to appoint Amb. Lodge to escort Mr. Khrushchev during his visit here. Since Lodge would be absent from the U.N. during the first two weeks of the General Assembly, it will be necessary for Amb. Wadsworth, his Deputy, to return to this country to head the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly. For this reason it would seem wise to extend the recess until October 12, a date which would allow adequate turnover time for Amb. Lodge in New York and allow Amb. Wadsworth to be briefed in Washington prior to returning to Geneva. This date, however, raised a new element in our thinking with regard to our public posture in the test negotiations. The Soviets have of late made much of various statements in the American press that we were preparing to resume testing after October 31. A six-weeks’ recess would bring us back to the negotiations close to October 31 and expose us to Soviet charges that the recess was nothing but a delaying tactic, since it would be obvious that no conclusion could be reached in the negotiations prior to the October 31 date which we had previously set for our unilateral moratorium. In view of this situation and since the President will probably not visit Moscow until November or early December, the State Department had come to the conclusion that it might be the best course for the U.S., when requesting the recess, to make a unilateral statement that because of the length of the recess we intend to continue to refrain from nuclear testing until December 31 of this year.

Mr. Dillon said that when discussing the Wadsworth–Lodge problem, and before the State Department views had been expressed, the President had expressed the strong feeling that we should propose to extend our moratorium until the end of the year. Mr. Dillon had said that he felt likewise but that he would like to discuss such a move with the other principals. The President had replied that this would of course be in order, but reiterated that he felt strongly on the matter.

Mr. Dillon said that there therefore seemed to be two courses open at the moment:

1) To agree to a recess and a suitable announcement concerning the extension of our voluntary moratorium. In any case the U.K. had expressed doubts during the Killian discussions in London as to how we might best present our argument for a more limited agreement to the Soviet Union. They want to consider the problem further. Thus we probably could not get U.K. agreement to raise the Bacher Panel data in Geneva prior to the President’s visit to London.

2) If any of the other agencies strongly disagree with this course, then they should reopen the question with the President in Gettysburg.

Mr. Gates said he felt this move constituted a major change in the position agreed upon at the July 23 meeting with the President.⁴ This would mean that the new scientific argument militating against a complete underground test cessation would not be presented before mid-October. He felt that we should at least either inform the Soviet Delegation that we intended to discuss the technical problems of underground detection when the conference reconvenes or alternatively give them a paper setting forth the problem which they could study during the recess. In any event it would be important to get something on our intentions in the record before the recess. He further felt that the decision to extend our voluntary moratorium would have unfortunate consequences on our weapons development program. He would prefer to delay any extension announcement until it became clear that such a move was necessary.

Mr. Dillon said he expected that the President would be under such pressure during the exchange of visits that he will feel it necessary to make some announcement. With regard to the July 23 decision, it had been his understanding that this course of action was subject to working out the arrangements with the U.K. Clearly the U.S. would have extreme difficulties in proceeding without the U.K.

Mr. McCone said he felt that we would continue to get a soft line from the U.K. as long as they were worried about their elections. Moreover, if we delay our presentation on the limited agreement we run the risk that our colleague at the conference table will represent a different U.K. Government, should Mr. Macmillan’s party be defeated in the election. He believed that the basic U.K. desire was to reach agreement on a total cessation of testing regardless of whether it were completely safeguarded. Mr. Gates said he could not see why the basically sound phased limited cessation agreement we had proposed would be so disastrous to the U.K. elections. Mr. Dillon replied that of course the U.K. was the best judge of that and emphasized that they have been quite emphatic in their desire for no shift in the negotiations before the President’s meeting with Macmillan in London.

Mr. Dillon said that some U.S. scientists, Dr. Kistiakowsky in particular, have continued to study the limited agreement and have developed some serious reservations concerning our proposal for a joint developmental or exploration program to improve our knowledge of seismic detection. They feel the best way to approach the new problem is to continue the negotiations in the present pattern but to ask for a high quota of inspections—somewhere around the 375 events which would be outstanding each year in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that he was very much afraid that from a purely technical point of view the U.S. would be open to a rather devastating attack if we proposed an agreement to ban atmospheric and high altitude tests while exempting underground testing. The experts in Geneva had expressed in their report the possibilities for evading detection in outer space—albeit at very high cost. Thus, while on the one hand we are saying that we cannot agree to ban underground tests because of a theoretical possibility of evasion, on the other we would be agreeing to ban tests in outer space where there was a more certain possibility for evasion. Furthermore, he felt it would be very difficult to present the Bacher report in Geneva, particularly a description of the intelligence factors involved. The sum of these considerations led him to believe that the U.S. would be open to the accusation that we are being inconsistent technically. Another area of concern is that a joint investigation of possible means for evading an underground ban would be very difficult to arrange timewise. Such an investigation would be a continuing type of undertaking rather than simply one or two shots to prove or disprove a theory. The Soviets are unlikely to agree to anything without a definite termination date.

In response to a suggestion by Gen. Loper that perhaps the best course would be to return to our old position that we only ban what can be controlled and thus withdraw from including high altitude tests in the agreement, Mr. Dillon said that he had understood that the possibility of evasion exists only in far space.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that this was indeed the case. In view of the rather substantial weights which would be carried by the 1–1/2-million-lb.–thrust or the 6-million-lb.-thrust engines under development now in this country, and presumably in the Soviet Union, one will in a very few years be able to carry devices with heavy shields to these far distances.

Mr. McCone said that it would seem to him that if such powerful vehicles would be available they would be able to carry practically any weight bomb we have already, and thus it would not be necessary to test to develop lighter weapons for use with our less powerful missiles.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he completely agreed with this thought. He believes that nuclear testing in outer space for developmental purposes would be the quickest way of pauperizing oneself he knows. Such tests may cost hundreds of millions of dollars each and, since the amount of information which would be obtained from outer space would be slim, we would require many such tests. Of course, the principle remains that evasion in far space is possible. He is worried as a technical person about the inconsistency of the U.S. position in refusing to deal with the underground situation while at the same time agreeing to an outer space ban where there is a loophole.

Mr. Dillon commented that if indeed the question of evasion of an underground agreement is a never-ending possibility, he believes there is a strong argument in support of returning to our original position of a complete cessation and handling the underground situation by proposing 375 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union each year. Gen. Starbird pointed out that even if the Soviet Union were to agree to such a number of inspections we would still have no guarantee against small underground tests by means of which the Soviet Union could push their weapons development quite far.

Mr. McCone expressed his concern that the proposed extension of our unilateral moratorium would be one more step in the erosion of our position. He felt we have already lost the threshold because we have not squarely proposed it in the negotiations. If we now extend our moratorium to December 31 because of the very real pressures which exist vis-à-vis the U.K., other crises in the future can be expected to militate toward further extensions. He did not believe that the U.S. could afford to take the position, as the U.K. seemed determined to do, that all testing must be stopped, unless we were absolutely sure that the Soviet Union is doing the same.

Mr. Dillon said that we were faced with the necessity of this recess. The question remaining is the tactics to be used.

Mr. Gates again expressed his concern about the extension move. He felt it has considerably more implications than merely an extension until the end of this year. Mr. McCone said that in the future it would be easy to argue for similar extensions because of our own election year, and then because of our elections, and then because a new President will be assuming office. This continuing uncertainty had considerable impact on our testing program. Eighteen months’ lead time is required for a large-scale series of tests in the Pacific, and even for underground tests in Nevada for which we already have tunnels we would need three months’ lead time. Gen. Starbird added that no significant preparation in Nevada can be taken without the fact becoming public information.

Mr. Dillon said that in any case he did not believe that the President would be able to reach a decision to resume testing before the end of December. Mr. Sullivan noted that our willingness to extend our voluntary moratorium may very likely be the sine qua non to Soviet agreement to a recess. Mr. Dillon said he thought that if as he believed we would not be in a position because of the Eisenhower–Khrushchev visits to test anyway, it would be best to make an announcement along the lines suggested by the President.

Mr. McCone proposed that perhaps a more satisfactory way to handle an extension, if it is indeed necessary, would be merely to have Amb. Wadsworth, when proposing a recess, say that we recognize that the recess would last so close to the Oct. 31 deadline we could not expect agreement before that time and that the U.S. is therefore willing after October 31 to allow a reasonable period of time for progress in the negotiations before deciding on a resumption of testing.

Gen. Starbird said he wished to bring to the attention of the group the fact that he expects a tremendous letdown on the part of the weapons laboratory scientists who are looking toward Oct. 31 for clarification of our intentions toward further testing. Gen. Loper said he felt it would be unwise for the President to take such a decision without having an evaluation of the decrease in our defensive readiness posture this no-testing situation is causing. The situation should not be passed over lightly. Gen. Starbird explained that even though the laboratories could certify the worth of certain weapons, proof tests were necessary for the Department of Defense to have full confidence in the weapons.

Mr. Dillon said that if Mr. Gates and Mr. McCone feel they must present their opinions to the President, the best course would be to seek an early meeting with the President so that an answer to Mr. Lloyd might be sent by Monday evening, August 17.

Mr. Gates said he wished to discuss the situation further with his staff and with the Joint Chiefs. He was very concerned that what was really being discussed was a complete cessation of testing rather than merely an extension of the moratorium to December 31.⁵ There will always be a reason why a resumption of tests should be deferred.

Mr. Dillon said he believed that any basic conclusions on the need for resuming testing will be based on the report of the Kistiakowsky Panel, which is expected by August 21. This report will detail the consequences to the United States of delaying testing. He would think in any case that the possibility of a definite decision by the President on the basis of this report would be unrealistic prior to his departure to Europe on August 26. Thus there could be no decisions before sometime in September.

Mr. Brent asked whether the Department of Defense was proposing to resume testing to improve our defense posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Were they assuming that the Soviet Union would not itself resume testing and that we would thus improve our two-year lead time?

Mr. McCone said it was worthwhile to discuss this point. The United States bases its defense policy on nuclear weapons to offset the manpower advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc. If this policy is good, then we must be in the best possible technological position. This requires continued development and testing. We can reduce the fear of fallout by testing underground and in the upper atmosphere. But to withdraw any further than that would be to allow the basis of our defense policy to erode away. He did not think that the Soviet Union is aiming only toward a cessation of testing. Rather they seek to get a lead on all nuclear weapons, thus leaving the free world to the mercy of their defense superiority. The United States must decide whether it will allow itself to be forced into this course.

Mr. Sullivan pointed out that we were not proposing to shift away from the limited agreement approach, but only revising our timing. Mr. Dillon affirmed this.

General Starbird noted that when nuclear weapons leave development laboratories and are deployed by the armed forces the possibility of espionage is increased. We have indications that the Soviet Union has been able to gain considerable useful information on specific weapons. There are, however, no parallel cases on the part of the United States.

After some discussion of the report expected from the Kistiakowsky Panel, it was agreed that it would be best for the panel to report in writing to Dr. Kistiakowsky, who would then brief the NSC, orally rather than by circulating a written document. This would avoid undue dissemination and the possibility of leaks.

Mr. Dillon said that if we are to approach the Soviet Union next week concerning a recess we will need to be able to reply to Mr. Lloyd’s message by August 17 at the latest. It would thus be necessary to see the President on August 17 at Gettysburg if any of the principals wished to dispute the proposed tactics. The State Department would therefore draft a reply to Lloyd accepting a recess and indicating that we will announce our intention to continue to refrain from testing for a reasonable time after October 31. He would expect this evening or tomorrow morning a clarification of the views of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Gray said he thought we should make an effort to present the Bacher data before the recess, or at least put the Soviets on notice that we consider a discussion of the technical problem essential when we return from the recess.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he felt that the Berkner report had made our concerns to the Soviets clear. Couldn’t we just make clear to them our intention to return to this matter?

Mr. Sullivan pointed out that any advance indication that we intended to press for discussion of the technical problems would probably cause the Soviets to refuse to agree to a recess. Mr. Dillon said that in any case we should plan to raise the matter as soon as the Conference reconvenes.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Morris and approved by Dillon on August 24. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 36–37.
1. Reference is to the report of the Joint U.S.–U.K. Technical Group To Review Technical Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Test Detection, which met in London August 10–11. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology) See the Supplement.
2. Dated August 7. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Lloyd–Herter)
3. The conference was in recess from August 28 to October 27.
4. See Document 225.
5. On July 26, the Department of State announced an extension of the moratorium until December 31. For text of the statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1439–1440.