Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

225. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, July 23, 1959, 10:15 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dillon, Secretary Gates, Mr. McCone, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, Dr. Kistiakowsky, General Loper, General Starbird, Mr. Philip Farley, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the next move with regard to atomic testing in the light of the unfavorable prognosis of the test talks at Geneva. Decision on this matter was considered necessary at this time because of the logistical problems involved in any resumption of tests. The problem that the President put to the Science Advisory Committee is to outline a reasonable program of tests, should there be a resumption of testing. Two different test series are undergoing consideration. One is the series of tests of stockpile atomic weapons in the Pacific next summer, sponsored by the Secretary of Defense; the other, sponsored by the AEC, would be a series of “diagnostic tests” underground in the U.S. to test the design of new devices.

Mr. Gates pointed out that the proposed weapon stockpile test series will cost $125 million. In preparing for next summer’s tests, the Department of Defense should spend some $30 million between now and October if these tests are going to be held. If this were not done, then the earliest feasible time for summer tests would be eighteen months from then. Defense gave some indication that it had been hopeful that some indication would be forthcoming from Geneva as to how things are going—and that decisions could be taken based thereon.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that studies had been made eighteen months ago, before the Hardtack operations, outlining what would be gained through another series of tests. However, this study will not be comprehensive until the military viewpoint is included. He therefore proposed that a joint committee, including representatives from Defense, AEC, and the Science Advisory Committee should attack this problem.

The President said that he assumed that all would participate, but that he wished his Science Advisors to act for him in giving direction to the effort. Mr. McCone and General Starbird said that this coordinated study should be fairly easy since most of the work has been done.

Mr. Gates then pointed out that since Dr. York had ruled out high altitude shots, we are concerned with testing both underground and in the atmosphere. Our timing for next summer’s tests in the Pacific is already slipping. The President said that the first matter we should decide, this being the case, is the advisability of conducting tests in the Pacific.

Mr. Dillon then introduced Dr. Kistiakowsky’s briefing, and summarized its purpose as being to evaluate the worth of a “quota” system of inspections. Regardless of the way it is arrived at, the actual number of inspections permitted vs. the number of seismic accidents of varying intensity per year is the core of the question. (Dr. Kistiakowsky then gave Dr. Bacher’s briefing, which is appended hereto.)¹

The President summarized his view of the briefing by saying it appeared impossible to control underground tests. He inquired as to the feasibility of using one underground test site more than once. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that much is unknown in this area, and he thought that the AEC would like to conduct a series of underground tests to learn more about wave propagation through various kinds of soil and rock, the effects of decoupling, etc.

The President said that the cost of concealment of large-size tests would appear to be exorbitant, commenting on the estimate that 15 million tons of earth must be moved in order to accomplish maximum reduction of the seismic signal of a 100 KT test shot. Mr. Dulles agreed, adding that the Soviets would fear the detection of construction necessary for this concealed testing.

The group then addressed the Possible Course of Action, appended hereto. This course of action has been agreed among the various departments and agencies, except that Defense and AEC do not agree with the limitation imposed in the last sentence of the paper, which prohibits atmospheric testing. State feels that for propaganda purposes, this limitation must be included. Mr. McCone said, however, that it is possible to conduct all nuclear weapons diagnostic and safety tests underground. The testing in the atmosphere would be confined to that of weapons systems only.

Mr. Dillon warned of the British attitude in this matter, saying we must expect them to suggest going even further on self-imposed restrictions and to desire to refrain from all testing up to five years. Mr. Gates pointed out that more progress can be made in weapons development without testing than had previously been believed.

Mr. McCone expressed concern over the prospect of imposing a restriction on all tests since it would be impossible for us to detect if the Soviets do the same. The President said that it would be difficult for the Soviets to disagree if this testing is being conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the feasibility of detection system. Mr. Dillon said that the Soviets are capable of disagreeing to nearly anything.

Mr. McCone then referred to the President’s letter of April thirteenth to Khrushchev.² The President said this position still makes sense, in view of worldwide opinion. Further, that position avoids hamstringing the French unnecessarily, since they are desirous of embarking on tests of their own.

Mr. McCone then called attention to the next-to-last line of page 2 of the Proposed Course of Action and urged that this thought, the highlighting of unreasonable Soviet positions on the veto, be emphasized. The President reiterated his thought that if we stop atmospheric tests, then the Soviets must take full blame for worldwide fear of fallout.

Mr. McCone then proposed a recess of the Geneva talks until the first of next January, assuming that we go ahead with tests to enlarge our knowledge of underground test signals and establish the feasibility of underground decoupling this fall. Under these circumstances, we could conduct the tests and study the results prior to the reconvening of the Geneva talks.

Mr. Dulles pointed out, with regard to the percentage estimates given for the probability of detection of various sizes of shots, with varying numbers of inspections, that they are based on theoretical considerations only, with no regard to the Soviet physical capability of building these underground test sites. The President agreed.

John S.D. Eisenhower

Attachment

³

POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION

a) The Secretary to inform Lloyd of our present views, and offer an immediate visit by a U.S. technical team headed by Dr. Bacher to the U.K. to satisfy U.K. questions. (We should be prepared for a U.K. conclusion that the political advantages to be gained from agreement outweigh the technical uncertainties involved. In addition the U.K. is likely to resist a change in position while the Foreign Ministers Conference is under way and so long as a Summit Conference is a possibility.)

b) Secretary Herter and Lloyd to advise Gromyko in Geneva that we are seriously concerned about Soviet unwillingness to join in reconsidering the effectiveness of the Geneva system for dealing with underground tests in the low yield ranges and that, in spite of the progress which the negotiators have made, we will be unable to agree to a comprehensive ban until there is a solution of this problem. Gromyko should be made to understand that our public and Congressional opinion will not accept an agreement which is not technically sound, and that we cannot longer defer facing up to this problem. Secretary Herter to offer that Dr. Bacher visit Geneva or Moscow to review the technical considerations with Dr. Fedorov or other Soviet scientists.

c) If, as is to be expected, the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the proposed technical reassessment despite this démarche, Wadsworth should be instructed to state in the meeting that the United States, short of finding ways of overcoming the technical uncertainties, no longer believes it possible to agree to a full test ban.

1) This would be preceded by a presentation in the meeting, by Dr. Bacher, of our full analysis of the technical situation.

2) We should introduce a draft treaty for a phased approach similar to that developed subsequent to the April 13 proposal, preserving as many as possible of the now agreed elements of the control system but extending to high altitude tests on the basis of the recent technical agreement in this area.

3) Concurrently, we should propose to develop with them a concrete program of research and experimentation, to be conducted cooperatively over a definite period (2–5 years), designed to answer the present uncertainties about underground detection capabilities. The treaty could include provision for extending the ban to underground tests, perhaps in stages, as soon as effective control is proven possible by further study and experimentation. The initial stage, for example, might be to prohibit underground tests creating a seismic signal larger than 10–25 KT on the Rainier coupling, if this proves feasible.

4) This action might be coordinated with a message from Eisenhower to Khrushchev designed to authenticate this position.

5) If the USSR, under this pressure, agrees to the proposed reassessment, the conclusions of the Bacher Panel and the Latter theory will stand up under Soviet technical criticism, and thus will provide even stronger justification for our action. If the USSR continues to refuse, it will bear the onus of ignoring the difficulties we have described in specific terms.

d) If the USSR does not accept this proposal, the President should issue a statement recalling the U.S. delegation temporarily, announcing the intention to undertake the experimental program unilaterally (or jointly with the U.K.) and proposing resumption of negotiations as soon as the program produces results sufficient to warrant this action. Unreasonable Soviet positions on the veto would also be highlighted. In this event we should refrain from conducting any tests in the atmosphere and limit ourselves to a modest and restricted program of underground weapons tests conducted with a minimum of formal publicity. (We must anticipate Soviet and U.K. declarations of intent not to conduct any testing.)

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 17–18.
1. See the Supplement.
2. See Document 212.
3. Secret.