Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

217. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 5 p.m.

Secto 81. Department pass Defense. I met May 19 with Lloyd and Gromyko again to seek Soviet agreement for technical discussions on capabilities detection and identification seismic events and technical criteria for inspections. Pointed out if scientists are to meet prior to June 8 resumption nuclear test talks, decision needed as soon as possible. Gromyko was completely intransigent, denied any area of agreement in our discussion of May 14 except high altitude.¹

Gromyko stated he wanted position of Soviet Union made clear, that there is no relationship between the number of “suspicious events” and the number of inspections. He stated number of inspections is a political matter. He repeated this point several times and posed a direct question to both Lloyd and me as to whether we agree there is no connection between “suspicious events” and the number of inspections. Lloyd and I both took the position that Soviet Union can use any basis it wishes for determining number of inspections. I stated that while ultimately a decision on the number of inspections would be made by appropriate policy officials in the U.S. Government and that although the Soviet Union can use any basis it wishes to determine the number of inspections, the U.S. decision on numbers of inspections will be made after considering all factors, particularly the findings and advice of our scientists.

We emphasized to Gromyko that no agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing can possibly be reached until there is agreement on the criteria to be applied to inspection of unidentified events. We spent greater part of meeting trying to explain this point to Gromyko, who expressed view we were only trying to justify more inspections.

Gromyko recited usual Soviet line expressing concern that our proposal for technical talks represents a step backward from agreement already reached and that Soviet Union would oppose any attempt to disavow findings technical experts last summer. We pointed out to Gromyko that we were not trying to disavow findings of experts but to improve the scientific basis upon which an agreement on nuclear test cessation can be reached.

Lloyd suggested that Gromyko give us his views on this matter in writing, particularly after Gromyko seemed to imply that if we accept the Soviet position that there is no relationship between “suspicious events” and the number of inspections we might find some basis for technical talks. Gromyko at first agreed to submit his views to us in writing, then seemed to back away from this approach as not being particularly productive since he felt that our views on this subject were so far apart.

If Gromyko presents us an unacceptable paper on this subject, it is my intention to inform him that I see no point in further discussions and after registering disappointment at the Russian attitude on this subject, will inform him that we will have to see what progress is made after the testing negotiations resume on June 8.² I shall also point out to Gromyko that if his attitude is an indication of the way the Soviet Union will cooperate in an agreement on the suspension of nuclear testing, the situation does not look promising.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5–2059. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Moscow. Herter was in Geneva May 11–June 20 to attend the Foreign Ministers Conference. For additional documentation on the conference, May 11–August 15, see volume VIII.
1. According to Supnu 433 from Geneva, May 14, U.S. and British officials worked out a memorandum that they believed summarized the agreement of the May 14 Gromyko–Herter–Lloyd meeting. The three Foreign Ministers supposedly agreed, in light of the most recent scientific and technical information, that technical representatives should meet on June 1 to consider recommendations for detecting nuclear explosions above 50 kilometers and in outer space, improvements for distinguishing between underground explosions and earthquakes, and specific technical criteria that had to be satisfied by data from the control system before an inspection could be undertaken. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/5–1459) See the Supplement. A memorandum of the conversation of the Foreign Ministers on May 14 (US/MC/31) is in Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1338.
2. The Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing were in recess from May 12 to June 8.