Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests⁰

Washington, April 21, 1959, 7:08 p.m.

Nusup 307. For Wadsworth from Acting Secretary. We have been considering question tactics in period prior to Geneva meeting Foreign Ministers May 11 and request USDel comments following soonest.¹

US is now in excellent position place onus on Soviet Union either accept phased approach suggested by US or to make significant moves toward US position on control issues which must be resolved if complete nuclear weapons test cessation under effective control to be agreed.

In event of Soviet reply² accepting phased approach believe USDel should table as many as possible of draft treaty provisions applicable to this approach by or during first week May and might look toward recess after a few meetings devoted to clarification and answering questions. Recess would be based on practical difficulties involved continuation during Foreign Ministers’ meeting, need for consultations, and desirability USSR opportunity study detailed proposals. Resumption date would be fixed early in June. In this event would see no necessity for any formal discussion in side talks at Foreign Ministers’ meeting, though US might indicate Soviets would of course be free raise informally any broad questions relating to test negotiations in side talks with US and UK in course meeting Foreign Ministers and prior to resumption conference.

In event USSR gives no answer or maintains that no answer necessary on phased approach until conference explores further possibilities for progress on issues involved in complete cessation, USDel may continue tactic discussing and agreeing on relatively non-controversial articles that would be part of treaty under either alternative, while making clear these do not constitute significant progress and pressing Soviets for reply on alternative approaches. USDel should indicate that while of course willing hear Soviet suggestions any of outstanding issues USDel will be unable reach decisions or make concrete proposals these issues in absence Soviet answer as to broad course to be pursued. This would of course apply to composition of commission as well as questions of veto and on-site inspection since composition, voting procedures, and functions assigned to Commission re inspection necessarily interrelated. As to the staffing issue, believe as stated Nusup 301³ we should not indicate readiness to shift our basic position unless much more movement is evident on Soviet side. Staffing issue resembles issue of composition of Control Commission. Our posture on the two issues should be the same, i.e. that we are confident they can be resolved and will not be barriers to ultimate agreement if basic elements of effective control are agreed. Purpose authorized Wadsworth’s statement of April 13⁴ was to make this point and to lessen possibility Soviet could use movement on staffing issue as evidence of real progress and as excuse to evade answering on alternative approaches. Purpose was thus not to invite detailed negotiation this issue but to remove it from list of decisive issues.

If Soviet response to US proposal April 13 takes line that phased approach not acceptable, and that all nuclear weapons tests must be banned from time treaty enters into force, USDel should take position that it is up to Soviets to drop demand for comprehensive veto, accept effective arrangements for on-site inspection, and enter into joint consideration of technical problems of outer space and underground detection and identification in order make comprehensive agreement possible.

USDel presentations should carry clear implication that if USSR unwilling accept either (a) limited initial phase or (b) broader agreement based on effective inspection provisions, we see no basis for continuing present conference. In event Soviet rejection phased approach or in absence Soviet answer or major new proposal on basic issues believe USDel should look toward recess during first week May with question reconvening dependent Soviet response at time Foreign Ministers’ meeting on basic issues and on course to be pursued. Department would consider it desirable for US and UK in side talks at Foreign Ministers’ meeting to emphasize to Soviet Foreign Minister essential requirements for complete cessation, press USSR for answer as to basic approach to be pursued, and to consider in light Soviet attitude whether and when conference should be reconvened and terms of resumption.

Department considering pros and cons of release of slightly modified version Berkner Report on Seismic Improvements next week regardless Soviet response to previous US proposals. Request any comments USDel may have as to desirability, tactics and timing such release.⁵

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–2159. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Farley and Baker, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Herter.
1. In Supnu 382, April 22, Wadsworth responded that the suggestions in this telegram covered “very well what we should do in response to various approaches the Russians might take.” Wadsworth believed the Soviet Delegation would not give clear acceptance or rejection of the alternative U.S. suggestions and the conference should be recessed. (ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. To Eisenhower’s April 13 letter; see Document 212.
3. Dated April 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–1259)
4. On April 13, Wadsworth suggested to the Soviet Delegation that if the Soviet Union were prepared to change its position on the veto, on procedures for on-site inspection, and on early discussion of concrete measures for high-altitude detection, the Geneva Conference could proceed with the hope of concluding a comprehensive agreement. If the Soviet Union were unprepared to go this far, then the United States suggested, as a first step, an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers. (United Nations, Geneva Conference doc. GEN/DNT/PV.73, pp. 3–8) President Eisenhower also made this suggestion directly in his April 13 letter to Khrushchev; see Document 212.
5. In Supnu 383, April 22, which also commented on the Department’s suggested actions, the Delegation opposed release of a modified version of the Berkner report on the grounds that the Soviet Delegation could cite technical difficulties as being the real motivation for the U.S. decision to recess the negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/4–2259) See the Supplement.