Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

207. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 20, 1959, 11:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Prime Minister Macmillan
• Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd
• President Eisenhower
• Secretary Dulles

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

I [Dulles] referred to Geneva negotiations on nuclear test suspension and said that it now seems evident that there would not emerge from that conference an agreement including control provisions acceptable to us. I said I saw no prospect that the Soviets will abandon their concept of the veto, which has been borne out in the operations of the United Nations Security Council: that is, unless the Great Powers act in accord, they should not act at all.

I said that I thought that since atmospheric tests are increasingly shown to be injurious to life, we should extend indefinitely our suspension of them and hope that the Soviets would reciprocate. But, I said, I was sure that opinion in the United States would have no confidence in the possibility of a reliable control agreement being reached at Geneva. I recalled that Mr. Macmillan had himself suggested to me during my last visit to London the possibility that he and the President might address letters to Khrushchev setting out the proposition on atmospheric testing and the impossibility of an agreement to control specifically underground and high altitude tests unless the Soviets alter their position on the veto in the control system.

Mr. Macmillan said he understood the scientists had changed their view of the dependability of the conclusions on a control system, reached in Geneva in 1958. The President said that it is his understanding that the scientists now find that the originally proposed 180 world-wide stations would be inadequate to detect underground testing of moderate proportions. The President thought, however, that there might be present now elements of an agreement with the Soviets that there would be no atmospheric tests and no underground tests exceeding, say, 100 kilotons. He understood that underground tests larger than this could in any event be detectable. The President emphasized that he would not be willing to enter into an agreement with the Soviets suspending underground tests unless he could be sure that we could detect violations.

I remarked that I did not believe that we could, under any circumstances, get a veto-less control system with Russia.

Mr. Macmillan said that he attaches great importance to reaching some kind of an agreement in the Geneva talks.

I said that I thought it is perhaps now time to put Soviet intentions in this matter to the stern test by reacting firmly to their extreme position on the veto and showing some sense of outrage at the Soviet proposals. I thought that unless we reacted vigorously against this now, but went on to discuss other matters, we would have missed the psychological moment. Unless our reaction evoked better evidence than we now have of honorable intentions, we should not go with the present conference or set up a successor to it but could exchange views diplomatically.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles and Greene. The conversation, which lasted for 1 hour, was held at Walter Reed Hospital. Macmillan and his party were in Washington March 19–23.