206. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Herter
- Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
- Assistant Secretary Merchant
- Mr. Reinhardt
- Ambassador Whitney
- General Goodpaster
- Mr. Hagerty
- Major Eisenhower
This was the second meeting involving informal briefings for the Macmillan talks. [Here follows discussion of possible U.S.–U.K. differences over a summit meeting and the agenda of a Foreign Ministers Conference.]
The President then turned to the subject of nuclear inspection. Here he repeated the thoughts which he had expressed in the meeting of [Page 717] March 17th on the subject of development of a practical inspection system. The President is of the opinion that we should desert the scientists, and to some extent the Department of Defense in their insistence on obtaining a perfect system. What the President desires is a workable system which will give a true picture to the extent desired. He holds no brief for the number of inspection stations which must be set up in the USSR, be it 2,15 or 40; he holds no brief for any one particular degree of tolerance so long as the system is adequate to ensure the criterion agreed upon. Here Secretary Herter pointed out the difficulties which might be anticipated from the Senate in securing ratification of any agreement which allows for a threshold. He expressed the view that an agreement which could be restricted to atmospheric tests might be satisfactory. The President agreed emphatically with respect to atmospheric tests. He expressed the opinion that this would, in large measure, reduce the total number of tests conducted by virtue of the costly nature of conducting underground tests. He cited some technical data on the gigantic dimensions of a tunnel which must be created in-order to scale down seismic reaction to a nuclear test. Although it is possible to reduce the seismic effect of an exploded bomb by a factor of 1000, such would be highly expensive.1
Secretary Herter briefly mentioned the fact that the high altitude tests of 1958 had been made public yesterday without approval of the government. This brought a strong reaction from the President, who is of the opinion that some scientist had released the information. General Goodpaster explained the efforts to keep the release in perspective which had been made the day before. Mr. Sullivan, of the New York Times, apparently had notified Karl Harr that they were about to release the information which they had been holding back for some time at the remonstrance of Defense. In General Goodpaster’s view, the Times felt it was about to lose a scoop, since the discussion of this test series was becoming prevalent. The President referred to the publication of this matter in strong terms, and deplored any plans for releasing more information on the basis that some had already leaked. General Goodpaster assured him that we have never authorized further disclosure of information. To set the record straight, General Goodpaster advised the President that part of the information which had been released was already available to the scientists through the IGY, due to the radiation readings which had been transmitted from the satellites. The scientists who had made these readings were not under governmental control.
[Page 718]The President then turned away from this subject to continue with his thoughts on a nuclear test ban. For our first step, we should restrict our agreements to refraining from conducting tests in the atmosphere. We should not initially strive for perfection of detection of all shots, including those detonated underground. He recognized that there may be difficulty in securing agreement from the Soviets for any sort of test ban short of complete abolition. He recognized the Soviet position on the veto and their fear of espionage. He stated that he wanted Dr. Killian, Mr. McCone and somebody from Defense available to come to Camp David for these discussions. In view of the fact that only the West will adhere to the agreements, and in view also of the fact that very high altitude shots (he mentioned 300-mile altitude) will send almost negligible radiation to the earth, he desired to follow this approach and discuss the matter with the British.
[Here follows discussion of U.S.–U.K. economic issues, non-recognition of the German Democractic Republic, and administrative procedures for Macmillan’s visit.]
The President then mentioned once more the nuclear testing item, in an attempt to place it in the perspective of our overall position in the world. Anything we and the Soviets can do to build confidence in each other’s word is a step forward. We of the West are at present in the position of refusing everything brought up. This presents a poor image to the world, regardless of how spurious the Soviet proposals may be.
In passing, the President mentioned Khrushchev’s statement to Macmillan, to the effect that the Soviets have no interest in testing small weapons, and that their thinking is based on weapons of large megaton yield. Secretary Herter said this statement is being evaluated at the State Department. The President asked how you evaluate a liar.
[Here follows discussion of access to Berlin and administrative details for the Macmillan talks.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower.↩
- Eisenhower is referring to the so-called “Latter Hole” theory, named for Dr. Albert Latter of the Rand Corporation. The theory held that if nuclear explosions took place in large spherical caverns deep underground, the air gap between the explosion and the walls of the hole would theoretically “decouple” the explosion so that only a small seismic signal would be emitted. The true size of the test would therefore be masked.↩