Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

165. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, September 16, 1960—9:09 p.m.

418. Joint State–USIA message. US officials and media should use following points in discussing restriction Khrushchev to Manhattan. (Texts US communications to Soviets and to Hungarian UN Mission, relative Kadar restriction, and Secretary’s remarks on Castro restriction, made at September 14 press conference, transmitted previously Wireless File.)²

1. Under US–UN Headquarters Agreement, US is obligated provide unhindered access to UN Headquarters by all delegates UN member-states and to assure their security while they are on US territory outside Headquarters area.

2. Ordinarily, this obligation poses no major problems. However, attendance at 15th General Assembly of large number leaders Soviet-bloc Communist Parties, headed by Khrushchev, poses serious security problem, fundamentally different from usual problem arising from state visit. During state visit each movement can be anticipated in advance on split-second basis, but General Assembly session involves movements which are impossible to anticipate and prepare for in advance. May be noted³ police were involved in assuring Khrushchev’s security in NY area alone during his September 1959 visit. Measures necessary assure adequate security are greatly multiplied by extension of area through which protected person moves.

3. Khrushchev’s policies, actions, and public statements during past four months, particularly his personal attacks on President and continued illegal detention RB–47 crew members, have resulted in growing resentment among great number Americans, thus adding substantially to problem posed by deep animosity borne towards him by large number Eastern European émigrés, refugees, and exiles now living in US.

4. Under these conditions, US is obliged, in order be able fulfill its responsibilities under Headquarters Agreement, minimize to greatest extent possible dangers to security of Khrushchev and others whose position or activities can be expected place them in jeopardy. Only reasonable way in which this can be done is through restriction area their movements to minimum compatible with fulfillment their functions as delegates without hindrance.

5. If questions arise regarding Soviet demand that Khrushchev be permitted unrestricted access to Soviet summer residence at Glen Cove, Long Island, point No. 2 above may be supplemented by noting that security in New York City is provided by NYC police. Glen Cove is in Nassau County, outside NYC police jurisdiction, and unrestricted movement between Manhattan and Glen Cove would greatly complicate problem of providing protection, with hazards always attendant upon arrangements involving divided jurisdictions and responsibilities. Should be noted Soviets have not made any request for week-end visit to Glen Cove, but have only demanded unrestricted access to this location, 30 miles from NYC, at any time.

Also may be pointed out that limiting Khrushchev to Manhattan does not impede his carrying out normal functions at UN. Access to Glen Cove has little, if anything, to do with his fulfillment duties at General Assembly. Besides access to Manhattan’s unrivaled hotel facilities, Soviet UN Mission possesses adequate quarters, in close proximity UN, at its official Park Avenue mansion.

US officials and media should present argumentation, not as defense US action, but as explanation thinking which lay behind it. Care should be taken avoid leaving impression restriction is punitive in nature. Sole reason for restriction is personal safety of individuals involved. Restriction resulted, not from Khrushchev’s recent actions and statements per se, but from effect these are judged to have had on considerable segments US public opinion and from responsibility US police authorities (and ultimately of Federal Government) for Khrushchev’s personal security while he is in US.

To extent to which Kadar and Shehu restrictions are matters public interest, US officials may point out they prompted by same general reasoning as Khrushchev restriction. Regarding identical restrictions placed on Castro, same reasons apply except 5 above, particularly presence in NY area of numbers of hostile Cuban refugees. To maintain proper perspective, restrictions on Castro should be equated to those on Kadar and Shehu rather than Khrushchev.

Dillon

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1772. Official Use Only. Drafted by Richard T. Davies, Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs; cleared with EUR/P, AF/P, SCA, P, IO, SOV, EE/P, in substance with USIA and NEA/P,and in draft with ARA/P; and approved by Kohler.
2. Regarding the U.S. communications to the Soviet and Hungarian Missions at the United Nations, see Document 156. Regarding Herter’s September 14 press conference, see footnote 3, Document 160.
3. Omission in the source text.