Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

48. Draft Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Paris, July 10, 1957¹

Paris, July 10, 1957

SUBJECT

• Summary of Conversation Between Admiral Radford and Ambassador Houghton, Conducted at the U.S. Embassy Residency, Paris, 0900 Hours, 10 July 1957

1. The subject conversation was arranged at the request of Ambassador Houghton to discuss my talk with General Ely scheduled for the afternoon of the following day. Present in addition to the Ambassador and myself were:

• Mr. Yost, Embassy Paris
• Mr. Meloy, Embassy Paris²
• Captain Pitts, USN, JMAAG, Joint Staff
• Colonel Rosson, USA, Chairman’s Staff Group

2. I opened with the observation that instead of desiring three days for our talks as originally requested by him, General Ely had informed me the previous day that about two hours would suffice. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

[Numbered paragraphs 3–5 (1½ pages of source text) not declassified]

6. I next informed the Ambassador that word had reached me via the Embassy that Mr. Daridan wished to see me. Mr. Meloy, who had knowledge of the call, stated that Mr. Daridan had expressed a desire to see me as a personal friend and to ask certain questions of me. In response to the Ambassador’s query, Mr. Meloy indicated that Mr. Daridan had not revealed the subject of his questions.³ I postulated that Daridan might be interested in Indochina, and asked to be informed of the latest situation in that area. Mr. Yost pointed out that the French are accusing us of having inspired the Vietnamese to request withdrawal of French air and naval advisors. I traced briefly my appraisal of the effectiveness of French air and naval training based on my last visit to Vietnam, describing it as shamefully inadequate, and asserted that if the French would take a hard look at the subject they would recognize that the Vietnamese have been very frank with them. The French attitude in this instance is something I have had to contend with for a long time. According to what I have heard recently, they are now claiming that we are doing to them in Africa what we did to them in Indochina. I saw Indochina go down the drain. It might have been saved had De Lattre⁴ lived—he was the only one who saw that success was dependent upon the good will of the people. Briefings by the French on the situation there indicated that everything was progressing well, when in fact it was falling apart. They were misleading themselves.

7. In regard to Laos, Mr. Yost stated that the French claimed not to be up to anything, but that it is evident they are trying to preserve their prestige in that country.

8. With a shift of the conversation to Algeria I advanced the opinion that it is no longer possible to remain in a country against the will of the people unless one is prepared to suppress the population by ruthless means; this the French apparently do not wish to do. Mr. Yost pointed out that the French feel they cannot afford another defeat, to which I replied that the French should not have been defeated in Indochina. Ambassador Houghton raised the question as to whether we help the French by applying pressure from the outside. I stated that what we have done is to try to help the French on their own terms. We have not been tough enough. The advocates of that course have usually been voted down on the contention that measures of this sort would cause the Government to fall. They have gone steadily down hill anyway. Mr. Yost asserted that private, tough, frank advice is good; publicized advice, however, creates many problems for them. I stated that the form of the French Government makes help very difficult.

9. To a question raised in discussion as to whether the French are set upon placing the blame on the U.S. for losing Algeria while desiring privately to get out, the Ambassador said that the French would hang any catastrophe on us, but that they did not want to get out.

10. The conversation ended with remarks by Mr. Yost to the effect that Algeria is the last of the major French problem areas abroad—the situations in Black Africa and Madagascar provide for popular assemblies and future independence.

1. Source: Naval Historical Center, Radford Papers, Memos for the Record. Top Secret. Drafted by Admiral Radford on July 18. A verbatim account of this conversation, dated July 19, is ibid.
2. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris
3. A memorandum of the conversation between Jean Daridan and Admiral Radford, July 11, on the questions of disarmament and Algeria, is in the Naval Historical Center, Radford Papers, Memos for the Record.
4. General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner and Commander of French Forces in Indochina, December 1950–November 1951; he died in January 1952.