47. Despatch From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Return of De Gaulle
One of the natural results of the prolonged government crisis and the constitution by slim majority of the Bourgès-Maunoury government has been the increase in speculation that France might have to turn to De Gaulle to solve its problems. Various political observers have commented that the Algerian problem appears unsolvable without the presence of a strong man at the head of the French government who could impose his will on all political parties. Other observers have hinted that De Gaulle is ready and willing to return and that he would not pose conditions as he has done in the past.
[Page 128]On June 18 the Social Republican Center issued a statement, written by Secretary-General Roger Frey, which said that De Gaulle’s love of France and desire to serve his country has not diminished and that he is today, as he was on June 18, 1940 (the date of his appeal to Frenchmen to rally around) ready to govern “for a limited time”. Frey’s article went on to say that De Gaulle has remained quiet because he does not want his words misinterpreted by those with partisan interests. Nevertheless, said Frey, the General has not ceased to think of a change but this must be reached in a different political atmosphere than that which now exists.
On June 18 the General attended the annual memorial service for slain Resistance figures at Mont Valérien. As has been his custom, he did not make a speech nor did he reveal to others present his latest ideas.
Despite his continued public anonymity, the General has continued to see visitors regularly. He is also in correspondence with certain old friends. His activities are not, however, those of a man who is anxious to return to the political arena and who is expanding contacts with a view to an immediate return.
In a personal conversation with an Embassy officer, Frey expanded at length his views concerning the General’s availability and conditions for returning to power. These views are set forth below. They should be taken with a grain of salt. Most Gaullists and ex-Gaullists are too prone to attribute to the General their own thoughts. They also tend to exaggerate their own closeness with the General. The views expressed by Frey are, nevertheless, of some value and considerable interest.
According to Frey, De Gaulle believes that it is possible that the situation in France could deteriorate rapidly. In a period of perhaps six months the public could realize that Algeria was a complete stalemate, that France was bankrupt and that no solutions could be reached by the present or any possible successor government, given the present constitution of the Assembly. At that time, public opinion and the Parliament might be willing to call De Gaulle. To such a call he would respond willingly. As a condition for accepting the premiership, he would request from the Parliament the passage of a bill giving him wide, but not necessarily extraordinary, powers. He would ask for a guarantee of office through the term of the legislature (that is to say, another three years). He would in turn give a firm guarantee that he would resign at the end of the legislature and that he would not again run for office or accept any future call. He would also promise the drafting of a constitution, which would be submitted to popular referendum before the election. The constitution would change France’s [Page 129] electoral laws and constitutional set-up so as to establish a presidential regime, “much like that of the United States”, with a strong executive and a somewhat-curbed legislature.
The first problem to which De Gaulle would turn would be Algeria. For Algeria he would promise a large measure of autonomy, virtually approaching independence. Certain guarantees would be given the European settlers but the power of the rich, established “colons” would be broken. One result would be the return to France of large numbers of Europeans, who could no longer fit into the environment of a new and changed Algeria. However, the guarantees given the others and the fact that De Gaulle could obtain from the Algerian Moslems promises concerning future treatment of the European minority would prevent the outbreak of a European-directed civil war in Algeria.
The De Gaulle program for Algeria is not one which could be either proposed or implemented by any other Frenchman. All politicians of the present regime are too tainted with partisanship or too suspected by other political elements to be able to accomplish the necessary task. Only De Gaulle has the ability and the prestige to put over the only possible program which would guarantee some sort of future, close relationship between France and Algeria while giving the Moslems the self-government they strive for.
Part of De Gaulle’s ability to reach an Algerian solution is based on his close and continuing relationship with Morocco and Tunisia. He is particularly close to the Sultan with whom he is in regular bi-weekly correspondence. With Bourguiba2 the relationship is not quite so close but is of such a nature that Bourguiba has a great respect for and admiration of De Gaulle. De Gaulle believes, and has indicated to these leaders of the former protectorates, that there can be no settlement of Algeria without the full cooperation of the Moroccans and Tunisians.
De Gaulle believes that North Africa must be regarded as a whole. Morocco and Tunisia must turn once again towards France, as they would willingly do were it not for Algeria. Therefore, an Algerian solution could be the means for the achievement of a broader North African union, united to France, yet retaining certain attributes of independence. In return for such a union, supported economically and politically by France, Morocco and Tunisia might have to give up some of the independence which they have achieved too fast, but such would be in their interest. Both Moroccan and Tunisian leaders recognize the essentiality of such action and would be willing to enter into a closer relationship with France, if they were convinced that Algeria [Page 130] could be peaceably settled and that their interests would not be betrayed at some future date by some power-hungry French politician. All the above includes the creation of some sort of federation in which France would be the predominant but not dominating member.
As for the French political parties, Frey states that there is a wide current of opinion favorable to De Gaulle but it will not assert itself until the situation worsens. A De Gaulle government would be made up of representatives of all national parties. Appointments to ministerial posts would be based on personal rather than party qualification. Party differences would tend to disappear or at least fade away. Greater unity among national groups, plus strong leadership, would soon diminish the electoral attraction of the Communists.
Comment: It is entirely possible that De Gaulle, should he ever reach power, could have the prestige and ability to make an Algerian settlement. He does have the reputation of standing for all Frenchmen, of no matter what race, color, or place of birth. Bourguiba’s recent statements about De Gaulle tend to give some coloring of veracity to Frey’s reasoning.
In France, however, we have seen thus far no real signs of a popular desire to have De Gaulle back. There is considerable disgust with the present system. But, thus far, this disgust has been translated into apathy rather than action.
Given a real collapse—economic, political and social—combined with a defeat in Algeria, which would serve to exacerbate France’s relations with its allies and increase French chauvinism to a much higher point than exists today, a return of De Gaulle could be possible. It would require on the part of France’s legislators a far greater spirit of resignation and abnegation than we have thus far noticed. It is therefore only the faintest of possibilities, but it is one of which we will probably hear increasingly as the situation worsens and as solutions appear less and less obtainable. The time is not, however, now.
Counselor of Embassy