Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 25, 1957—6 p.m.

2824. Also sent USAREUR Heidelberg for Moreland as information unnumbered. Paris pass USRO, Knight and Wallner. Germans began 1957 conscious new year may bring crucial developments for FedRep. Following message examines dynamics of German body politic where they impinge on US interests. Four main threads intertwine throughout German problem which give major tone to whole complex:

(a) Outstanding event will be Federal election. Campaign will color what Germans think, say, and do in both domestic and international fields for next eight months.

(b) Reunification is principal preoccupation of many, remains at least in back of all Germans’ minds, and will come even more to fore as election campaign develops.

(c) FedRep continues enjoy unprecedented prosperity, and economic activity and employment seem likely continue at or near present level during coming year. Present state of economy constitutes element of great stability and contributes to political moderation.

(d) Dominating force in German politics remains 81-year-old Adenauer, who continues command respect and admiration of bulk of population. He has provided great steadfastness in German policy, particularly that of close integration with West. At same time, his stubbornness and preconceived notions occasionally complicate relations with US.

A. In field of national security preoccupation is primarily with Soviet Union and international Communism, both of which Germans fear and detest. All-pervading is desire to avoid World War III. German aspirations, politics and actions in this regard are discussed below:

1. During 1956 there was some fluctuation in closeness and cordiality of overall US-German relations. Fluctuation, however, took place on almost abnormally high plane of friendship and was due more to misunderstanding than difference of outlook. Low point was reached during summer as result of “Radford Plan”.

Presence American troops is acknowledged by almost all as best concrete assurance that US would come to Germany’s defense if she were attacked. Govt is inclined to get jittery at hint of any withdrawal of US forces, and Chancellor is particularly sensitive this subject. He is almost pathologically fearful US might either reach agreement with Soviets on disarmament, before reunification problem solved, or become so reliant on “strategic” atomic weapons as to withdraw into some form of isolation.

Important factor contributing to Chancellor’s dismay and anger over so-called “Radford Plan” was feeling it made him look silly politically after his long fight for large German army and because having just returned from Washington and advertised complete accord with US Govt. SPD took opportunity to ridicule his lack of real knowledge US policy.

Other members of govt and CDU have been generally convinced that our basic policy has not changed and have been embarrassed by Adenauer’s strong reaction. Even so, recent statements by prominent individuals such as Senators Knowland, Humphrey, Sparkman and Flanders, and new concepts on American strategy attributed in press to Governor Stassen, upset them, particularly because ammunition thus provided Socialist opposition.

Year’s end saw excellent German-American relations because of reassuring statements by Secretary on European policy, admiration for American position during Suez crisis, nature of President’s reply to Bulganin and because events in Hungary brought home with increased force extent of German dependency on US.

There has as yet been little reaction to announcement of proposed cuts in size of US divisions, possibly because not yet known whether resulting savings in manpower would automatically be followed by proportionate reduction in number of US soldiers in Germany. We believe even if this means eventual withdrawal of 10 thus and US soldiers from Germany, it could probably be handled so that repercussions in German public opinion and among most Govt leaders would not be great. We cannot confidently make such prediction with respect to Chancellor, however, and concurrent British cuts may well make situation more difficult.

Sporadic but extremely unpleasant incidents involving US soldiers seem to have made no permanent impression, and it is not expected that problems arising from existence of numerous US installations and personnel will reach serious proportions in foreseeable future.

2. Because most Germans realize they cannot face Soviets alone they support concept of collective security.

(a) Govt strongly supports NATO and would prefer more exclusive American attention to European affairs than US able or likely to give in view its worldwide commitments.

(b) FedRep is one of prime movers toward European unity and under Adenauer leadership has shown welcome readiness make concessions to advance Common Market and EURATOM. At present there is much encouraging activity in these fields. If, however, for any reason, they should suffer fate of EDC, effect in Germany, at least, would be such that future of European integration would be bleak indeed.

(c) Despite German commitment to collective effort, there are now visible some increasing signs of desire for greater independence of action. We interpret opinion polls purporting show increasing trend toward “neutralism” as reflecting this desire as much or more than desire to stay aloof from conflict.

3. German relations with East are based on hatred and fear of Communism and Russians, deep fear of war, constant urge to recover Eastern territory and see hostile power removed from their borders. While realizing they can accomplish nothing by force there still remains lurking belief they are smarter and can eventually outwit Russians.

Result is a staunch anti-Communist policy but one which is relatively cautious as applied in its external dealings with Communism.

(a) Problem of reunification remains outstanding unsolved issue of German foreign policy and colors all dealings with Moscow. Desire for reunification is matter of conscience for nearly all Germans, but there is considerable disparity among various groups of population as to how much FedRep should pay for it. To date, actual depth of disparity is unknown since Soviet Union has proven adamant in its refusal to give up East Zone.

German politicians and press constantly keep topic alive by examining most international events in reunification mirror. Subject will certainly be discussed more intensively during coming year as election campaign develops. Although what German parties say about reunification unlikely have decisive effect on election outcome, no politician can afford to neglect topic. In light increased emphasis in election year, Govt may be expected to show more initiative on unity issue without, however, changing past position that reunified Germany must have freedom to choose its own alliance partners.

(b) Relations with Moscow have not improved as result exchange of Ambassadors. Diplomatic channels have not been extensively or effectively exploited by either side, but many Germans believe coming year will see intensification of Soviet efforts to further “normalize” relations, either by new initiative in trade field, or by some move designed influence election outcome for Socialists.

(c) Secondary aspect of Eastern problem is relations with satellites. Govt position toward satellites will be conditioned by judgment as to what policies would most contribute to further relaxation of Moscow’s control over them. While there is increasing pressure, especially from the satellites, to achieve this goal by establishing relations, and while Foreign Office thinking seems to be moving slowly in same direction, at moment Govt still restrained by desire to refrain from taking any step which might encourage additional countries recognize GDR.

(d) Relations with GDR constitute continuing problem. During 1956 there was large movement of goods and individuals across zonal border. FedRep position on recognition is made somewhat easier before world opinion by fact that East Zone regime clearly demonstrates complete subservience to Moscow.

(e) One specific question, which will probably become more acute as West German rearmament proceeds, is what involvement of West Germany and/or US might be anticipated if uprisings should take place in GDR. Responsible German opinion very apprehensive on this score, and both Govt and opposition counsel East Zone populace to patience and restraint.

(f) Berlin is particularly frustrating problem. Germans know they are helpless and completely dependent on three Western occupying powers. Nevertheless, through mixture of longing, bravado, politics, and inchoate desire to do something, they continue to poke at problem by talking about making it capital, about voting rights for Berlin deputies in Bundestag, etc. They can be expected to continue these maneuvers—just as we come to expect Communist harassment of our rights of access.

4. 1956 brought serious beginning of defense effort, marked by major cabinet shakeup. Well-intentioned but ineffectual Defense Minister Blank was replaced by energetic and ambitious Bavarian Strauss. Latter’s approach to rearmament effort by stressing quality rather than quantity enjoys greater popular appeal. At year’s end FedRep had only 70,000 men under arms instead of 96,000 originally promised NATO and now contemplates having approximately 135,000 by end 1957, instead of 270,000 planned last summer.

One of great anomalies of German military buildup is that it begins in midst of protracted international discussion of disarmament. This fact plays into hands of opponents of rearmament in Germany and creates difficult psychological atmosphere in which Govt must take such politically unpopular steps as conscription. Moreover, Govt finds itself in something of self-contradictory position on disarmament; in principle, it supports international agreement to reduce forces provided adequate safeguards are assured (fully endorsing US position in this regard), while it secretly would prefer to see no major agreement reached until German buildup attains dimensions permitting FedRep to negotiate on more equal basis vis-à-vis both East and West. In other words although they fear war, they also fear sharp reduction in international tensions would take heat off Western attempts to obtain acceptable reunification.

Further complications in effort to rearm arise from twin sets of facts: on one hand, conscription and “militarism” are unpleasant concepts (as is gradually dawning realization of cost of modern armies). Germans are, therefore, tempted obtain more power with fewer men (and less money) by use of nuclear weapons. On other hand, they are also aware—particularly true of Chancellor—all-out nuclear war would be catastrophic. They are, therefore, only beginning to struggle with following questions: What is relationship in nuclear age of military power to national strategy, how far can one rely on a deterrent concept which is based on weapons whose use might mean destruction of civilization, and how can a Govt of democratic processes long maintain large (and expensive) military establishment without creating by-products dangerous to democratic structure of state itself?

To date Govt seems to have selected, consciously or otherwise, following solution to dilemma: continue to worry about larger implications for Germany and Western civilization involved in large nuclear stockpiles on both sides of curtain, while concurrently requesting assignment of “tactical” nuclear weapons for their own forces and stoutly maintaining that there exists a NATO requirement for large conventional forces. This is apparently based on following beliefs: (a) that their forces must have most modern weapons if they are to be effective, (b) that use of such weapons makes possible forces less costly in both money and men, and (c) that there could be a “limited” use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict or that there could be hostilities in Europe of some size in which only “conventional” weapons were employed.

Despite above, no substantial body of German opinion concludes FedRep should stand aside unarmed and leave US and USSR to face each other alone.

B. Internal affairs.

1. In economic sphere, West Germany enjoys fruits of continuing boom. With 1956 gross national product (at market prices) over 42 billion dollars, country has doubled level since 1949. German Mark remains one of strongest currencies, and in 1956 FedRep piled up trade and payments surplus of over one billion dollars with EPU countries. Total dollar and gold reserves have risen to over three billion dollars. It is impossible to predict what course Germany would take if there were serious depression, but foregoing factors combine to put country in much healthier position withstand world economic crisis than during crash of 1929–32, when German economy was much more fragile because based to larger extent on foreign loans.

As of September, only 2 percent of labor force unemployed. Number of gainfully employed reached all-time high of 19 million, and workers’ living standards were continuing to increase. Rising prices some areas constitute important political as well as economic problem, but fears of inflation are exaggerated. Government worried increased prices some consumers’ items may cost votes, but finds it difficult problem to cope with without violating own basic philosophy of free market economy or endangering its support from industry and agriculture.

2. Domestic political scene has become much more fluid. Recent local elections appeared to show SPD passed CDU—temporarily at least—in popular support. Events in Hungary deeply affected German thought and may have served to alter the balance in favor of CDU. Moreover, events of coming eight months can change picture drastically; but if no decisive events take place in that interval, Socialists appear have almost even chance entering government. It therefore of interest to examine to extent feasible today what changes might be expected of German policy if CDU no longer in control.

Present Socialist leadership is moderate and anti-Communist. Embassy concludes that if SPD were to assume responsibility for conduct of govt, German foreign policy would not—in spite of nerve-wracking initial period of “sloshing around”—change to extent dangerous to West. Nevertheless, new tone and emphasis would undoubtedly be given reunification problem. SPD Govt would display greater activity and initiative. Actually, SPD unlikely accept solution much different from one which CDU might have been forced to accept had Soviets offered unity for non-participation in NATO. SPD predicates its agreement to any solution on Western approval, including “security guarantee”, exact nature of which not yet defined. Despite continued formal opposition to membership in NATO, Socialists have publicly declared they will not tear up treaties.

SPD’s position against NATO membership for reunited Germany means that any further conference with Soviets on topic would begin with Western negotiating position weakened.

CDU remains largely under Adenauer’s personal control, although party demonstrated greater independence of Chancellor in 1956 than heretofore. Internal stresses continue strong; if Adenauer should die, intra-party dissension would come even more to fore, but probably CDU would not split. Succession question would be one of most difficult to solve since there is still no clear “heir apparent”. Half dozen men are in running, with Foreign Minister Brentano appearing hold lead. If reelected Chancellor, Adenauer may agree step down voluntarily after additional year’s service, thus permitting more orderly transition.

It must also be remembered that there are several small parties which may be in position to dictate composition of another coalition.

A phenomenon of domestic scene is that both major Govt and opposition parties attach so much importance to American goodwill in election year that both Adenauer and Ollenhauer planning trips to US in coming months.

CDU in general, and Adenauer in particular, will undoubtedly expect overt American endorsement at time of elections as in 1953.

Finally, democracy has become going concern in West Germany. Although national traits have not basically changed in ten years and there is much history to overcome, present parliamentary system seems to have become accepted as natural way of life, has won support of broad mass of population, and has no substantial body of opponents internally. Further, establishment of republic has been attended by tremendous rise in standard of living and has attained international respect and support of West. Barring severe depression and/or major international political reverses, foregoing trends appear have good prospect of continuing.

Conant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/1–2557. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Frankfurt, Bremen, Duesseldorf, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Berlin, and Heidelberg.