68. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 30, 1956, 2:15 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Force Levels
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Heinrich Krone, CDU Faction Leader of German Christian Democratic Party
- Dr. Werner Dollinger, Deputy Chairman, CSU Faction
- Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. Jacob D. Beam, EUR
- Mr. Jacques J. Reinstein, EUR:GER
Dr. Krone said he wished to express his and Dr. Dollinger’s appreciation for the opportunity to come to the United States under the exchange program and emphasized the value of such visits to international understanding. He said that he and Dr. Dollinger had arrived in the United States five weeks ago. At that time the situation was somewhat tense because of the public debate regarding military matters. He wished to inform the Secretary that he was completely satisfied with the conversations which he had had in the State Department and that he was returning to Europe with a sense of calmness with regard to these matters. He understood that adjustments in military planning were being considered, but that this was only natural and involved no basic change in policy. He was satisfied that as regards conventional weapons the people in Europe could be entirely calm.2
Dr. Krone said that he had not, of course, seen the Chancellor during this time, but that he could imagine the Chancellor was somewhat upset. He hoped that his visit in the United States would enable him to allay the Chancellor’s apprehensions. He pointed out [Page 150] that, as the Secretary knew, there would be an election in Germany next year. The Christian Democratic Party had maintained its unity and had secured the enactment of laws for the establishment of military forces in the face of strong efforts by the opposition. At the present time public opinion polls appeared to indicate an unfavorable sentiment toward the Government. All these matters were, of course, linked.
The Secretary said he realized a certain amount of emotional and intellectual disturbance had been aroused by articles which had emanated from Washington about two months before. He recalled that when he had seen Foreign Minister Brentano in London the previous week, the latter said it had made things very difficult for him and the Chancellor not to have known of these articles in advance. The Secretary replied that he thought it inappropriate that the German Foreign Minister be informed before the American Foreign Minister. They both learned of the articles at the same time and in the same manner. The Secretary said that when the United States budget was being made up and the services were all fighting for a larger share in the budget, all sorts of plans were made at the lower level and stories appear in the press as to what is proposed. He said he never paid much attention to these stories, nor did the President. However, he could easily understand the concern which they had caused in Germany. He knew the stories were not true, whereas the Germans had not known this.
The Secretary said that with regard to the substance of the matter, the United States is making and will continue to make a very great effort toward military preparedness. It is devoting approximately 11 per cent of its gross national product to various military purposes. There has been no suggestion that Germany should do as much. The United States has approximately three million of its citizens under arms, which represents about 2 percent of our population. This number may vary somewhat, but will not vary greatly. There was no suggestion that Germany should make a comparable contribution in military manpower. The term of military service in the United States is two years. There has been no suggestion that it should be more than 18 months in Germany. The Secretary said that he could not see, under these circumstances, how it could be suggested that the Chancellor was asking the German people to undertake more than a minimum share of the burden of defense.
The Secretary said people asked what kind of a war one must prepare for. He thought that no one in the world could answer this question. The British had been thinking of placing greater emphasis on atomic weapons. Then the Suez crisis had arisen, which required infantry, landing craft and ships. The answer was that the tasks must be divided. The primary responsibility of the United States was to [Page 151] stay ahead of the Soviet Union in the field of atomic: arms and their means of delivery. He said this was an American responsibility, since the United States is the only country with the technical ability to do so and which can bear the costs. However, the United States was going to do more than this. It would continue to maintain extensive ground forces and naval forces. He believed Germany had a duty, as a member of NATO, to provide a substantial contribution to the conventional forces needed to deter war or in the event of war. He thought that Germany had a particular responsibility as a divided country in which there was a greater risk of war which would be called not international, but civil. There are two countries in the same situation, Korea and Vietnam. Both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam carry much greater defense burdens than it has been suggested Germany carry.
The Secretary said he made these remarks with no intent of criticism of the Chancellor and his party, for whom he had great respect, but in the hope that an understanding of our position would help Dr. Krone and Dr. Dollinger to make it clear to the German people. He knew how difficult it is to get understanding of these matters in Germany, as in Japan. The cruel experiences which these nations suffered in the last war have understandably led to feelings of pacifism and neutrality. However, he was certain that the real interest of the Federal Republic lay in making a substantial contribution to the varied forces needed so that war can be deterred by making it clear that no kind of war can be successful.
Dr. Krone thanked the Secretary for his statement and said that both he and Dr. Dollinger were in agreement with what the Secretary had said. They agreed with regard to the treaties and their implementation. He said that there was full agreement in the coalition and in the Government. He appreciated the Secretary’s remarks with regard to Korea and Vietnam and the possibility of a war involving conventional methods. He said that he would be seeing the Chancellor and hoped that he could express to him the Secretary’s desire for even greater understanding between the United States and Germany.
The Secretary said that he could. He believed there was no need to assure the Chancellor of the high respect and confidence which the Secretary has for him and of our feeling that so long as he is leading the German people or that his policies were being followed, the Federal Republic would undertake a fair share of the responsibility for the defense of the free world.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Reinstein on September 1. Krone visited the United States July 25–September 7 at the invitation of the U.S. Government.↩
- No other records of Krone’s conversations have been found in Department of State files.↩