Office of the Historian

311. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Jandrey) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1

Washington, October 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

  • US Course of Action with Respect to Yugoslavia

In carrying out the courses of action approved by the Secretary with respect to Yugoslavia we believe it is important, particularly in view of Ambassador Mates’ remarks yesterday,2 that we avoid giving [Page 791] the impression we are motivated primarily by a desire to support the Federal Republic in its present stand. The Germans themselves have not asked for any gesture of support, and do not apparently expect one at this juncture. The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, may well be prepared, in their present mood, to interpret any untoward action on our part as confirmation of their suspicion that we “pressured” Germany into breaking relations. We therefore believe the present situation calls for careful and deliberate action on our part in order to impress upon the Yugoslavs that it is the almost complete alignment of their policies with those of the USSR that has obliged us to change our programs, and not merely their attitude on any issue. This is, of course, consistent with the position taken in our various contacts with the Yugoslavs in recent weeks; you will recall that it was also discussed briefly in the paragraph on timing and presentation in our memorandum to the Secretary of October 18,3 a copy of which is attached.

Recommendation:

1)
That you advise the Department of Defense to suspend further shipment of jet aircraft upon completion of delivery of those scheduled for November. This means, in effect, that our understanding with Defense will be allowed to run its course, and that Defense will not be required to take any extraordinary steps to stop delivery of the November aircraft, which we understand are already in the pipeline.
2)
That meanwhile Mr. Dillon call in Ambassador Mates this week or early next week to inform him
a)
that US participation in the Majdanpek project is not considered feasible at this time;
b)
that we are now prepared to negotiate the supplemental PL–480 program (a $7.5 million program concerning fulfillment of commitments from previous years); but
c)

that we are not now prepared to negotiate the PL–480 program for FY–1958.

These are items on which we were committed in the recent economic talks to act shortly. On MSA Special Economic Assistance for FY–1958 Mr. Dillon might simply maintain our position during the talks, i.e., that we are not yet ready to discuss the allocations with Yugoslavia.

3)
That you call in Ambassador Mates to inform him of the aircraft suspension but do so only after two or three weeks have passed, when we will have had an opportunity to observe the further Yugoslav reaction to the present situation, and particularly to watch [Page 792] Yugoslav activity in the forthcoming UN debate on the Middle East question and disarmament (both of these are points on which the Yugoslavs have claimed in the past they differ from the USSR). This also has the effect of delaying the impact of the aircraft suspension, removing it further from the German question.4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/10–2257. Secret.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. Supra.↩
  4. Murphy initialed his approval of all the recommendations.↩