Office of the Historian

282. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 31–56
Washington, July 24, 1956.

YUGOSLAVIA’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

The Problem

To reassess Yugoslavia’s present and future international position and to estimate the probable effects of possible US courses of action with respect to Yugoslavia.

[Page 737]

Conclusions

1.

Evidence available so far indicates that Yugoslavia has preserved its independent status. We consider it unlikely that Tito has as yet decided that his interests can best be served from a position within rather than outside the Communist orbit or that he has made a covert agreement with Moscow to join the Bloc.2 (Paras. 7–8)

2.
Despite increased cooperation and the likelihood of even closer ties between Yugoslavia and the USSR, it is unlikely at least for some time to come that Tito will associate himself formally with the Bloc. However, he will almost certainly seek to develop closer ties with the Satellites and will almost certainly side with the USSR on most major international issues. In particular, he will almost certainly be a willing and active exponent of policies designed to promote popular fronts, to woo the neutralist nations, to spread the concept of coexistence, and to gain converts for the Soviet stand on disarmament and European security. (Paras. 18–20)
3.
US ability to influence Yugoslav policy—never decisive at its strongest—has sharply declined and will probably continue to do so. It is unlikely that either a continuation of US aid or a threat to cut it off would restrain Tito from continuing to build up his ties with the Communist world. Nevertheless, Tito continues to look to the US for aid (notably substantial amounts of wheat and spare parts for US military equipment) and probably believes that the US will feel compelled to meet these requests in some degree to keep him from moving even closer to the Bloc. If he considered that the loss of US aid were imminent, he might make gestures to mollify the West but would probably not fundamentally alter his policy. (Paras. 25–26)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of the paper.]

  1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to notes on the cover sheet, “the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff,” and was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on July 24. NIE 31–56 supersedes NIE 31–2–55, Document 254.↩

  2. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this paragraph fails to give sufficient weight to the possibility that a covert arrangement with Moscow for partnership in the Soviet Bloc may have been made. He believes, therefore, that the second sentence should be deleted and the following substituted:

    “We consider it unlikely that Tito has come to a decision for overt acknowledgment of a partnership in the Soviet Bloc. However, the existence of a covert arrangement to this end cannot be discounted.” [Footnote in the source text.]

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