Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, May 16, 1956—8 p.m.

1407. Paris pass USCINCEUR, Knight and Wallner. Department pass Defense and DA. Embassy telegram 1392.²

1. In interview with Foreign Secretary today he opened by stating difficulties in military aid program had been fully reviewed with Tito and what he had to say represented latter’s considered views. Foreign Secretary thought recent difficulties were really of secondary importance but Yugoslav Government realized after my remarks to Prica³ it owed United States more careful explanation on political plane and how its policy affected military aid. Yugoslav Government was convinced, he said, both governments want to carry out announced military program which it believes is mutually advantageous. United States military aid has been and is of great importance to Yugoslavia and it would welcome [any] assurance United States can give that aid as programmed will be received and would appreciate as much information as we can give of delivery schedule in order it may properly do its part. It is true in history of our military collaboration that United States attaches importance to size AMAS staff for reasons explained and likewise that Yugoslav Government for other reasons has always wished to hold down size. But this attitude has not and does not today indicate any change of basic Yugoslav policy and he hoped we would accept his categorical assurance to the effect. It was on this fundamental postulate that he would later suggest how we would jointly implement October 1 memorandum.

2. On political plane Yugoslav policy vis-à-vis Soviets is obviously difficult. Yugoslav Government considers United States military assistance as positive element in its policy and neither government should underestimate effect of this aid in modifying Soviet policy. Yugoslav Government was convinced that fact itself of United States aid had resulted in changes of Soviet policy of far-reaching consequence. Yugoslav Government also freely admitted United States aid had enabled it to hold its own against East and thereby helped to bring about changes we are now witnessing. Perhaps our respective estimates on Soviet changes could differ, but Yugoslav Government could not underestimate importance of factor of United States military aid and, therefore, it had every interest to work out secondary problems. What Prica had meant was to ask United States not to render present Yugoslav policy vis-à-vis USSR more difficult, and try to settle our joint problems with understanding of Yugoslav position and difficulties. There were obviously difficulties for both sides in implementing military program but he had no wish to revive past controversies and Yugoslav Government wanted to clear the table and adjust immediately our present difficulties. He still thought it wise to defer our proposed conversations of future aid but this should not affect solution of secondary difficulties. In implementation of October 1 memorandum he, therefore, proposed following:

3. Yugoslav Government would approve at once five new personnel for AMAS. As deliveries under programs are resumed, Yugoslav Government will make no difficulty on personnel questions and will work them out with us. He would put in strong plea not to force the pace on new assignments for political reasons explained above, but these personnel questions could and would be worked out as program advanced.

4. Re future military aid, I replied I had only one caveat to avoid future misunderstanding. We had not pressed Yugoslav Government and indeed subject had been raised by Gosnjak. We stood ready to enter into discussions when Yugoslav Government was prepared. I merely wished to observe that as months went by time was lost as we had to prepare estimates well in advance and this type of planning could not be done in a vacuum. We had already witnessed effect of difficulties last year on announced military program. Foreign Secretary said he understood this point.

5. My estimate is that Yugoslav Government, after salutary jolt was received, has now receded in principle from its repudiation of parts of October 1 memorandum and wants to reestablish status quo ante on face-saving device of agreeing to increase in AMAS personnel as deliveries increase. Inasmuch as that is what we plan, I think we should not quarrel with it. No doubt we may have arguments in future on exact number of personnel, but I believe interviews with Foreign Secretary and Tempo have established validity of October 1 memorandum. As a part impending request for visas will represent replacement personnel over next three months and as exact composition of AMAS may, from our point of view, depend upon how future military aid develops, it seems to me we have gained our point and can now resume.

6. Recommend, therefore, suspension of delivery F–86–Es be lifted and effort made to deliver them on May 21. Personnel actions be resumed upon receipt advice from AMAS respecting movements scheduled for near future. Shipment support equipment for first-wing F–86–E can likewise be resumed.

7. Waters concurs foregoing.

8. Foreign Secretary then touched briefly on wheat problem expressing hope we could soon give some indication of what could be expected for fiscal year 1957. I explained once again we could not make commitments until Congress concludes action on 1957 MSP and increases ceiling for Public Law 480 sales.⁴ Foreign Secretary asked if in interim we could not begin preliminary discussions on economic aid program and inform Yugoslav Government as legislation progressed through Congress of what we thought possibilities on wheat were likely to be. I said I would inquire. He hoped that as we ironed out difficulties on military aid, we could proceed with economic aid discussions even though firm commitments could not yet be made.

9. If other recommendations this telegram approved, recommend we proceed as outlined Icato 256.⁵

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/5–1656. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris.
2. Dated May 14. (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/5–1456)
3. See telegram 1386, supra.
4. The administration requested an appropriation of $30 million for Yugoslavia under the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1957.
5. Icato 256 to Belgrade, May 5, stated that the United States could not provide additional commodities until Congress completed action on the fiscal year 1957 Mutual Security Program, but suggested that discussions on Yugoslavia’s needs could begin. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/5–556)